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Abstract 
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a major global public health concern. The Viet Nam 
National Action Plan on AMR recognised surveillance as one of critical components for 
control. However, the current AMR surveillance system (AMRSS) in Viet Nam is likely to be 
over-representing severe and hospital acquired infections (HAI), potentially resulting in an 
overestimation of resistance among community acquired infection (CAI). This thesis aims to 
evaluate the AMRSS in Viet Nam and to make suggestions to optimize the AMRSS 
effectiveness in providing accurate and representative AMR data for CAI patients in this 
setting. 
A systematic litterature review was conducted to generate an overview of the AMRSSs that 
have been implemented globally and any evaluations of such systems. There is no standardized 
framework or guidelines for conducting evaluation of AMRSS. Less than 10% of the systems 
reported some system evaluation, focusing on few attributes such as representativeness, 
timeliness, bias, cost, coverage, and sensitivity. This review highlighted the need for systematic 
evaluation to assess AMRSS performance and for developing specific methods, building on 
current evaluation guidelines, with additional attributes specific for AMR surveillance. 
An evaluation of the hospital-based VINARES (Viet Nam Resistance) AMRSS in Viet Nam 
in two time periods, 2012-2013 and 2016-2017, was carried out. The sensitivity of the AMRSS 
was in the 2-5% range and remained similar between the two periods. There was a delay in 
data submission from the hospitals, which affected surveillance timeliness. No evaluation of 
the surveillance system was carried out to identify problems and implement prompt resolutions. 
Data from these two periods showed increasing trends of resistance among key pathogen – 
antimicrobial combinations, and a lack of discrimination in resistance results between CAI and 
HAI patients. 
Optimization through modelling of the hospital based AMRSS was then carried out focusing 
on carbapenem resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae using baseline data from VINARES and 
employing model-based methodologies examining key attributes including accuracy, 
sensitivity, coverage, and representativeness with two assumptions: (1) hospitals of a same type 
(national, specialized and provincial) were similar; (2) resistant proportions were similar by 
type of hospitals for CAI while they varied for HAI. Overall, the results showed that the 
accuracy of AMR data is enhanced when the number of hospitals increases (0.6% decrease in 
mean squared error for one additional hospital (CI 0.6% - 0.7%)). For a given amount of budget, 
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the optimal numbers of hospitals by type can be determined using this modelling approach to 
identify a system with the best values for each performance attribute. 
The results indicate that the current AMRSS can increase the proportions of specialized and 
provincial hospitals to increase accuracy of data and system representativeness. The models 
were based on VINARES data, therefore the results are likely to be valid for an AMRSS with 
similar organizational structures and data collection protocols. The amount of budget that the 
government and foreign development partners are willing to spend on AMR surveillance is 
also an important factor in identifying the optimal hospital combination for the AMRSS. 
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Résumé en français 
 
Introduction 
La résistance aux antimicrobiens (AMR) est une préoccupation majeure de santé publique 
mondiale car elle peut restreindre les choix et augmenter les échecs de traitement, les coûts 
médicaux et les décès. Le fardeau de l’AMR est probablement plus élevé dans les pays à revenu 
faible ou intermédiaire (PRFI), tel le Viet Nam.  
Il existe un consensus général parmi les décideurs politiques et sanitaires sur les problèmes 
graves et croissants causés par l’AMR au Viet Nam. Un plan d'action national de lutte contre 
l’AMR a été approuvé pour la période 2013-2020, qui souligne l'importance des systèmes de 
surveillance systématique pour évaluer l'utilisation et la résistance aux antibiotiques. Cela est 
également conforme au plan de lutte mondial contre l’AMR lancé par l'Organisation mondiale 
de la santé (OMS) en 2015.  
 
Plusieurs programmes de surveillance de l’AMR ont été mis en œuvre au Viet Nam depuis la 
fin des années 80 avec un nombre variable d'hôpitaux participants, certains de ces programmes 
ont été soutenus par des organisations internationales. Le projet VINARES a été lancé en 2012 
dans le cadre d'une collaboration entre le Ministère de la Santé, l'Hôpital National pour les 
Maladies Tropicales, la Société Vietnamienne des Maladies Infectieuses, l'Unité de Recherche 
Clinique de l'Université d'Oxford - Viet Nam (OUCRU) et l'université de Linköping, Suède, 
ainsi que 16 hôpitaux à travers le pays. VINARES visait à soutenir le développement d'une 
gestion efficace des antimicrobiens et à renforcer le contrôle national de l'utilisation des 
antibiotiques dans le pays. En 2016, la deuxième génération de VINARES a été lancée et le 
réseau est désormais officiellement reconnu par le Ministère de la Santé comme le réseau 
national de surveillance de l’AMR. Cependant aucune évaluation du système de surveillance 
d’AMR n’a été réalisé au Viet Nam.  
 
Une des préoccupations en ce qui concerne l'évaluation de l'efficacité du système de 
surveillance de l’AMR est la surreprésentation probable des infections graves, y compris des 
infections nosocomiales (HAI), ce qui se traduit par une surestimation de la résistance aux 
infections nosocomiales (CAI). Ce problème limite l'utilité des données de surveillance de 
l’AMR pour informer le développement et la mise à jour des lignes directrices nationales et 
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locales sur l’utilisation des traitements antibiotiques. Avec notamment la possibilité d’observer 
une prescription excessive s'il n'est pas interprété et utilisé de manière appropriée par les 
médecins dans leur traitement. Par conséquent, mes recherches portent sur les questions 
d'évaluation des systèmes de surveillance de l’AMR et explorent les solutions pour améliorer 
leur efficacité et leur intérêt dans le contexte du Viet Nam, un PRFI. 
Buts et objectifs du travail de recherche 
Cette étude de doctorat vise à évaluer de manière systématique le système de surveillance de 
l’AMR (AMRSS) au Viet Nam et à développer un modèle d’AMRSS efficace et efficient en 
fournissant une estimation précise et représentative de la proportion de résistance chez les 
patients CAI. Plus précisément, les objectifs sont les suivants: 1) faire un état des lieux des 
système de surveillance de la résistance aux antimicrobiens dans le monde par une analyse 
systématique de la littérature et identifier les différentes caractéristiques opérationnelles 
pertinentes ainsi que les attributs d'efficacité affectant les performances du système; 2) évaluer 
de façon systématique le système de surveillance de l’AMR au Viet Nam au cours des deux 
périodes VINARES 2012-2013 et 2016-2017 afin d'identifier les attributs importants qui 
impactent les performances de surveillance dans le pays; 3) analyser les résultats des tests de 
sensibilité aux antibiotiques (AST) qui ont été soumis au système VINARES en 2012-2013 et 
2016-2017 pour fournir des données de référence et analyser l’évolution de la résistance aux 
antibiotiques au Viet Nam; 4) développer un modèle de classification pour estimer la 
proportion de patients par source d'infection (CAI et HAI) et les proportions de résistance 
spécifiques à chaque groupe pour les données VINARES; et 5) optimiser l'efficacité du système 
de surveillance de l’AMR au Viet Nam en ce qui concerne la précision et la représentativité 
des données d’AMR pour les patients CAI et ce en faisant varier les attributs clefs du système 
de surveillance identifiés précédemment. 
 
Je vise à répondre à deux hypothèses clés et questions de recherche : 
Hypothèse 1 : La proportion de résistance aux antibiotiques utilisée pour informer les directives 
locales de traitement est surestimée dans le système actuel de surveillance passive au 
laboratoire, car les diagnostics microbiologiques sont souvent réservés aux cas les plus graves 
et aucune métadonnée n'est collectée pour faire la distinction entre les infections 
communautaires (CAI) et nosocomiales (HAI) où la proportion de résistance aux antibiotiques 
est beaucoup plus élevée les derniers. 
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Question de recherche 1 : Comment estimer la proportion de résistance pour informer les 
directives locales de traitement pour les patients CAI? 
Hypothèse 2 : Les ressources humaines et économiques pour la surveillance de l’AMR au Viet 
Nam ne sont pas allouées de manière adéquate. Le résultat (proportion de la résistance aux 
antibiotiques) pourrait être affecté par le nombre d'hôpitaux et le type d'hôpital (national, 
spécifique et provincial) participant au système de surveillance. 
Question de recherche 2 : Comment pouvons-nous optimiser l'efficacité et le coût du système 
de surveillance de l’AMR au Viet Nam ? 
Résultats 
Revue littérature des systèmes de surveillance de l’AMR dans le monde 
Le nombre de systèmes de surveillance de l’AMR dans le monde a considérablement augmenté 
à la fin des années 90 ; la plupart des systèmes mis en place après 2010 sont des systèmes 
internationaux passifs (qui reçoivent les données des systèmes de surveillance nationaux). Ces 
systèmes peuvent être très différent, notamment en ce qui concerne les objectifs de 
surveillance, les agents pathogènes ciblés, le nombre d'hôpitaux participants, l'inclusion de 
laboratoires centraux / de référence, les normes d'interprétation des résultats de l'AST, les 
mesures de contrôle de la qualité, les informations sur la déduplication et l'intégration des 
informations cliniques. Ces variations entraînent des difficultés lors de l'agrégation des données 
et de la comparaison entre les régions. 
Il n'y a pas non plus de cadre et de lignes directrices normalisés pour mener une évaluation des 
systèmes de surveillance de l’AMR. Une évaluation des systèmes a été rapportée dans moins 
de 10% des cas, se concentrant sur quelques attributs tels que la représentativité, la rapidité, le 
biais, le coût, la couverture et la sensibilité. Les informations sur l'évaluation de ces attributs 
sont peu explicitées dans ces études. À l'exception de l'évaluation systématique du programme 
australien de surveillance du gonocoque (Australian Gonococcal Surveillance Programme), 
l'évaluation est présentée comme une analyse complémentaire plutôt qu'une évaluation 
systématique de l'ensemble du système de surveillance de l’AMR. Dans toutes les études, le 
contexte dans lequel s’inscrit la surveillance était également peu explicité. 
Cette revue a mis en évidence la nécessité d'une évaluation systématique pour évaluer les 
performances de l'AMRSS et peut-être la nécessité de développer des méthodes spécifiques 
  
ix 
 
s'appuyant sur les directives d'évaluation existantes avec la prise en compte d’attributs 
complémentaires spécifiques à la surveillance de l’AMR. 
Évaluation du système de surveillance de l’AMR au Viet Nam – basé sur VINARES 
Le réseau VINARES était opérationnel en tant qu'AMRSS en 2012-13 et 2016-17. Il est ensuite 
devenu le Système National de Surveillance de l’AMR et la collecte de données a repris en 
2018. 16 hôpitaux faisait partie du réseau VINARES en 2012 : 4 hôpitaux nationaux, 5 hôpitaux 
spécialisés et 7 hôpitaux provinciaux. En 2016, le nombre d'hôpitaux ayant soumis des données 
a été réduit à 13 avec 3 hôpitaux nationaux, 3 hôpitaux spécialisés et 7 hôpitaux provinciaux. 
Alors que la contribution des isolats des hôpitaux provinciaux est demeurée la même entre les 
2 périodes (44%) et des hôpitaux nationaux a augmenté de 10% en 2016-2017 par rapport à 
2012-2013. La représentativité géographique a également changé en raison des fluctuations du 
nombre d'hôpitaux, avec une sensibilité faible pour les deux périodes. Ces variations pourraient 
affecter les proportions globales de résistance estimées entre les deux périodes. 
Dans le cadre d'un protocole de surveillance passive, les laboratoires des hôpitaux inclus dans 
VINARES ont été invités à envoyer des données à l'unité centrale dans un délai spécifié 
(mensuel pour la première période et trimestriel pour la deuxième). La qualité et la cohérence 
des données ont été assurées par la formation, l'utilisation des directives Clinical & Laboratory 
Standards Institute (CLSI) traduites, l'inscription au UK-NEQAS et la soumission des données 
standardisées à l'aide de WHONET. Malgré cela, un délai dans la soumission des données des 
hôpitaux (10% de soumission dans un délai de 1 à 3 mois) a été observé, ce qui a affecté la 
rapidité du système de surveillance. Ce problème et de nombreux autres problèmes 
opérationnels peuvent être améliorés grâce à une évaluation régulière en temps réel du système 
de surveillance pour identifier les problèmes et mettre en œuvre des actions correctives rapides. 
 
Résultats de l'analyse des données AST du réseau de surveillance VINARES 
Au cours de la période 2012-2013, les données d'un total de 24 732 isolats cliniques dédoublés 
ont été signalés. Les bactéries les plus courantes : Escherichia coli (4437 isolats, 18%), 
Klebsiella spp. (3290 isolats, 13%) et Acinetobacter spp. (2895 isolats, 12%). La 
consommation moyenne d'antibiotiques à l'hôpital était de 918 doses quotidiennes définies 
(DDD) / 1000 jours-patients. Les céphalosporines de troisième génération étaient la classe 
d'antibiotiques la plus utilisée (223 DDD / 1000 jours-patients, 24%), suivies des 
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fluoroquinolones (151 DDD / 1000 jours-patients, 16%) et des céphalosporines de deuxième 
génération (112 DDD / 1000 patients -jours, 12%). Les proportions de résistance aux 
antibiotiques étaient élevées : 1098/1580 (69%) des isolats de Staphylococcus aureus étaient 
résistants à la méthicilline (MRSA); 115/344 isolats (33%) et 90/358 (25%). Streptococcus 
pneumoniae avait une sensibilité réduite à la pénicilline et à la ceftriaxone, respectivement. Un 
total de 180/2977 (6%) E. coli et 242/1526 (16%) K. pneumoniae étaient résistants à 
l'imipénème, respectivement ; 602/1826 (33%) Pseudomonas aeruginosa étaient résistants à la 
ceftazidime et 578/1765 (33%) à l'imipénème. 1495/2138 (70%) d’Acinetobacter spp. étaient 
résistants aux carbapénèmes et 2/333 (1%) à la colistine. 
 
Au cours de la période 2016-2017, 42553 isolats ont été inclus pour l’analyse ; dont 30222 
(71%) bactéries Gram-négatives et 12331 (29%) Gram-positives. 8793 (21%) provenaient 
d'USI et 7439 (18%) d'isolats provenaient d'infections invasives. 
E. coli et S. aureus étaient les espèces les plus fréquemment détectées avec respectivement 
9092 (21%) et 4833 isolats (11%) ; suivie de K. pneumoniae (3858 isolats - 9%) et 
Acinetobacter baumannii (3870 isolats - 9%). Les bactéries étaient principalement isolées des 
expectorations (8798 isolats - 21%), du sang (7118 isolats - 17%) et de l'urine (5202 isolats - 
12%). 
1824/2510 (73%) des isolats de S. aureus étaient MRSA. 99/290 (34%) d'Enterococcus 
faecium étaient résistants à la vancomycine. La proportion de S. pneumoniae résistant à la 
pénicilline était de 83% (657/794). La proportion d'E. coli portant de béta-lactamases à spectre 
élargi (ESBL) était de 59% (4085/6953) et de 40% (1186/2958) chez K. pneumoniae. La 
proportion de A. baumannii et P. aeruginosa résistants aux carbapénèmes était de 79% 
(2855/3622) et 45% (1514/3376), respectivement. La proportion de Haemophilus influenzae 
résistant à l'ampicilline était de 88% (804/911) parmi tous les isolats. 18/253 (7%) de 
Salmonella spp. et 7/46 (15%) de Shigella spp. étaient résistants aux fluoroquinolones. 
Une variation importante des profils de résistance a été observée entre les différents hôpitaux. 
Le nombre d'isolats soumis au cours de la période 2016-2017 était deux fois plus élevé qu'en 
2012-2013. Les proportions d’AMR détéctées étaient plus élevées en 2016-2017 pour la plupart 
des combinaisons pathogènes-antimicrobiens d'intérêt, y compris les entérobactéries 
résistantes aux imipénèmes, A. baumannii et P. aeruginosa. 
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Optimisation du système de surveillance de la RAM au Viet Nam 
L’optimisation de l’AMRSS au Viet Nam se base sur 3 hypothèses : (1) il existe trois types 
d'hôpitaux (national, spécialisé et provincial) similaires en termes taille de (admissions de 
patients, capacité en lits), proportion de CAI : HAI chez les patients présentant une infection 
et des proportions résistantes chez les patients CAI / HAI ; (2) la proportion de résistantes dans 
les CAI est similaire dans tous les types d'hôpitaux, tandis que celle dans les HAI varie selon 
le type d'hôpitaux. 
Sur la base d'un modèle de classification d'ensemble, 1216 (76%) des patients VINARES ont 
été classés comme ayant un CAI et 385 (24%) ayant un HAI. La proportion estimée de K. 
pneumoniae résistante aux carbapénèmes était de 9% pour le CAI et de 9% à 15% pour le HAI 
selon le type d'hôpitaux. L'erreur quadratique moyenne (MSE) de la proportion de résistants 
pour le CAI de VINARES 2012-2013, qui comprenait 4 hôpitaux nationaux, 5 hôpitaux 
spécialisés et 7 hôpitaux provinciaux, est de 2,27 x 10-4. 
Dans l'ensemble, le MSE diminue tandis que le nombre d'hôpitaux augmente (diminution de 
0,6% pour un hôpital supplémentaire en moyenne (IC 0,6% - 0,7%)), ce qui montre qu'un 
nombre plus élevé d'hôpitaux peut améliorer la précision des données sur l’AMR. Cependant, 
cela n'est correct que pour les hôpitaux spécialisés ou provinciaux : le MSE réduit de 1,8% (IC 
1,8% - 1,8%) et 2,2% (IC 2,2% - 2,2%) pour l'ajout d'un hôpital spécialisé et d'un hôpital 
provincial, respectivement ; mais le MSE augmente de 3,5% (IC 3,4% - 3,5%) pour l'ajout d'un 
hôpital national. En particulier, les combinaisons comprenant une proportion d'hôpitaux 
nationaux et spécialisés variant entre 0 et 33% ainsi qu’une proportion d’hôpitaux provinciaux> 
67% obtiennent le MSE le plus faible. La valeur la plus fable de MSE dans ces combinaisons 
est obtenue pour un nombre total d'hôpitaux de 43. 
La sensibilité et la couverture augmentent avec l’ajout d'un hôpital de plus, mais la vitesse 
d'augmentation ralenti avec l’augmentation de nombre d'hôpitaux. Par exemple, on observe 
une augmentation de 1,09 si on ajoute un hôpital dans un AMRSS ayant 11 hôpitaux, cette 
valeur est réduite à 1,05 fois dans un AMRSS ayant 20 hôpitaux. En ce qui concerne la 
représentativité, pour un nombre total fixe d'hôpitaux, la meilleure combinaison par type 
d'hôpital peut être identifiée en terme du plus haut niveau de représentativité. Par exemple, 
pour les combinaisons de 25 hôpitaux, la combinaison de 1 hôpital national, 7 hôpitaux 
spécialisés et 17 hôpitaux provinciaux (n = 25) était la plus représentative, et cela semblait 
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également être la plus représentative de toutes les combinaisons avec la plus petite valeur de 
Chi - statistique carrée. 
Le coût total de la surveillance pour VINARES 2012-2013 a été estimé à 386 milliers USD 
pour 24 mois. Le coût de l'unité centrale, d'un hôpital de référence et d'un hôpital participant 
était de 38 000, 21 300 et 7 300 USD par an, respectivement (avec une période de 5 ans 
présumée pour les coûts fixes initiaux). Le coût annuel augmente de 7300 USD avec l’ajout 
d’un hôpital supplémentaire, quel que soit le type d'hôpital. Le MSE diminue rapidement au 
début, mais le changement dans la courbe du MSE diminue plus lentement lorsque le coût 
supplémentaire dépasse 1 million USD. La sensibilité et le taux de couverture diminuent 
progressivement. Avec 830 000 USD rajoutés dans de budget de l'AMRSS, la MSE diminuerait 
de 50%. 
Pour une combinaison bactérie-antibiotique prioritaire donnée (K. pneumoniae – carbapénèmes 
dans cette thèse), avec un budget donné, le nombre optimal d'hôpitaux peut être déterminé en 
utilisant les attributs d'efficacité décrits ci-dessus. Pour un nombre donné d'hôpitaux, nous 
pouvons identifier la combinaison d'hôpitaux nationaux-provinciaux-spécialisés qui affiche la 
MSE la plus faible, la sensibilité la plus élevée et la représentativité la plus élevée (tableau 1). 
Tableau 1 : Liste des AMRSS optimales par nombre d'hôpitaux après sélection basée sur MSE, sensibilité et 
représentativité 
Nombre total 
d'hôpitaux  
AMRSS 
optimal (a) 
 
Coût de 
l'AMRSS 
($) 
Augmentation de 
la sensibilité (%) 
Augmentation de la 
couverture (%) 
Diminution 
de MSE 
 (%) 
Augmentation 
des coûts (%) 
12 1 : 6 : 5 153 600 107 111 90 84 
13 1 : 5 : 7 160 900 109 106 87 88 
14 1 : 4 : 9 168 200 103 103 80 92 
15 1 : 4 : 10 175 500 104 109 72 96 
16 1 : 5 : 10 182 800 118 119 64 100 
16(*) 04:05:07 182 800 100 100 100 100 
17 1 : 5 : 11 190 100 123 126 71 104 
18 1 : 11 : 6 197 400 166 175 70 108 
19 1 : 7 : 11 204 700 152 153 69 112 
20 1 : 7 : 12 212 000 154 155 61 116 
25 1 : 12 : 12 248 500 214 220 58 136 
30 1 : 7 : 22 285 000 191 204 43 156 
40 2 : 11 : 27 358 000 277 292 42 196 
50 1 : 13 : 36 431 000 342 352 38 236 
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60 1 : 19 : 40 504 000 435 448 36 276 
70 1 : 29 : 40 577 000 546 574 37 316 
(a) Ratio des hôpitaux National : Spécialisé : Provincial. (*) Combinaison de référence, qui était la combinaison 
des hôpitaux créés à VINARES en 2012 et reste la même dans l'actuel réseau national de surveillance de la 
résistance aux antimicrobiens. Le pourcentage d'augmentation / diminution des attributs d'efficacité a été comparé 
à cette combinaison de référence. 
 
Discussion et conclusion 
Dans cette recherche, j'ai utilisé diverses méthodes pour évaluer l'efficacité d'un système de 
surveillance de la résistance aux antimicrobiens dans le contexte vietnamien avec les données 
de référence du projet VINARES. VINARES et le système national de surveillance actuel 
utilisent une approche de surveillance passive, qui a été efficace pour obtenir des données d'un 
grand nombre d'hôpitaux à faible coût en utilisant les infrastructures de santé existantes. La 
surveillance passive est considérée comme une stratégie relativement peu coûteuse pour obtenir 
des informations sur la santé auprès de populations ayant une large couverture géographique, 
cependant, cette approche pose également des problèmes dans le contrôle de la qualité des 
données et dans la rapidité du système, car le système dépend fortement du personnel des 
hôpitaux participants pour effectuer l'activité de surveillance requise. Des évaluations 
systématiques périodiques du système de surveillance peuvent aider à garantir que le système 
fonctionne efficacement, que les informations fournies par le système sont utiles pour la 
pratique de la santé publique et que les ressources de santé sont dépensées de manière 
appropriée pour la surveillance. 
Malgré les limites intrinsèques à l'approche de surveillance passive et l'absence de métadonnées 
cliniques, les données collectées dans VINARES au cours des deux périodes 2012-2013 et 
2016-2017 ont fourni une description des proportions résistantes de bactéries importantes - 
combinaisons d'antibiotiques pour chacun des hôpitaux participants du réseau et pour tous les 
hôpitaux combinés, avec stratification par échantillon (le sang et la liquide cérébrospinal vs. 
autre) et par salle (Unités de Soins Intensifs (USI) vs. non USI). Ces données sont importantes 
pour comprendre la distribution et l'ampleur du problème de l’AMR dans les hôpitaux du Viet 
Nam. 
Comme souligné tout au long de cette thèse, un objectif important de la surveillance de la 
résistance aux antimicrobiens au Viet Nam est d'obtenir des informations précises sur les profils 
  
xiv 
 
de résistance pour éclairer les actions de contrôle et le traitement. Par conséquent, il est 
important d'identifier la combinaison d'hôpitaux qui fournissent des données avec moins de 
biais et une plus grande précision tout en économisant les ressources investies dans le système 
de surveillance. À l'aide de méthodes de simulation, j'ai identifié les solutions d'optimisation 
en fonction des principaux attributs et coûts d'efficacité et en faisant varier le nombre 
d'hôpitaux selon leur type. Les résultats ont montré qu’afin d'augmenter la précision et la 
représentativité du système, les proportions des hôpitaux spécialisés et provinciaux inclus dans 
le système devraient être augmentée  
Ces estimations sont basées sur les données VINARES, par conséquent, les résultats sont 
susceptibles d'être valables pour des systèmes de surveillance qui ont des structures 
organisationnelles et des protocoles de collecte de données similaires comme VINARES. Avec 
un cadre à ressources limitées comme le Viet Nam et de nombreux autres PRFI, cette 
méthodologie pourrait être appliquée pour optimiser les systèmes de surveillance avec un 
budget restreint. En substituant les données de référence correspondantes (nombre de types 
d'hôpitaux, nombre de patients avec CAI / HAI, nombre de patients porteurs d'isolats 
résistants), les attributs d'efficacité de ces systèmes de surveillance peuvent être évalués pour 
déterminer la structure la plus souhaitable. 
 
Il n'y a pas de solution unique pour la combinaison optimale d'hôpitaux. Cela dépend du budget 
que le gouvernement est prêt à dépenser pour la surveillance de l'AMR. L'approche que j'ai 
utilisée pour déterminer le rapport coût-efficacité des systèmes peut apporter une réponse à 
l'option qui conduirait aux meilleurs résultats pour atteindre les objectifs de la surveillance en 
prenant en compte la contrainte budgétaire. Bien que l'approche de surveillance passive 
présente des limites inhérentes, il s'agit d'une solution à long terme et à faible coût adaptée aux 
paramètres des PRFI comme le Viet Nam. 
Des initiatives continues sont mises en œuvre pour améliorer la surveillance de l’AMR au Viet 
Nam. Le Ministère de la Santé a reconnu VINARES comme réseau national de surveillance de 
la résistance aux antimicrobiens et la surveillance s’est poursuivie dans le cadre du projet pilote 
du Fonds Fleming (OUCRU) et de la subvention nationale (FHI360, PATH, NIHE, OUCRU) 
et du programme de sécurité sanitaire mondiale. Un protocole de surveillance des agents 
pathogènes de l’OMS GLASS avec ajout d'agents pathogènes spécifiques et la collecte 
simultanée de métadonnées cliniques limitées est également en cours d'élaboration. Grâce à ces 
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développements et à une mise en œuvre en continue, l'efficacité du système national de 
surveillance peut être encore améliorée et les données de surveillance de l’AMR peuvent être 
utilisées pour soutenir les actions de lutte contre l’AMR au Viet Nam. 
Depuis 2019, OUCRU et l'Hôpital national pour les maladies tropicales pilotent ACORN (A 
Clinically - Oriented Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network), avec des sites 
d'inscription supplémentaires au Laos et au Cambodge. ACORN combine la collecte de 
données cliniques et de laboratoire avec un feedback direct aux médecins locaux. Les données 
de ce projet pilote seront également utilisées dans notre modèle afin de trouver le réglage 
optimal pour un AMRSS étendu à l'avenir. 
En conclusion, les performances du système de surveillance de l’AMR au Viet Nam et son 
optimisation sont étroitement dépendantes de la structure du réseau des hôpitaux, l'approche de 
surveillance mise en œuvre, y compris la conception de protocoles de collecte de données pour 
inclure les métadonnées nécessaires, la surveillance simultanée et le feedback rapide des 
données aux participants. La mise en place d'une évaluation en continue pour identifier en 
temps opportun les problèmes et mettre en œuvre des résolutions d'amélioration dans les 
hôpitaux est primordiale. La structure actuelle comprenant 4 hôpitaux nationaux, 5 hôpitaux 
spécialisés et 7 hôpitaux provinciaux devrait être réexaminée avec une augmentation des 
proportions d'hôpitaux spécialisés et provinciaux pour améliorer la précision et la 
représentativité des données sur l’AMR. 
 
Sur la base des résultats de cette recherche et de la situation actuelle au Viet Nam, les 
recommandations suivantes sont avancées pour les prochaines étapes de l'amélioration du 
rapport coût-efficacité de la surveillance de la résistance aux antimicrobiens au Viet Nam et 
dans d'autres pays à faible revenu ou à faible revenu : 
• Élaborer un plan d'évaluation réaliste et pertinent à intégrer au réseau national de 
surveillance de la résistance aux antimicrobiens en place pour surveiller et améliorer 
régulièrement les performances techniques et l'efficacité du système. Il est également 
tout aussi important d’assurer que les données recueillies auprès du système de 
surveillance soient utilisées de manière appropriée et efficace pour améliorer le 
traitement antibiotique et contrôler les problèmes de l’AMR – et ainsi assurer l’impact 
de cette surveillance. 
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• La surveillance de l’AMR est l'une des stratégies importantes du plan d'action national 
de lutte contre l’AMR. Les données du système de surveillance de l’AMR devraient 
être utilisées pour la conception et l'évaluation des actions et des interventions 
nationales et locales pour s'attaquer aux problèmes de l’AMR, y compris l'élaboration 
de lignes directrices et d'outils de traitement pour les médecins des hôpitaux locaux. 
Ces données devraient donc être dans un format en libre accès, qui devrait être 
accessible pour la recherche et la mise en œuvre du programme ainsi que pour les 
praticiens locaux. 
• La conception du protocole national actuel de surveillance de la résistance aux 
antimicrobiens devrait être étendue pour inclure les informations cliniques clés de 
chaque patient, en particulier les informations sur l'origine de l'infection afin 
d'améliorer l'utilité des données de surveillance de la résistance aux antimicrobiens pour 
guider le traitement et élaborer des directives de traitement spécifiques. La faisabilité 
de cette extension doit être soigneusement évaluée sur la base des données d'ACORN 
et des preuves de la mise en œuvre de GLASS provenant d'autres pays. 
• Envisager d'autres composants ou alternatives de surveillance de l’AMR, y compris une 
approche de surveillance active et une approche intégrée de surveillance de la santé- 
prenant en compte les problématiques de l’AMR en santé animale. Une évaluation 
économique plus approfondie de ces composantes serait intéressante, y compris une 
analyse de l'impact budgétaire pour fournir plus d’évidences aux décideurs politiques 
dans leur prise de décision en termes d’optimisation de la surveillance de l’AMR. 
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General introduction 
 
 
The development of antimicrobial resistance 
What we classify today as antibiotics and antimicrobial substances are chemical compounds 
that bacteria and fungi have been producing for billions of years, before and during the 
evolution of humans. In addition, synthetically produced compound with antimicrobial activity 
are also included in this definition. Since the discovery of antibiotics, innumerable human lives 
have been saved from various infections, from common conditions such as urinary tract, skin 
and soft tissue infections, and pneumonia through to life-threatening conditions such as 
endocarditis, meningitis and sepsis [1]. Without antibiotics, routine and advanced medical 
procedures such as cancer treatment, organ transplants and open-heart surgery can be 
complicated with high risk of infection [2].  
As predicted by Alexander Fleming, who discovered penicillin, antimicrobial resistance 
(AMR) evolved alongside antibiotics, a phenomenon that was also discovered soon after the 
discovery of antibiotics: clinical penicillin resistance was described within 10 years after its 
wide-scale introduction [3]. AMR is a naturally occurring evolutionary phenomenon in 
response to exposure to antimicrobials. Resistance conferring genes have been described in 
ancient DNA from far before the use of antimicrobials by humans [4]. All microorganisms, 
including bacteria, viruses, parasites and fungi have evolved resistance against the 
antimicrobial agents humans are using to treat their infections, and this hinders successful 
treatment of the most important human infections such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
Throughout this thesis I will focus on bacteria and antimicrobial resistance among bacteria 
only, excluding mycobacteria. 
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The spread of AMR over the world 
The widespread use of antibiotics in humans and animals can potentially lead to a form of 
ecological imbalance whereby resistant strains survive and spread globally and across 
populations more efficiently than sensitive strains [5]. In addition to the antibiotic consumption 
in human and animals, a number of other factors also contribute to the world-wide increase of 
antimicrobial resistance among bacteria, including inadequate healthcare diagnostics capacity 
and infection control practices, lack of clean water and effective sewage systems and high 
population densities [6]. The spread and persistence of resistant bacterial species in the 
agricultural industrial complex also present a great challenge for the control of AMR attributed 
by complex and interconnected factors including antimicrobial usage and biosecurity and 
disease control practices on farms [7]. AMR has become a worldwide problem that was further 
enhanced by increasing transmission through movement of people, animals and food across 
international boundaries [8]. Resistance has made infections more difficult or impossible to 
treat, has resulted in increased mortality, prolonged illness in people and animals, increased 
healthcare costs, and production losses in agriculture, livestock and aquaculture [9,10]. 
Therefore, an integrated and multi-sectoral one-health approach to combat AMR has been 
proposed in the literature [11]. 
The health and economic impact of AMR 
The problems caused by AMR through reducing treatment options are the main source of 
global concern for population health, healthcare systems, and national income [12]. The 
increases in number and global distribution of resistant pathogens pose a huge threat to global 
health; resistant infections frequently result in longer hospital stays, higher medical costs, and 
increased mortality. The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance reports that by 2050, there will 
be ten million deaths a year attributable to AMR [1]. Despite criticism on the assumptions and 
methodologies used for estimating the burden of AMR [13], these estimates continue to be 
quoted to show the size of the burden that can be caused by AMR. However, there is still a 
large gap in our understanding of the burden of AMR due to the limited and unreliable data 
available, particularly from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [14]. The contribution 
of use of antimicrobials in livestock production on the burden of resistance for public health is 
also not quantified yet [15,16]. 
With a higher incidence of infectious diseases, often poorly functioning public health 
infrastructure, unrestricted and poorly regulated antibiotic sales and use, and lack of reliable 
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AMR surveillance data, the burden of AMR is likely to be higher in LMICs [17–19], including 
Viet Nam. This can also have consequences to other parts of the world because globalization 
increases the vulnerability of any country to diseases occurring in other countries [20] and 
international travel is a risk factor for the acquisition of infections with multidrug-resistant 
bacteria [21,22]. 
Compared to the 23,000 deaths (7 per 100 000 inhabitants) estimated to be attributable to drug 
resistant bacterial infections in the USA [23] and the 25,000 deaths (5 per 100 000 inhabitants) 
in the European Union [24], much more attributable deaths were estimated in Asia, despite the 
limited data available from Southeast Asia [25]. In Thailand (population of 66 million), based 
on retrospective data from hospitals, a total of 38,481 deaths (58 per 100 000 inhabitants) were 
estimated to be caused by hospital acquired resistant infections alone in 2010 [26]. 
The World Bank estimated a cost of US$ 1–3.4 trillion each year by 2030 to the global economy 
if the AMR problem is not contained, and the cost will be the highest for LMICs with 
significant drops in their economic growth [27]. Based on the framework of the Review on 
Antimicrobial Resistance’ [12], two modelling studies also provided estimated costs of over 
$14 billion to over $3 trillion in loss attributed to AMR to the global GDP by 2050 [28,29]. 
AMR in Viet Nam 
Located in Southeast Asia, a hot spot for emerging infectious diseases and AMR [19], Viet 
Nam faces alarming increases in AMR among many organisms with rates among the highest 
in the region and the world [30].  
An analysis of the situation from 2010 and 2013 showed the first overall picture of antibiotic 
use with unregulated and unrestricted access and increasing burden in Viet Nam [31]. At that 
time, oral second and third generation cephalosporins were the most commonly sold and 
prescribed antibiotics, followed by oral broad-spectrum penicillins, macrolides/azalides and 
fluoroquinolones. Furthermore, with the increasing usage of injectable cephalosporins and 
carbapenems in hospitals, antibiotics continue to account for a large share in hospital treatment 
expenditures [31].  
Resistance rates have increased among many organisms in the past two decades. For example, 
an Asian Network for Surveillance of Resistant Pathogens (ANSORP) study, carried out in 
Asian countries, reported penicillin-resistance to increase from 8% to over 70% between 1995 
and 2000 among community-acquired invasive pneumococci [32]. Between 2004-2006, 
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methicillin resistance was found among 30% of community acquired and 74% of hospital 
acquired Staphylococcus aureus infections, according to an another ANSORP study [33]. 
Among S. aureus bloodstream infections, 19% were found to be methicillin resistant in 2008-
2009 (n=80) [2].  
The Comparative Activity of Carbapenem Testing (COMPACT) II study found that high rates 
of resistance were also reported among 1,260 Gram-negative pathogens isolated from 
hospitalized patients at 20 centres in five Asia-Pacific countries including 3 in Viet Nam [34]. 
Data from Viet Nam showed the proportion of Enterobacteriaceae producing extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) was 44% among isolates from non-critical care and 81% from 
critical care patients (n = 71) [34]. Carbapenem resistance in Pseudomonas aeruginosa  and 
Acinetobacter baumannii was also detected in particularly high proportions in this study, (47%, 
42/90) and (89%, 17/19), respectively. There was a dramatic increase in nalidixic acid 
resistance from 4% to 97% among 1,393 isolates of Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi isolated 
in 4 hospitals in southern Viet Nam between 1993 and 2005 [35]. 
There is an overall consensus among the political and medical leadership on the serious and 
growing problem caused by AMR in Viet Nam. A National Action Plan to combat AMR has 
been approved for the 2013-2020 time period, which outlines the importance of systematic 
surveillance systems to monitor antibiotic use and resistance [31]. This is also in accordance 
with the Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance launched by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in the year 2015 [36].   
AMR surveillance: a critical element for efficient AMR control 
Widely acknowledged as one of critical components in the global and national response to 
control AMR, there have been a number of international and national efforts to implement 
AMR surveillance systems / activities. Strengthening evidence-based decision-making through 
enhanced surveillance and research is one of the five strategic objectives of the Viet Nam 
National Action Plan and the Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance [36]. WHO 
recommended that a national AMR surveillance system should be developed in every member 
state to systematically collect and analyse AMR data for defined key organisms in healthcare 
and community settings, and to detect and report emerging resistance of public health concern.  
The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) have defined public 
health surveillance as “the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
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dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in public health action to reduce 
morbidity and mortality and to improve health” [37]. An effective surveillance system therefore 
must provide chronological data that are consistent and comparable across sites and regions 
and accurately describe and monitor a health event to inform timely control actions [38].  
The strategic objective of surveillance in the Global Action Plan was consolidated through the 
WHO’s establishment of the Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS) 
to enable the collection of standardized, comparable and validated data on AMR to support the 
global and national action plans to combat AMR [39]. Strengthening global AMR surveillance 
is critical to inform global strategies, monitor the effectiveness of public health interventions, 
and detect new trends and threats [8]. According to US CDC recommendations, an AMR 
surveillance system should tracks changes in microbial populations, permits the early detection 
of resistant strains of public health importance, and support the prompt notification and 
investigation of outbreaks [37]. Data from surveillance can help countries to detect the 
emergence of AMR and provide necessary information to guide clinical decision-making and 
inform treatment guidelines, identify target populations, trends over time and informs the 
development and implementation of policy and interventions and serve as a benchmark for 
measuring their impact [27]. 
AMR surveillance worldwide 
Soon after the recognition of the emergence of resistance, surveillance has been set up to 
monitor resistance as part of disease-specific programs such as for tuberculosis, malaria, 
HIV/AIDS and influenza. Surveillance programs targeting resistance among important 
bacterial pathogens are more recent. The first report from WHO in 2014 shows a diverse picture 
of the status of AMR surveillance worldwide [8]. By 2014, accross the WHO regions, 
longstanding regional surveillance and collaboration had only been established in the European 
Region and the Region of the Americas. In other countries, there were only individual 
surveillance sites or programs with small numbers of tested isolates per bacterium. AMR 
surveillance in most countries is based on routine samples often taken from hospitalized 
patients and as microbiological investigations are often underused and reserved for patients 
with more severe or unresponsive illness, has an over-representation of severe infections and 
includes both community- and hospital acquired infections [8].  
Following the WHO report on surveillance, GLASS was lauched and, as of December 2018, 
had 71 countries enrolled as shown in a report on the early implementation of GLASS [40]. 
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Data on selected priority bacteria causing human infections including Acinetobacter spp., 
Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Neisseria gonorrhoeae, Salmonella spp., Shigella 
spp., S. aureus, and Streptococcus pneumoniae were collected through a case-finding 
surveillance system. This system focuses on priority specimens including blood, urine, stool, 
and cervical and urethral specimens sent to laboratories for clinical purposes and accompanied 
by population data such as the overall number of patients tested per specific specimen, age, 
gender and infection origin which can be used to define whether the infection has been 
contracted in hospital or from the community. The increasing number of countries enrolled in 
this system has shown a collective understanding and active participation of countries in the 
global effort to control AMR [40].   
Since AMR has now become a worldwide problem not only for human but also animal health, 
international recommendations have been made by The Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and WHO on 
integrated surveillance systems in humans, food-producing animals and food –commonly 
referred to as One Health surveillance [41–44]. In 2014, this integrated surveillance has only 
been initiated in 9 high income countries [8], e.g. DANMAP of Denmark [45] or 
NORM/NORMVET of Norway [46]. 
 
Challenges in AMR surveillance 
The WHO report from 2014 also pointed out the gaps in current AMR surveillance [8]. 
Although there have been successful surveillance programs on specific bacterial pathogens, 
many gaps and challenges remain, including the lack of surveillance for a number of important 
common pathogens, the lack of common standards for methods, data sharing, and coordination 
between the programs. Other reports also pointed out limitations inherent in most surveillance 
systems, including the conventional laboratory-based ones, such as the undetermined nature of 
the isolate (causative, colonizing or contaminant), the lack of information on the source and 
type of infection (community or hospital acquired), or duplication of microbiological reports 
[47,48]. Additionally, current AMR surveillance programs are limited, as clinical and 
demographic metadata, which are important for better understanding of relevance and 
representativeness, are often lacking [38]. Most AMR surveillance reports are from Europe. A 
recent review showed many variations in the surveillance protocols including the types of 
microbiological samples monitored and the criteria for susceptibility intepretation in 42 
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regional and national systems in 20 countries. Importantly, none of these systems collected 
outcome data; and most were using the proportion of resistant isolates as one and often the only 
indicator (in 43% of systems) [49]. 
GLASS does not recommend the use of laboratory-based surveillance only, which has 
nonetheless been very commonly used to monitor AMR, as this approach does not provide 
information of the population. GLASS recommends 2 main types of surveillance approaches, 
which should include data on AMR combined with patient and microbiological information: 
case finding based on priority specimens sent routinely to laboratories (passive surveillance) 
and case-based surveillance of clinical syndromes (active surveillance) [39]. The former 
approach allows clinical data to be combined with microbiological data, which provides critical 
elements to ensure meaningful recommendations to take actions (e.g. monitoring, evaluation 
and de-duplication of data). 40 national reports were sent to GLASS in the first data call in 
2017, which included 5 (12.5%) sample-based (provide both basic insight into patterns and the 
extent of AMR in the tested populations) and 35 (87.5%) isolate-based (provides data on 
resistance patterns within the bacterial population) systems [50]. However, this additional 
collection of data also requires additional investment of time and resources compared to the 
passive laboratory-based systems. In a recent study using GLASS recommendations, the 
collected data were shown to be informative for developing antimicrobial treatment guidelines 
for patients suspected of having bacteremia [47]. Since additional clinical and antimicrobial 
consumption data were also collected, this program could provide useful information on the 
attributable burden of AMR including mortality and costs.  
AMR surveillance evaluation 
There is limited literature on the evaluation of different aspects of AMR surveillance systems. 
The WHO, FAO and OIE have recently released a framework and recommended indicators for 
monitoring and evaluation of the Global Action Plan on AMR, which also contains indicators 
for the surveillance component.  Surveillance related output indicators mainly include countries 
that report to GLASS and the percentage of hospitals where AMR data are collected on a 
regular basis to local prescribing hospital-based physicians, at the regional or local level [51]. 
There are a small number of individual studies that evaluated the performance and effectiveness 
of local AMR surveillance systems using various and inconsistent evaluation approaches [52–
55].  
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Evaluation is “the systematic and objective assessment of the relevance, adequacy, progress, 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a course of action, in relation to objectives and taking 
into account the resources and facilities that have been deployed” [56]. Evaluation of 
surveillance systems is critically important because it can assess if the systems have been 
effective in achieving the predefined surveillance objectives and if they have performed in an 
efficient manner [57]. The costs of setting up and maintaining a surveillance system need to be 
justified against the benefits that data generated from the system can provide. Evaluation can 
help identify areas for improvement in surveillance methods and result in cost savings for the 
surveillance system [58]. Evaluation of human health surveillance systems typically includes 
an assessment of a range of attributes as seen in several existing generic guidelines [59–61]. 
For example, the guidelines developed by the US CDC suggest ten attributes for evaluation: 
simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, sensitivity, positive predictive value, 
representativeness, timeliness, stability and usefulness [59]. Studies evaluating surveillance 
systems often focused on a subset of attributes deemed relevant for the context under evaluation 
[57]. A description of the structure of a surveillance system has to be derived in order to 
understand the surveillance process, select relevant attributes and provide relevant 
recommendations [62]. 
 
Problem statement for the research included in my thesis 
In Viet Nam, there have been several AMR surveillance programs since the late 1980s with 
varying numbers of participating hospitals, some of these programs were supported by 
international organizations. These include the National Program for Surveillance of Antibiotic 
Resistance (NPSAR), the Global Antibiotic Resistance Partnership (GARP), Surveillance of 
Antibiotic Resistance (SOAR), Viet Nam Resistance (VINARES) I and II, and the current 
National AMR Surveillance Network (supported through the Fleming Fund pilot and country 
grant and the Global Health Security Agenda).  
VINARES was initiated in 2012 as a collaboration between the Ministry of Health, the National 
Hospital for Tropical Diseases, the Vietnamese Infectious Diseases Society, the Oxford 
University Clinical Research Unit, Viet Nam (OUCRU) and Linköping University, Sweden, 
together with 16 hospitals across the country. VINARES aimed to support the development of 
effective antimicrobial stewardship and strengthen national evidence-based control of 
antibiotic use in the country. In 2016, the second generation of VINARES was started and the 
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network is now formally recognized by the Ministry of Health as the National AMR 
Surveillance Network. Despite the successful continuation and upgrading of the VINARES 
network to the national network, there has not been any evaluation of past AMR surveillance 
systems in the country.  
Surveillance is among the key strategies in the National Action Plan to combat AMR. Despite 
initial achievements in AMR data collected from the hospital networks, these data have been 
discontinuous and mostly dependent on external funding for data submission and quality 
control. Given the already tightened healthcare budget allocation in a LMIC setting like Viet 
Nam, identifying conditions under which the national surveillance system would perform 
efficiently and effectively in achieving the surveillance objectives will be critical for the 
implementation and evaluation of the National Action Plan. Evaluation of AMR surveillance 
systems in Viet Nam will provide practical data for the government and foreign development 
partners to justify their resource allocation and make appropriate decisions on further 
investments on the surveillance system in the country. The results of evaluation will also be 
useful for improving the design of the system to make it more efficient and effective. 
In addition, through the viewing and analysis of the data collected from the AMR surveillance 
programs, it can be seen that these data currently do not contain population metadata and patient 
clinical information required to identify the origin of infection. Therefore, AMR data cannot 
be separated into hospital-acquired infections (HAI) and community-acquired infections 
(CAI). This issue, together with likely over-representation of severe infections leads to a 
problem of overestimation of resistant proportions for use in informing the development and 
updating of national and local antibiotic treatment guidelines. If this is not interpreted and used 
appropriately, data generated from existing AMR surveillance systems can contribute to over-
prescription of broad-spectrum and reserved antibiotics in response to the reported higher 
resistance rates.  
Research aim and objectives  
The research presented in this thesis aims to systematically evaluate the AMR surveillance 
system (AMRSS) in Viet Nam and develop an AMRSS model that is effective and cost-
effective in providing an accurate and representative estimate of resistant proportions among 
patients with CAI. 
Specific objectives are to: 
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· Systematically review the literature to obtain an overview of the current status of AMR 
surveillance and identify relevant technical and operational aspects and effectiveness 
attributes affecting system performance in the studies reporting the implementation and 
evaluation of AMR surveillance systems in the world  
· Systematically evaluate the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam in two periods 2012-
2013 and 2016-2017 to identify the important attributes affecting surveillance 
performance in the country, using data collected from VINARES and applying two 
evaluation tools that have been considered as providing a flexible and detailed 
framework for evaluation of surveillance systems. 
· Analyse the antimicrobial susceptibility testing results that have been submitted to 
VINARES in 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 to provide baseline data and describe trends 
in the resistant proportions in Viet Nam. 
· Develop a classification model to estimate the proportion of patients by origin of 
infection (CAI or HAI) and resistant proportions specific to each group for the 
VINARES data to be used in optimizing the effectiveness of AMR surveillance system 
in Viet Nam. 
· Optimize the effectiveness of AMR surveillance in Viet Nam in providing accurate and 
representative AMR data for CAI patients by varying the key system parameters 
representing the important surveillance attributes. 
 
Research hypotheses and questions 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of antibiotic resistance for informing local treatment guidelines 
is overestimated in the current passive laboratory-based surveillance system since 
microbiology diagnostics are under-used and often reserved for more severe and unresponsive 
cases and no metadata are collected to distinguish between community- and hospital-acquired 
infections (HAI), while the proportion of antibiotic resistance in HAI is much higher than in 
CAI.  
Research question 1: How to estimate the proportion of resistance to inform local treatment 
guidelines for patients with CAI? 
Hypothesis 2: Human and economic resources for AMR surveillance in Viet Nam are not 
adequately allocated. The result (resistant proportion) could be affected by the number of 
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hospitals and the types of hospitals (national, specific and provincial) participating in the 
surveillance system. 
Research question 2: How can we optimize the effectiveness and cost and effectiveness of 
AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam? 
Thesis outline 
This thesis consists of four chapters, each of these was written in a manuscript format. 
In Chapter 1, I present the results of a systematic literature review of the AMR surveillance 
systems in public health that have been implemented globally. I summarize the information on 
all identified AMR surveillance systems, identify the gaps in the current literature on AMR 
surveillance overall and highlight the lack of systematic evaluation of such systems to help 
improve their performance and effectiveness.  
Following the findings from Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I focus on evaluation of an AMR 
surveillance system in Viet Nam (VINARES) during two time periods, 2012-2013 and 2016-
2017. Despite the existence of several surveillance projects in the past, VINARES was selected 
for evaluation in this chapter because of available information on the organization, functioning, 
costs and performance of system in the two time periods. In this chapter I point out the strengths 
and weaknesses of this surveillance network and identify the areas for improvement that can 
be considered for the National AMR Surveillance Network.  
In Chapter 3 I describe the findings from the analysis of antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
data collected in VINARES in the two time periods. I present the resistant proportions of nine 
priority pathogen-antimicrobial combinations and a comparison of data between the two time 
periods. These data can be used as a baseline for monitoring the AMR trends and evaluation of 
interventions to control AMR in Viet Nam. 
In Chapter 4 I assess the effectiveness and cost of an AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam 
by varying the key system parameters. A number of potential AMR surveillance models were 
generated using baseline data from VINARES. Modelling results show how the effectiveness 
of an AMR surveillance system changes when the numbers of the different types of 
participating hospitals change and under what conditions a balance between effectiveness and 
costs is reached to give the best outcome in the most cost-effective manner.  
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In each chapter, I have included a discussion on the significant findings and study strengths 
and limitations. In the concluding chapter, key research findings throughout the PhD program 
are recapped and linked back to the research hypotheses and questions stated at the beginning 
of the study. I conclude with a number of recommendations for future research and 
implementation of AMR surveillance in Viet Nam and beyond. 
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Chapter 1 
 
A systematic review of antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance systems 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The development of antimicrobials have put an environmental pressure on bacteria 
selecting mutations allowing them to survive. This evolution results in antimicrobial 
resistance that hinders the treatment of infectious diseases. The use of antimicrobials, 
whether appropriate or inappropriate, is considered the main driving force speeding up 
the development of resistance among bacteria against antimicrobials [2]. Examples of 
inappropriate use include using antimicrobials for growth promotion in agriculture, using 
antimicrobials for viral infections or naturally resistant bacterial species, using too broad 
spectrum antimicrobials, using an incorrect dose or using antimicrobials for an 
insufficient or excessive duration [63]. Resistance among bacteria causing infections 
difficult or impossible to treat, results in increased mortality, prolonged illnesses in people 
and animals, increased healthcare costs, and production losses in agriculture, livestock 
and aquaculture [10,64]. 
Surveillance has long been recognised as one of the important tools to understand the 
problem and support the fight against AMR [65]. The US CDC have defined public health 
surveillance as “the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in public health action to 
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reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health” [37]. An effective surveillance 
system therefore must provide chronological data that are consistent and comparable 
across sites and regions and accurately describe and monitor a health event to inform 
timely control actions [38]. As stated by US CDC, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance 
(AMR) tracks changes in microbial populations, permits the early detection of resistance, 
and supports the prompt notification and investigation of outbreaks [37]. Surveillance 
provides information for clinical decision-making, guides policy recommendations and 
to assess the impact of resistance containment interventions [37]. 
Surveillance systems usually employ a passive and/or active approach [66]. Passive 
surveillance is a widely used approach, defined as “the ongoing monitoring of infections, 
based on diagnostic isolates submitted from clinically diseased individuals or groups”. 
This approach is usually less costly, however, many biases can arise including lack of 
representativeness (collected data may not reflect the characteristics of the target 
populations), variation in reporting practices, outbreak occurrence, the issue of multiple 
isolates per individual being submitted, different laboratory methods, and lack of data on 
useful denominator information (e.g. number of samples tested but found negative). On 
the other hand, active surveillance, defined as “the planned collection of targeted and 
representative samples” is usually more costly but can provide more representative 
estimates of the target populations [66].  
Under WHO classifications of surveillance systems [67], passive surveillance involves  
regular reporting of disease data by all institutions that see patients (or test specimens) 
and are part of a reporting network, while  active surveillance is defined as the planned 
collection of targeted and representative samples. A third type of surveillance was also 
considered, called sentinel surveillance. This is used when high-quality data are needed 
but cannot be obtained from the passive surveillance system; it is set up by deliberately 
selecting the reporting sites that have high probability of seeing cases of the disease under 
question. 
In general, objectives of AMRSS at the national level can be grouped into the following 
categories [68]: 
· to monitor trends in infection and resistance,  
· to develop standard treatment guidelines,  
· to assess resistance containment interventions,  
 A systematic review of AMR surveillance systems  
 
15 
 
· to provide an early alert for novel resistant strains,  
· to promptly identify and control outbreaks.  
Moreover, an AMRSS can be established to link information on AMR from different 
sectors, such as human, animal, food, agriculture, environment, and data on antimicrobial 
consumption in human and animal populations and environmental antimicrobial usage 
[69]. Another objective of AMRSS was to study susceptibility patterns of bacteria to 
targeted antimicrobials.  
In response to the alarming increase of AMR, WHO has launched the Global Action Plan 
on Antimicrobial Resistance in the year 2015 with five strategic objectives; one of which 
is to strengthen evidence-based decisions through enhanced surveillance and research 
[36]. Following this, the Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS) 
was launched by WHO in the same year to enable the collection of standardized, 
comparable and validated data on AMR to support the global and national action plans to 
combat AMR [39]. As emphasized by WHO, there is still a big gap in our understanding 
of the spread, evolution and impact of AMR; and strengthening global AMR surveillance 
is critical to inform global strategies, monitor the effectiveness of public health 
interventions, and detect new trends and threats [8]. 
Characteristics of a relevant AMR surveillance system were the topic of a discussion 
panel in 2000, consisting of experts in clinical microbiology, infectious diseases, 
epidemiology, statistics, antimicrobial development. These systems “should be able to 
detect significant differences and shifts in susceptibility to various antibacterial agents, 
and the information derived from them should reach as many interested parties as 
possible in a timely manner”, whether focusing especially on few organisms or covering 
many diseases or organisms [65]. Thus, AMR surveillance systems need to be sufficiently 
sensitive to identify changes in susceptibility to inform treatment decisions and 
interventions to control resistance. The information obtained from such surveillance 
systems can help identify any new trends and emergence of resistance in targeted 
pathogens and agents and inform alternative therapies for treatment and strategies to 
control and prevent resistance from further development and spread [65].  
The requirements for an effective AMR surveillance system have been identified for 
nearly two decades, consisting of components related to the program design, 
methodology, clinical aspects, and dissemination [38]. More precisely, an effective 
 A systematic review of AMR surveillance systems  
 
16 
 
program should (1) be longitudinal, comprehensive, independent and incorporating a 
quality assurance system for program management; (2) have standardized specimen and 
testing protocols, centralized laboratory testing, quantitative determination for wide range 
of antimicrobials, determination of resistance mechanisms, assessment of antimicrobial 
usage and resistance, and quality control for testing and data analysis; (3) have guidelines 
for inclusion of patients and specimens, collection and integration of clinical and 
demographical data and guidelines for intepretation of surveillance data; (4) have easy 
access to up-to-date data and ability to perform custom analyses. AMR surveillance also 
should include appropriate denominator data and clinical metadata in order to estimate 
the proportion of AMR among different pathogens and clinical diagnoses [70]. 
There have been few reviews on AMR surveillance systems around the world. The most 
commonly cited review is the one reported by WHO in 2014 which pointed out many 
gaps and challenges such as a lack of common standards for methods, data sharing, and 
coordination between the program [8]. There was a more recent systematic review 
focusing on the methodology of surveillance on AMR and healthcare associated 
infections; however it focused on European countries only. This review showed that the 
European systems varied widely in the types of microbiological samples and 
susceptibility intepretation as well as outcome indicators [49]. In 2018, a review of Ashley 
E.A. et al. about supranational antimicrobial resistance surveillance networks involving 
low- and middle-income countries since 2000 highlighted that the biggest challenges 
faced by these networks has been achieving high coverage, complying with the 
recommended frequency of reporting and obtaining high quality, representative 
surveillance data [71]. 
Therefore we conducted this systematic review of the AMR surveillance systems that 
have been implemented globally, looking at their organisation, performance and 
evaluation protocols and outputs. We aimed to identify relevant technical and operational 
aspects and effectiveness attributes that could affect the performance of AMR 
surveillance systems around the world, and review the evaluation processes that have 
been used for these systems. 
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1.2. Methods 
1.2.1. Literature sources and search strategy 
A systematic literature search was performed following key principles of PRISMA 
requirements (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) 
[72] using PubMed, Web of Science and Google Scholar to identify articles. 
Supplementary table S1.1 listed requirements which were applied and explained those 
that were not applicable in this systematic review. Searched items were restricted to 
articles published in English and French (two foreign languages known by the reviewer) 
until December 31st of 2017.  
Four domains were included in the search, with several keywords for each: surveillance 
(“surveillance or report or monitor”), system (“system or network or program or 
programme”), antimicrobial (“antibiotic or antimicrobial”) and resistance (“resistance or 
resistant”). 
Articles from references of selected papers were identified and were subsequently added 
to the review. 
1.2.2. Article selection 
Two screening phases were carried out to select articles. In the first phase, articles were 
screened by titles and abstracts which included AMR surveillance systems information. 
In the second phase the articles were screened based on the full-text and excluded 
according to the following exclusion criteria:  
1) does not mention any of these terms: antimicrobial, antibiotic, resistance, 
surveillance;  
2) only describes the trend/pattern/distribution of resistant bacteria;  
3) only presents results of an AMR surveillance system- not describing the system 
itself;  
4) only describes the techniques/methods for AMR diagnostic;  
5) only emphasizes the importance of AMR surveillance system in general, without 
describing any specific system;  
6) only describes the association between the antimicrobial consumption (AMC) and 
AMR;  
7) only describes the treatment of infections caused by resistant bacteria;  
8) only presents microbiological information; and 
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9) a systematic review which did not cover AMR surveillance system organisation 
and evaluation. 
1.2.3. Data selection and analysis 
The following data were retrieved from the articles included in the review: surveillance 
level (international or national), country(ies) included, surveillance type (sentinel, active 
or passive), surveillance field (human or animal health), collection of antimicrobial 
consumption data, target of investigation (pathogens, antimicrobial agents and types of 
microbiological samples), denominator information, laboratory quality control method, 
performance standard for AST interpretation (Clinical & Laboratory Standards Institute 
(CLSI) [73], European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) 
[74] or local standard) and outcome parameters. For the articles that provided information 
on the evaluation of the surveillance systems, additional data were retrieved including the 
type of evaluation (performance, functional or economic), the attributes assessed 
(representativeness, timeliness, acceptability, flexibility, sensitivity, simplicity, bias, 
completeness of reporting, level of coverage, protocol quality, quality of data, utility of 
surveillance data and cost), the evaluation standards, the evaluation methods, and the 
main evaluation results. 
The AMRSS were classified by human versus animal, national versus international, or 
community versus hospital-based. For each system, the objectives, surveillance methods, 
strengths and weaknesses were identified based on the information reported in the 
included articles. The main analysis focused on hospital-based AMRSS and forms the 
baseline of my PhD project. 
1.3. Results 
1.3.1. Article selection 
1810 articles were identified by the literature search and 197 were retrieved for full text 
screening. After full-text screening, 127 articles were excluded. Among the excluded 
articles, 45 articles only present results of an AMR surveillance system, 21 describe the 
techniques/methods for determining AMR and 17 emphasize the importance of 
surveillance system. 
A total of 79 articles were included in the final review and analysis, including nine 9 
citations (Figure 1.1). Among this, 70 systems focused on human health, four on animal 
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health, and five on both human and animal health. Evaluation of surveillance system was 
reported for 7 AMRSS. 
 
Figure 1.1: PRISMA flow chart diagram of articles selection process in the systematic review 
1.3.2. AMR surveillance systems in general 
The AMRSS described in this review were started between 1986 and 2011, including 33 
still ongoing at the date of publication. The median duration of international active and 
sentinel AMRSS was 3 years (IQR 2 – 7 years) and 4 (IQR 2 -5) years for passive systems 
(figure 1.2). National-scale AMRSS had a median of 4 (IQR 2 – 6) and 6 (IQR 3.5 – 7.5) 
years for active and passive systems, respectively.  
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Among the 79 systems included in the analysis, the most common objectives were: 
monitoring trends in infection and resistance (48/79 systems), followed by studying the 
susceptibility pattern for targeted antimicrobials (22/79 systems). The objective of linking 
AMR with different sectors was described in 6 systems, including 3 systems investigating 
the link with AMC and three with food, animal production and admission ward. 
    
Figure 1.2: Timeline of the published AMRSS from the start to the end date of the surveillance programs 
or to the year of article publication. LMIC: Low and middle income country; UMIC: Upper middle income 
country; HIC: High income country 
1.3.3. AMR surveillance systems in humans 
Among the 75 AMRSS in humans or both humans and animals, 40 and 35 were systems 
on a national and international scale, respectively. AMC data was collected in 16 systems. 
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Thirteen international AMRSS collected existing data; 21 acquired new data and one used 
data from a literature review. The systems that acquired new data used reference 
laboratories to analyse isolates sent from the participating medical centres or hospitals. 
Western Europe and Northern America were the two most often represented regions in 
the surveillance programs. Out of the 40 national systems focusing on humans, 29 
systems were based in high-income countries and 11 systems in LMICs (classifications 
based on world-bank stratifications) [75]. 
1.3.4. Hospital-based AMRSS 
As the overall objective of this thesis focuses on the hospital-based AMRSS, the main 
analysis focused on 71 such AMRSS (including laboratory and medical centres) (table 
1.1; from S01 to S71). These included 34 active, 33 passive and 4 sentinel surveillance 
systems (table 1.2). The United States were the leading country with 7 national-scaled 
AMRSS, followed by France (4 AMRSS) (table 1.1). Twenty AMRSS were deployed in 
more than one continent (including 6 active and 14 passive surveillance systems). 
Supplementary figures 1a to 1i represent location of countries participating in the largest 
international systems (S02, S12, S21, S05, S10, S09 and S14).  
The most frequently described objectives were monitoring trends in infection and 
resistance (43 systems), followed by studying the susceptibility pattern of targeted 
antimicrobials (20 systems) and early alert for novel resistant strains (6 systems) (figure 
1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3: Distribution of objectives of AMR surveillance systems. Number of systems were showed. 
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The number of hospitals in each AMRSS varied from 1 to more than 600. There were 
four surveillance systems conducting surveillance on food safety together with AMR in 
humans. AMC data were collected in 14 systems (19%). All these systems were based in 
Europe and North America. Among them, 12 systems were at national level and two at 
international level. 
There were 9 surveillance systems focusing on one bacterium (4 N. gonorrhoeae, 3 S. 
aureus, 1 A. baumannii and 1 S. pneumoniae). Three of four N. gonorrhoeae surveillance 
systems were sentinel. Enteric pathogens were the most frequent group of bacteria under 
surveillance (4 systems), followed by respiratory tract pathogens (3 systems). Anaerobes 
(S52 and S46) and fungi (Candida spp.) (S21) were also monitored. 
Laboratory quality control was implemented in 35 (49%) systems. Internal and external 
quality control supports reliability of test results [76]. Among these 35 systems, internal 
quality control using reference strains was reported in 25 systems: 13 using American 
Type Culture Collection (ATCC) reference strains [77], and 12 others using other 
reference strains. Ten systems implemented an External Quality Assessment (EQA) 
program to ensure quality and comparability across laboratories. 
The CLSI performance standards for AST were used in 44 systems. The version of CLSI 
varied from 1998 to 2013 depending on the systems. The EUCAST performance standard 
was used as single breakpoint in 6 systems. Two programs in Europe, EARSS and its 
successor EARS-Net (S07 and S09) collected data from various countries, which used 
EUCAST, CLSI and local standards to interpret their data. Five systems used two 
breakpoints to interpret one dataset to validate the results. Two systems in France (S61 
and S62) and two in Sweden (S69 and S70) used only their national breakpoint. 
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Table 1.1: AMRSS identified from the literature review until 31/12/2017 
Code Surveillance system name Country Level Type of 
surveillan
ce 
Start Duratio
n 
Surveillanc
e target 
S01 Chemotherapy Alliance for Neutropenics and the Control of 
Emerging Resistance [78] 
North America International active 2000 3 Human 
S02 International Network for the Study and Prevention of Emerging 
Antimicrobial Resistance [79] 
US and Europe International passive 1998 3 Human 
S03 Programme to Assess Ceftolozane/Tazobactam Susceptibility 
(PACTS) [80] 
US and Europe International passive 2012 1 Human 
S04 A study of typhoid fever in five Asian countries: disease burden 
and implications for controls [81] 
Asia International passive 2001 1 Human 
S05 Central Asia and European Surveillance of Antimicrobial 
Resistance [82] 
Asia and Europe International passive 2011 5 Human 
S06 Surveillance network for the enteric infections Salmonella and 
VTEC O157 [83] 
Europe International active 1997 3 Human 
S07  European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System [84] Europe International active 1998 4 Human 
S08 European Surveillance of Antibiotic Resistance [85] Europe International sentinel 1999 2 Human 
S09 European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network [86] Europe International active 2001 10 Human 
S10 The European Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme 
[54] 
Europe International sentinel 2009 4 Human 
S11 WHO Western Pacific Regional Programme for Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance [87] 
World International passive 1991 8 Human 
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S12 The Alexander Project [88] World International active 1992 10 Human 
S13 Study on Antimicrobial Resistance in Staphylococcus aureus [89] World International active 1996 1 Human 
S14 SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance  [90] World International passive 1997 5 Human 
S15 Meropenem Yearly Susceptibility Test Information Collection [91] World International active 1997 7 Human 
S16 ARTEMIS Global Antifungal Surveillance Programme [92] World International passive 1997 11 Human 
S17 International Nosocomial Infection Control Consortium (INICC) 
[93] 
World International passive 1998 10 Human 
S18 Prospective Resistant Organism Tracking and Epidemiology for 
the Ketolide Telithromycin [94] 
World International passive 1999 4 Human 
S19 Pan-European Antimicrobial Resistance Using Local Surveillance 
(PEARLS), Wyeth Pharmaceuticals [95] 
World International sentinel 2001 2 Human 
S20 NosoMed Pilot Survey in the Eastern Mediterranean Area [96] World International passive 2002 2 Human 
S21 Antimicrobial Resistance Epidemiological Survey on Cystitis [97] World International passive 2003 4 Human 
S22 TARGETed Surveillance Study [98] World International passive 2003 1 Human 
S23 Tigecycline Evaluation and Surveillance Trial (TEST) [99] World International active 2004 9 Human 
S24 International Daptomycin Surveillance Programmes [100] World International passive 2005 8 Human 
S25 Community-Acquired Respiratory Tract Infection Pathogen 
Surveillance (CARTIPS) [101] 
World International passive 2009 2 Human 
S26 ResistanceMap [102] World International passive 2009 10 Human 
S27 Assessing Worldwide Antimicrobial Resistance and Evaluation 
Programme (AWARE) [103] 
World International passive 2012 1 Human 
S28 International Network For Optimal Resistance Monitoring 
(INFORM) [104] 
World International active 2012 3 Human 
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S29 In Vitro Activity of Oral Antimicrobial Agents against Pathogens 
Associated with Community-Acquired Upper Respiratory Tract 
and Urinary Tract Infections [105] 
World International passive 2012 2 Human 
S30 Minocycline activity tested against Acinetobacter baumannii 
complex, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and Burkholderia cepacia 
species complex isolates [106] 
World International active 2013 1 Human 
S31 Global Point Prevalence Survey of Antimicrobial Consumption 
and Resistance (Global-PPS) [107] 
World International passive 2014 2 Human 
S32 International Solithromycin Surveillance Programmes [108] World International passive 2014 1 Human 
S33 Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance at a tertiary hospital in 
Tanzania [55] 
Tanzania national active 1998 5 Human 
S34 RESISTNET Surveillance Program in Brazil [109] Brazil national active 1998 2 Human 
S35 Canada surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in respiratory tract 
pathogens [110] 
Canada national active 1994 3 Human 
S36 Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance [111] 
Canada national active 2002 12 Both 
S37 Gonococcal Isolate Surveillance Project [112] US national passive 1986 6 Human 
S38 New Jersey AMR surveillance [113] US national active 1991 2 Human 
S39 National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System [114] US national active 1996 6 Both 
S40 Intensive Care Antimicrobial Resistance Epidemiology [115] US national active 1996 2 Human 
S41 AFHSC-GEIS network [116] US national active 1998 2 Human 
S42 Drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae surveillance [117] US national active 1998 1 Human 
S43 Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Research [118] US national active 2009 4 Human 
 A systematic review of AMR surveillance systems  
 
26 
 
S44 China Gonococcal Antimicrobial Susceptibility Programme [119] China national sentinel 1987 27 Human 
S45 CHINET surveillance system [120] China national passive 2005 10 Human 
S46 AMR surveillance network Indian Council of Medical Research 
[121] 
India national passive 2008 2 Human 
S47 Japan nosocomial infections surveillance [122] Japan national passive 2000 8 Human 
S48 Korean Nationwide Surveillance of  Antimicrobial Resistance 
[123] 
South Korea national active 1997 2 Human 
S49 Nepalese AMR programme [124] Nepal national active 1998 15 Human 
S50 MRSA multi-centre surveillance [125] Pakistan national passive 2006 3 Human 
S51 Laboratory-based Antimicrobial Drug Resistance surveillance 
program [126] 
Singapore national active 2006 1 Human 
S52 Taiwan Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance [127] Taiwan national passive 1998 3 Human 
S53 National Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Thailand [128] Thailand national active 2000 6 Human 
S54 Australian Gonococcal Surveillance Programme [52] Australia national active 1981 23 Human 
S55 The surveillance network (TSN) in Australia [129] Australia national active 1998 4 Human 
S56 Passive surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in Queensland 
public hospitals [130] 
Australia national Active 2002 2 Human 
S57 Bulgarian Surveillance Tracking Antimicrobial Resistance [131] Bulgaria national passive 1997 7 Human 
S58 Surveillance for Antimicrobial Resistance in Croatia [132] Croatia national active 1996 4 Human 
S59 Danish Integrated Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and 
Research Programme [45] 
Denmark national active 1996 21 Both 
S60 English Surveillance Programme for Antimicrobial Utilization and 
Resistance [133] 
UK national active 2013 4 Human 
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S61 ABU and ABR surveillance system in CHU de Besançon [134] France national passive 1998 6 Human 
S62 Network of private medical analysis laboratories [135] France national active 2000 5 Human 
S63 Surveillance of antimicrobial use and antimicrobial resistance in 
intensive care units [136,137] 
Germany national active 2000 3 Human 
S64 The Greek Network for the Surveillance of Antimicrobial 
Resistance [138] 
Greece national passive 1995 2 Human 
S65 Hungarian ABR monitoring system [139] Hungary national passive 1997 5 Both 
S66 Infectious diseases Surveillance Information System [53] Netherlands national passive 1996 12 Human 
S67 Norwegian monitoring program of antimicrobial resistance in feed, 
food, and animals [46] 
Norway national passive 2000 7 Human 
S68 Susceptibility to the Antimicrobials Used in the Community in 
España [140] 
Spain national active 1996 4 Human 
S69 The Swedish Strategic Programme Against Antibiotic Resistance 
[141] 
Sweden national passive 1994 12 Both 
S70 Surveillance of antibiotic resistance in ICUs in southeastern 
Sweden [142] 
Sweden national active 1995 3 Human 
S71 Surveillance  of MRSA bacteraemia in the UK [143] UK national passive 2001 4 Human 
S72 Community-Based Surveillance of Antimicrobial Use and 
Resistance in Resource-Constrained Settings [144] 
Asia and Africa International passive 2002 4 Human 
S73 Bacterial Infections and Antibiotic-Resistant Diseases Among 
Young Children in Low Income Countries [145] 
Asia and Africa International passive 2014 4 Human 
S74 Antibiotic Resistance in the Mediterranean Region [146] Mediterranean International passive 2003 4 Human 
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S75 Colombian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance [147] 
Colombia national active 2011 4 Animal 
S76 Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network [148] US national active 1996 10 Human 
S77 Japanese Veterinary Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring 
Program [149] 
Japan national passive 1999 4 Animal 
S78 Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in bacteria from animal 
[150] 
France national active 1996 12 Animal 
S79 VAV surveillance network [151] Spain national active 1996 6 Animal 
Note: S01 to S71: hospital-based AMRSS; S72-S79: other AMRSS 
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Table 1.2: Summary of the main characteristics of AMRSS worldwide 
Characteristic Category n (%) 
Surveillance level National 39 (55) 
 International 32 (45) 
Type of surveillance Active 34 (48) 
 Passive 33 (46) 
 Sentinel 4 (6) 
Pathogen included Neisseria gonorrhoeae 4 (6) 
 Acinetobacter baumannii 1 (1) 
 Staphylococcus aureus 3 (4) 
 Streptococcus pneumoniae 1 (1) 
 S. aureus, E. coli, K. pneumoniae 1 (1) 
 Gram-negative bacteria 1 (1) 
 S. aureus / S. pneumoniae and other Gram-positive bacteria 2 (3) 
 Enteric bacteria 4 (6) 
 Respiratory tract bacteria 3 (4) 
 Enterobacteriaceae 2 (3) 
   
 Campylobacter 1 (1) 
 Candida 1 (1) 
 All microbiological data 47 (67) 
Antimicrobial 
consumption data 
Collect new data 12 (17) 
Use data from other sources  2 (3) 
No antimicrobial consumption data 57 (80) 
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Standard for AST 
interpretation 
CLSI  44 (62) 
EUCAST  6 (8) 
Local standard 3 (4) 
CLSI and EUCAST 2 (3) 
CLSI and local standard 3 (4) 
CLSI, EUCAST and local standard 2 (3) 
Unspecified 11 (15) 
Indicators of 
resistance 
Proportion of resistant isolates 61 (86) 
Proportion of resistance in population 3 (4) 
Number of resistant cases 1 (1) 
Unspecified 6 (8) 
Denominator data Number of tested isolates  56 (79) 
 Number of admission and tested isolates 4 (6) 
 Number of negative results and tested isolates 1 (1) 
 
Number of blood culture, bed capacity, admission and tested 
isolates  
4 (6) 
 Unspecified 6 (8) 
Clinical information Yes 18 (25) 
 No 53 (75) 
Data de-duplication Yes 29 (41) 
 Unspecified 42 (59) 
Types of 
microbiologic sample 
Blood 3 (4) 
Blood and cerebrospinal fluid 3 (4) 
Bloodstream, skin, respiratory, urinary tract 1 (1) 
Sputum 1 (1) 
Urine 1 (1) 
Stool 1 (1) 
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All 58 (82) 
Unspecified 3 (4) 
Performing AST 
location 
In reference/central laboratory 20 (28) 
In local laboratory 51 (72) 
Quality control External Quality Assessment 10 (14) 
 Reference strains 13 (18) 
 Yes (but method unspecified) 12 (17) 
 Unspecified 36 (51) 
 
Once isolates were collected, they were either analysed in the laboratory of participating 
hospitals/medical centres (51 systems – 70%), or they were sent to a central laboratory 
for analysis (20 systems – 30%).  
Sixty-one AMRSS calculated resistant proportions among tested isolates and three 
systems estimated the resistant proportion in the population where population information 
was collected. Sixty-five AMRSS collected the number of isolates as denominator data, 
among them two systems also collected number of negative results and 8 systems 
collected other denominators (number of admissions, bed capacity, number of blood 
cultures). One fourth (18 AMRSS) collected the clinical information of patients. The lack 
of clinical and denominator information did not allow the analysis of the origins of the 
resistant isolates.  
The relation between the type of surveillance, the location of performing AST and the 
scale of AMRSS with other characteristics are shown in the cross tables (table 1.3). In 
general, active surveillance systems were more likely to be organised at national than 
international level (24 (62%) versus 10 (31%)). The AMRSS which analysed the isolates 
in a central laboratory were more likely to focus on specific pathogens than those 
analysing in a local laboratory (13 (65%) versus 17 (34%)). The former systems also 
performed data de-duplication more frequently (12 (60%)) than the latter (17 (34%)). 
More national AMRSS collected antimicrobial consumption data than international 
systems (10 (26%) versus 4 (13%)). 
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of AMRSS by type of surveillance (active versus passive); by laboratory location 
and by surveillance level. Chi-squared test was used to compare two groups. 
 Type of surveillance  
 Active (n=34) Passive (n=33) p-value 
 Laboratory location: 
reference/central laboratory 
8 (24%) 10 (30%) 0.73 
 Antimicrobial consumption  7 (21%) 7 (21%) 1.00 
 Data de-duplication  14 (41%) 13 (39%) 1.00 
 Specific pathogen  13 (38%) 9 (27%) 0.49 
 Quality control  15 (44%) 18 (55%) 0.54 
 Clinical information  9 (26%) 8 (24%) 1.00 
  Laboratory location  
 In reference/central  
laboratory (n=20) 
In local  
laboratory (n=51) 
p-value 
 Antimicrobial consumption  2 (10%) 12 (24%) 0.34 
 Data de-duplication  12 (60%) 17 (34%) 0.07 
 Specific pathogen  13 (65%) 17 (34%) 0.03 
 Quality control  10 (50%) 25 (50%) 1.00 
 Clinical information  7 (35%) 11 (22%) 0.39 
  Surveillance level  
 International (n=32) National (n=39) p-value 
 Active surveillance 10 (31%) 24 (62%) 0.02 
 Laboratory location: 
reference/central laboratory  
12 (38%) 8 (21%) 0.19 
 Antimicrobial consumption  4 (13%) 10 (26%) 0.28 
 Data de-duplication  11 (34%) 18 (46%) 0.45 
 Specific pathogen  18 (56%) 12 (31%) 0.05 
 Quality control  18 (56%) 18 (46%) 0.54 
 Clinical information  7 (22%) 11 (28%) 0.74 
Note: p-value is calculated from chi-squared test for the difference between two proportions 
 
Evaluation of AMR surveillance system 
Evaluation of performance, process and cost was reported for seven AMR surveillance 
systems (table 1.1 - S10, S33, S38, S39, S42, S54 and S66). Performance evaluation 
assessed the effectiveness aspects of the surveillance systems, while process evaluation 
measured how well the systems were structured and functioned. Altogether, the seven 
evaluations assessed 13 different attributes [59] (table 1.4) . Representativeness was the 
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most frequently assessed attribute (evaluated in three systems), followed by timeliness, 
bias, completeness of reporting and cost (two systems each) (figure 1.4).  
Two systems in Australia (S54) and the Netherlands (S66) reported using the updated 
guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems from US CDC [59] in their 
evaluation, other evaluations assessed the attributes according to their needs without 
using any guidelines. The evaluations used various quantitative and qualitative methods 
for assessment of the attributes. All but one evaluation assessed two or three attributes, 
only S02 performed a full performance evaluation using the six effectiveness attributes. 
Figure 1.4: Frequency of the type of evaluation attributes used in AMRSS evaluation worldwide 
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Table 1.4: AMRSS evaluation methods and results  
Attribute name 
AMRSS 
Code 
Attribute definition in the evaluation Evaluation method Attribute assessment results 
Representativeness 
 
S54 
An AMRSS that is representative 
accurately describes the resistance 
pattern over time and its distribution in 
the population by place and person 
Calculate the proportion of number of isolates 
tested by this system with the total number of 
gonococcal notifications between 1995 and 2003 
Between 1995 and 2003, the total 
isolates tested annually by Australian 
Gonococcal Surveillance Programme 
averaged 63.1% of the total 
gonococcal notifications in Australia 
S66 
Did not define Compare between all early warning signals of 
this surveillance system and outbreaks notified 
by other networks. 
Participation was voluntary, which 
resulted in a non-representative sample 
of medical microbiology laboratories 
for the Netherlands. 
S38 
The validity of an isolate-based 
surveillance in estimating rates of 
infection 
Determine the correlation of the number MRSA 
blood isolates from the surveillance system and 
the number reported by the hospital for 
September 1991. 
Correlation coefficient r = 0.78, 
statistically significant. The AMRSS 
represented well the population. 
Sensitivity S54 
The proportion of AMR cases detected 
by the surveillance system 
Examine whether the AGSP tests enough isolates 
to detect changes in AMR 
Over 3,000 isolates were tested each 
year nationally, but it was difficult to 
assess whether this number is 
sufficient to detect significant changes 
in gonococcal AMR rates in sub-
populations. 
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Simplicity S54 
The simplicity of an AMRSS refers to 
both its structure and ease of operation 
Assess the flow of data in the system (collection, 
transmission, analysis and reporting) 
The surveillance system was relatively 
simple as all the reference laboratories 
use standardised testing methods and 
the common case definition. There was 
a clear mechanism for data flow 
through the system. 
Timeliness 
S54 
Timeliness reflects the speed between 
steps in an AMRSS 
Assess the flow of data in the system (collection, 
transmission, analysis and reporting) 
The system had continuously reported 
on a quarterly and annual basis within 
six months of the end of the reporting 
period. This is adequate for reporting 
on AMR trends. 
S42 
The classification of average time to 
complete reporting. 
Compare the median time between specimen 
collection with the completion of reference 
laboratory testing for Active Bacterial Core 
surveillance (ABCs) or reporting to the health 
department of Knox County (KOHs) and 
conventional reporting (was 3 weeks). 
Time to release report of ABCs and 
KOHs were 4 and 1 months, 
respectively. These components were 
slower than conventional reporting 
which had weekly reporting. 
Bias 
S33 
The selection bias in favour of patients 
with infections caused by resistant 
organisms 
Self-estimation of how well the rural population 
is represented 
Study’s sample represented poorly the 
rural population 
S39 
The selection bias towards dirty 
facilities in AMR surveillance in animal 
Calculate a contaminated fraction to present the 
possibility of cross-contamination. Higher 
fraction, more possibility of overestimate the 
resistant proportion 
No data 
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Completeness of 
reporting 
S10 
Completeness of data reporting is 
presented for collection periods 
Calculate percentage of records that has 
information of each variable (gender, age, mode 
of transmission, HIV status…). 
Gender and age (99%); Mode of 
transmission (57%); HIV status (35%) 
S42 
Did not define Capture-recapture analysis: Cases with invasive 
S. pneumoniae were cross-checked between two 
components by using available patient 
identifiers.  Total cases were combined from two 
components: Active Bacterial Core surveillance 
(ABCs) and Knox County Health Department 
surveillance program (KOHs). 
ABCs component captured 86% of 
non-duplicated isolates. KOHs 
component captured 89%. 
Cost 
S33 
The monetary value of implementing 
the surveillance program 
Calculate direct and indirect cost Direct cost: 1000€/PC Indirect cost: 
100€/month/site 
S42 
Annual cost to maintain the surveillance 
system 
Direct and indirect costs were estimated for 1998 
on the basis of interviews with relevant 
personnel from the different surveillance 
systems. 
The annual cost of the ABCs and 
KOHs components were an estimated 
$30,000 and $5,000/year, respectively. 
Acceptability S54 
Acceptability reflects the willingness of 
persons and organizations to participate 
in the surveillance system 
Assessed through survey-based consultation with 
stakeholders of this surveillance system 
(reference laboratories, clinics, public health 
officials, WHO)  
The acceptability of the system is high 
for the contributors to the system, 
where all reference laboratories have 
participated continually over the last 
25 years. 
Flexibility S54 
The capacity of an AMRSS in adapting 
to changing information needs or 
operating conditions with little 
Identify examples of the system’s ability to adapt 
to changes in testing methods 
The network has had to adapt to some 
challenges (e.g. using new molecular 
based methods to diagnose gonococcal 
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additional time, personnel, or allocated 
funds. 
infections and molecular based 
methods to diagnose gonococcal 
infections). 
Level of coverage S10 
number of isolates tested compared to 
the number of reported cases 
Calculate the ratio of number of isolates tested 
compared to the number of reported cases as part 
of the enhanced epidemiological surveillance of 
STI in 2010. 
Number of isolates tested ranged from 
1% (United Kingdom and Hungary) to 
81% (Portugal). 
Protocol quality S39 
The level of consistent protocol between 
laboratories for isolation of organisms 
Compare the sampling, transporting and 
reporting activities of local laboratories with the 
standard protocols of program.   
Human data lack a rigorous sampling 
plan and suffer from irregular 
compliance. 
Quality of data S66 
Did not define Examine the percentage of error and unknown 
data. 
The evaluation revealed that the 
quality of the data was insufficient. 
Utility of 
surveillance data 
S38 
The usefulness of data in describing 
institutional risk factors for increased 
rates of nosocomial infection. 
Stepwise multiple linear regression analysis was 
used to evaluate the mean annual rate of MRSA 
blood isolates as the dependent variable with 
continuous and categorical independent variables 
of interest. 
Significant linear relationship between 
population density and mean annual 
MRSA blood isolate rate. 
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1.4. Discussion 
In this review, we outlined the key aspects of AMR surveillance systems that have been 
implemented and published worldwide and summarized the performance of the systems for 
which an evaluation was reported. The number of AMR surveillance systems has increased 
substantially in the last two decades, particularly more systems at an international scale and 
more systems employing an active approach at the national scale. This review also highlighted 
several limitations within AMRSS worldwide. Firstly, the microbiological and epidemiological 
capacities of health-care facilities in these systems need strengthening; this issue was discussed 
explicitly in 12 systems (17%). Second, a lack of reliable methods for excluding duplicate 
isolates, as shown in 42 systems (59%), without specification of de-duplication could lead to 
bias and an overestimation of the resistant proportions. Furthermore, the collection of 
microbiologic samples was heterogeneous among the systems, therefore data aggregation and 
comparison between hospitals or laboratories are not feasible, as mentioned in S27, S19 and 
S11. Thus, the value of an AMRSS is restricted primarily to the participating hospitals, 
laboratories or medical centres in using AMR surveillance data for improvement of patient care 
and supporting interventions to control AMR. Next, even though several international AMR 
surveillance programs were in place, there was a lack of a formal framework for collaboration 
among surveillance programs worldwide. As an example, in the European Antimicrobial 
Resistance Surveillance Network (S09), the Central Asia and European Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance (S05) or WHO Western Pacific Regional Programme for 
Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (S11), the requirements for data collection and 
quality were different. This can pose a challenge for any efforts to combine or share the data 
between the programs. Last, the evaluation framework for AMRSS evaluation were also highly 
variable. There is currently no standard evaluation framework developed specifically for 
surveillance systems in AMR. 
An important finding of this review was the gap in the evaluation of the AMRSS including 
performance evaluation, despite many efforts to implement surveillance as one of the important 
tools in controlling AMR. This finding is consistent with the general lack of evaluation of 
animal and human health surveillance systems worldwide [57,62]. Among the 79 reported 
systems, only 7 had performed an evaluation using a limited number of evaluation attributes. 
The methodologies for evaluation of the surveillance systems were highly heterogeneous, 
therefore it was not feasible to compare the performance of AMRSS worldwide. This problem 
might be due to the lack of a systematic methodology for surveillance evaluation, which has 
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been discussed in a recent project for the development of SurvTool (a tool for the integrated 
evaluation of animal health surveillance systems) [152]. The development of this tool aims to 
provide detailed and structured information on the available methods and relevance according 
to a specific evaluation question and context for animal health surveillance, which could also 
be applied to AMR surveillance.  
Representativeness was by far the most frequently assessed attribute. As recommended by the 
US CDC updated guidelines for surveillance system evaluation, representativeness should be 
assessed by comparing the reported events to the actual events [59]. However, the latter is 
generally unknown; and each study used different type of information available for the same 
targeted geographical area to evaluate this attribute. S54 used the total number of gonococcal 
notifications in the previous eight years in Australia while S66 and S38 used data on resistant 
cases notified by other networks in same year of surveillance for comparison.  
Definitions of the attributes under evaluation were also different across the systems in some 
aspects. An example was for the attribute of completeness of reporting which had different 
meanings in the two evaluations under which it was evaluated (S42 and S10). The European 
Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Programme (S10) defined this as the percentage of 
records that has information of each collected variable in the system, while the Innovative 
Surveillance system for Drug-resistant S. pneumoniae (S42) defined this as the percentage of 
invasive cases which were captured by the surveillance component in comparison with a 
conventional system. The definition used as in the evaluation of S42 was more similar to the 
attribute of representativeness assessed in S66 and S38 mentioned above. 
Timeliness, which is also a critical attribute in AMRSS as it will influence the rapidity of the 
treatment and/or control action, was only assessed in two systems. S54 assessed timeliness by 
evaluating the flow of data in the system (collection, transmission, analysis and reporting) and 
S42 assessed it by comparing the data processing duration between two components of the 
system. The fixed timeline in data collation on a quarterly basis and in release of data report 
on a semi-annual basis in S54 might have improved the timeliness of the system, and more 
importantly this timeline was considered to be acceptable by the stakeholders. Therefore, 
assessment of timeliness should be based on the responses by the stakeholders who benefit 
from the surveillance system. 
Cost of implementation was the only financial attribute that was assessed in these surveillance 
systems (S42 and S33). The costs reported in these studies were costs of equipment and human 
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resources. As noted in one study (S33), it was difficult to distinguish between the costs of 
running surveillance activities from the costs of running the daily laboratory activities (such as 
susceptibility testing and data entry and analysis). The benefits and cost savings from AMR 
surveillance systems were also not assessed in these studies. To support further implementation 
especially in resource-restricted settings, more data on costs of setting up and running AMR 
surveillance programs should be collected and published. 
There was a lack of data on AMC collected as part of the reviewed AMR surveillance systems. 
In the analysis of two systems, the authors used AMC data from other surveillance programs. 
The analysis from S61 demonstrated the use of time-series graphs to show the possible 
association between ABC and the emergence of AMR. Other systems that collected AMC data 
only showed Defined Daily Dose/1000 bed-days [153] and no investigations were reported in 
these analyses on the link between AMC and AMR. Monitoring both AMC and AMR is 
important as identified in the WHO’s Global Action Plan [36]. In addition, monitoring of 
antimicrobial use should be incorporated in or linked with the AMR surveillance system in 
order to evaluate the impact of any interventions to control AMR through improving 
antimicrobial consumption practices in the targeted population.  
The choice of denominator data was important in the surveillance of AMR as this allows a 
comparison in the resistance prevalence between participating sites (clinics, hospitals or 
nations). This has also been identified in the report by Rempel et al., who did an assessment 
on 22 surveillance systems to investigate their validity: all studies used appropriate 
denominator data and case definitions [154]. An AMRSS had appropriate denominator and 
case definition if this choice protected against bias [154]. Denominator information may be 
useful for estimating the prevalence of specific resistance profiles in the human and animal 
population. 
Although this review specifically targeted the AMRSS that were published in academic 
literature, I have also searched the references and the reports from public health agencies. In 
fact, 40/79 systems were at national scale, and some papers that I included were the reports 
from these government agencies. The search process I used was valid because it follows a 
systematic process with reproducible steps, and through this process I could identify the papers 
and reports that contain required information for evaluating the characteristics, strengths and 
weaknesses of each system. There might be some systems that I have missed during this 
process, however I believe this might be due to the fact that there is not enough information 
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available about these systems, and thus including them would not improve significantly the 
conclusion of my analysis. 
1.5. Conclusion 
This review resumed the key elements of AMR surveillance systems over the world and the 
methods and results of AMR surveillance system evaluation. The findings from this review 
show that although AMRSS have been increasingly implemented in many countries, a number 
of limitations exist in the surveillance protocols that can affect the validity and usefulness of 
the generated surveillance data. These are issues in microbiological and epidemiological 
capacity, data de-duplication, heterogeneity in data collection and quality, and a lack of 
evaluation in most of the AMRSS. A lack of an evaluation framework was also found among 
the limited number of studies, which performed evaluation on a few performance attributes. 
This review highlighted the need for systematic evaluation to be carried out to assess AMRSS 
performance and for developing specific methods building on from current evaluation 
guidelines with additional attributes specific for AMR surveillance.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Application of SurvTool and OASIS to 
evaluate the VINARES network for 
surveillance of antimicrobial resistance 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) among common bacterial pathogens is recognized as a global 
health threat, leading to a significant increase in healthcare costs, treatment failures and deaths 
[155]. This issue is more pressing in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), including 
Viet Nam. While exact data and evidence are scarce from LMICs, the burden of resistant 
infections is disproportionate to the countries’ resources, [31]. Surveillance has been indicated 
as one of the important strategies in Global and in National Action Plans to contribute to 
combating AMR including in Viet Nam [156]. 
According to WHO, surveillance of antimicrobial resistance is the continuous, systematic 
collection, analysis and interpretation of AMR data needed for the planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of public health practice. AMR surveillance allows the early detection of public 
health emergencies, to observe trends over time and to evaluate the impact of an intervention. 
AMR surveillance data inform local clinical decision making and guidelines and allow 
priorities to be set and can inform public health policy and strategies [39]. A surveillance system 
is composed of one or several surveillance components – one component is defined as a single 
surveillance activity used to investigate the occurrence of one or more hazards [157].  
 Evaluation of the VINARES surveillance network  
 
43 
 
Bax et al. [65] mentioned the multiple difficulties of AMR surveillance in the structure of study, 
the selection of host populations to be sampled and the choice of sampling methods and 
organisms. The testing method and cut-offs for susceptibility used for antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing (AST) is also important and needs to be standardized. The statistical 
handling of surveillance data is challenging and sustainable funding is a great concern in 
surveillance.   
In order to optimize the use of available resources, timely and relevant evaluation of AMR 
surveillance systems (AMRSS) needs to be performed. Evaluation can inform planning a new 
or re-designing the existing surveillance system, to ensure reaching the objectives and to take 
the appropriate corrective actions. 
There have been very few evaluation frameworks designated to evaluate surveillance systems 
for AMR specifically. AMR surveillance was a part/activity in a framework [62], or was 
considered as a general public health surveillance system. From a public health perspective, 
there have been a number of guidelines and tools developed for evaluating surveillance 
systems. In 1988, the US CDC published Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems to 
ensure that problems of public health importance are being monitored efficiently and 
effectively [37]. US CDC’s Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems were updated in 
2001 to address the need of integrating surveillance and health information systems and 
changes in the objectives of public health surveillance to facilitate the response of public health 
to emerging health threats. 
In 2008, the Health Metrics Network - a global health partnership focused on strengthening 
health information systems in low- and middle-income countries, hosted by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) – provided an assessment tool for assessing National Health Information 
Systems. This tool assesses the inputs and outcomes of a surveillance system, builds consensus 
around the priority needs, informs stakeholders and ensures the comparable assessment 
findings [158]. 
WHO introduced a multi-stage rapid assessment analytical tool to assess the AMR situation in 
countries in 2011 [159]. This tool was used to determine the extent to which effective practices 
and structures to tackle AMR were already in place and where gaps remained. Authorities in 
each country were invited to complete the questionnaires themselves. 
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In 2012, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published a 
handbook, which serves as guidance for infectious diseases surveillance system evaluation and 
data quality monitoring and supports self-assessment of surveillance systems at various levels 
from local to national in order to provide accurate and timely information for decision-making 
[160]. 
In 2015, WHO introduced the Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS). 
GLASS aims to enable standardized, comparable and validated AMR data collection and 
analysis and sharing of AMR data across countries to inform decision-making and action [6]. 
It provides a list of indicators for monitoring and evaluating GLASS implementation of each 
country.  
In 2016, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) provided the Assessment 
Tool for Laboratories and Antimicrobial resistance Surveillance Systems (ATLASS) in order 
to support countries in assessing and improving their national AMR surveillance system in the 
food and agriculture sectors [161]. This tool generates a baseline, and classifies a “stage” for 
AMR laboratory capacity detection, AMR surveillance, and information dissemination. 
Since 1988, a number of national and international efforts have been made to implement AMR 
surveillance in Viet Nam, at different scales (table 2.1). The National Program for Surveillance 
of Antibiotic Resistance (NPSAR), implemented by the Vietnamese Ministry of Health (MoH), 
was the first national surveillance program for AMR [162,163]. Under this program, common 
bacteria causing infections (including S. aureus, E. coli, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., P. 
aeruginosa...) in all specimens in both in-patients and out-patients under a passive component 
were isolated and antimicrobial susceptibility tests were performed. MRSA, ESBL and 
Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococci (VRE). An active component determined the pathogenic 
bacteria in healthy children in communities (nasal S. pneumoniae, nasal H. influenzae, rectal 
E. coli and oral S. aureus) and their antibiotic sensitivity pattern.  
 The number of participating hospitals increased from 9 in 1988 to 30 in 1993. This program 
was stopped in 2006. In 2008, the Global Antibiotic Resistance Partnership (GARP) and the 
Oxford University Clinical Research Unit Viet Nam (OUCRU) collaborated with the Viet Nam 
MoH to set up a new antibiotic resistance surveillance program. A cross-sectional study was 
performed to collect antibiotic resistance and antibiotic purchasing data from 15 participating 
hospitals in 2008-2009 [164]. From 2009 to 2011, another initiative, the Surveillance of 
Antibiotic Resistance (SOAR) program was implemented in 11 hospital across Viet Nam, 
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focusing on AMR among respiratory pathogens [165]. Isolates of Streptococcus pneumoniae 
and Haemophilus influenzae were obtained from clinical materials taken from adult and 
paediatric patients with community-acquired respiratory infections.  
In 2012, the Viet Nam Resistance (VINARES) project was launched. A hospital network was 
established and surveillance data on antimicrobial resistance and antibiotic consumption were 
collected from this network in two time periods: 2012-2013 (VINARES 1) and 2016-2017 
(VINARES 2), which could be considered two components of this surveillance system. 
VINARES 1 was implemented as a collaboration between the MoH, Vietnamese Infectious 
Diseases Society, OUCRU and Linköping University, Sweden, together with 16 hospitals 
across the country [166]. VINARES 2 collected data for the 2016-2017 period as part of a 
UK/Viet Nam Partner Driven Collaboration entitled “Towards an evidence based National 
Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance in Viet Nam”. Thirteen hospitals participated in the 
network in VINARES 2, all of which also participated in VINARES 1. The primary aim of 
VINARES 2 was to create an evidence informed methodology and well governed working 
processes to develop and implement policies and guidelines for controlling AMR in Viet Nam. 
Large surveillance datasets have been submitted to the network in these two periods; however 
there has not been any formal evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of these two 
surveillance projects. 
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Table 2.1: Objectives of NPSAR, GARP, SOAR and VINARES projects in Viet Nam 
Surveillance 
component 
Objective Surveillance 
type 
Duration Hospital number Surveillance procedure 
NPSAR Monitoring antibiotic 
resistance among 
microbiology laboratories. 
Developing national action 
plan to improve antibiotic 
prescribing and use. 
Passive and 
active 
1988-2006 31 All participant hospitals submitted annual data directly to 
Department of Therapy (1988-1990) and Department of Drugs and 
Medical Devices (1990-2006) of MoH. There were nine annual 
trainings for laboratory technicians in all (n = 24) provincial 
hospitals.Community samples were collected in healthy children 
(nasal S. pneumoniae, nasal Haemophilus influenza, rectal E. coli, 
oral S. aureus).This project issued 6 research yearbooks every two 
or three years. 
GARP Addressing the challenge of 
antibiotic resistance by 
developing actionable policy 
proposals. 
Monitoring AMR in 
hospitals 
Passive 2009 15 A cross-sectional study was performed to collect antibiotic 
resistance and purchasing data. Hospitals carried out antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing (AST) then submitted annual result to MoH 
in paper form. OUCRU was in charge of analysis of data and 
producing a report. One report was issued after the study. 
SOAR Surveillance of antimicrobial 
resistance of key respiratory 
pathogens 
Active 2011 11 S. pneumoniae and H. influenzae isolates were collected from 
adult and paediatric patients with community-acquired respiratory 
infections from 11 different centres in Viet Nam. AST was 
centrally performed.  
 
VINARES Collecting national-wide 
AMR data in hospitals 
Passive 2012-2013 
 
2016-2017 
16 (2012-2013) 
 
13 (2016-2017) 
The Viet Nam Resistance network (VINARES) was launched in 
2012 as a collaboration between the MoH, the Vietnamese 
Infectious Diseases Society, OUCRU and Linköping University, 
 Evaluation of the VINARES surveillance network  
 
47 
 
Sweden. Reported data including AST results from bacterial 
isolates from clinical specimens were sent monthly to OUCRU. 
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The hospital network for AMR surveillance established as VINARES has been recognized by 
the MoH as the National AMR Surveillance Network in 2016 and data collection is ongoing 
[167]. The network is currently supported by a Fleming Fund country grant and by the Global 
Health Security Agenda, with contributions from WHO, US CDC, PATH, FHI360 and 
OUCRU. It is important to perform a thorough assessment of the quality and effectiveness of 
VINARES 1 and 2 to understand the strengths and weaknesses of this hospital surveillance 
network and identify the areas for improvement to support the organization and implementation 
of an improved national surveillance system.  
The objective of this study is to evaluate the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam based on 
the VINARES project, comparing the two periods of 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 by assessing 
its strengths, weaknesses, effectiveness and implementation costs and to provide meaningful 
recommendations for its improvement. 
2.2. Methods 
2.2.1. Evaluation approach and framework  
SurvTool [152] was used to establish the framework to evaluate AMR surveillance system in 
Viet Nam. A number of approaches are available for evaluating surveillance systems 
[60,158,168,169], however, most of these had the limitation that they lacked the level of detail 
and flexibility needed for practical implementation [62]. SurvTool was developed to provide a 
practical approach for evaluation of surveillance systems. It was built within the RISKSUR 
project, an EU-funded project from 2012 to 2015 delivered by the RISKSUR consortium 
(www.fp7-risksur.eu). Within this project, decision support tools (software which supports 
analysts and decision makers in making better and faster decisions) were developed that can 
be used to evaluate surveillance systems, based on an interdisciplinary approach. The 
development of SurvTool was built on existing evaluation frameworks, methods and tools  
available in the literature [62] and incorporating inputs from experts. The main objective of 
SurvTool was to guide users in practically planning and implementing an integrated evaluation 
of surveillance systems [152]. 
Specifically, SurvTool helps the user to establish an evaluation context, including surveillance 
description, evaluation questions and suggestion of assessment methods [170]. This tool was 
used to: 1) describe the surveillance system and its components under evaluation; 2) identify 
the most relevant evaluation questions based on the specific context and decision-makers 
requirement and 3) identify the most relevant evaluation attributes to assess and the method to 
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do so. An evaluation attribute is a criterion that measures a specific functionality or 
effectiveness of the surveillance system.  
To date, SurvTool has been applied mostly in animal health surveillance [171,172]. However, 
SurvTool can support evaluation of surveillance systems with multiple objectives such as 
prevalence estimation and case finding, or demonstration of freedom from disease or early case 
detection. It could be applied on endemic, sporadic or emerging diseases and also to AMR 
surveillance (www.survtools.org). 
We evaluated the antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) data submitted by participating 
hospitals in VINARES 1 and VINARES 2. For denominator data, we used data from the annual 
health statistics of Viet Nam to calculate the effectiveness of AMR surveillance system in Viet 
Nam in the timeframe between 2012-2013 and 2016-2017. The proportions of resistant priority 
pathogens against relevant antibiotics were summarized by region and hospital type, separately. 
The antimicrobial susceptibility data come from microbiological laboratories of VINARES 1 
and 2. We received the data in WHONET format [173] and imported into the R program for 
the descriptive analysis. The cost data was extracted from official budget documents of 
VINARES project stored on the OUCRU server. These data were available for OUCRU staff 
only. Cost analysis was done in Microsoft Excel. 
2.2.2. Qualitative assessment of the surveillance system using OASIS tool  
To assess the evaluation attributes, we used OASIS (Outil d'Analyse de Systèmes d'Information 
en Santé  - a French acronym that translates as ‘analysis tool for surveillance systems in human 
and animal health’); a qualitative assessment tool for assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
of surveillance systems based on 78 criteria describing the situation and operation of a 
surveillance system [174].  
OASIS was developed by ten epidemiologists, developers and users of assessment methods 
and surveillance system managers from the French Agency for Food, Environmental and 
Occupational Health Safety (ANSES) [175]. OASIS combines three methods, including 
surveillance network assessment tools, critical control points assessment method and the US 
CDC Guidelines for Evaluating Surveillance Systems to develop a complete and standardized 
surveillance system assessment tool [175]. It standardizes the results and gives a better 
comparison of surveillance systems. OASIS was initially developed as an assessment tool of 
surveillance systems on zoonoses and animal diseases, but it can also be applied for general 
health surveillance systems.  
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The OASIS questionnaire includes 78 questions representing the functional parts of a 
surveillance system, and is used to collect information to support the scoring of the assessment 
criteria. These assessment criteria are categorized in ten sections according to the structure and 
activities of a surveillance system. Based on the information collected, each criterion is scored 
from 0 to 3 according to the level of completion of the system and scores are added up for each 
section; a higher score reflects better performance. These sections include:  
· Objectives and scope of surveillance: assess the relevance of surveillance objectives, 
level of detail, accuracy,  
· Central organization: assess the structure and operation of central unit, 
· Hospital organization: assess the structure and operation of participant hospitals, 
· Laboratory: assess the integration of laboratory in the surveillance system, the quality 
assessment of laboratory and accuracy of test, 
· Surveillance tools: assess the standardization of surveillance protocols, measurement 
tools and data collection, 
· Surveillance procedure: assess the active/passive component of surveillance system, 
· Data management: assess the adequacy of the data management system,  
· Training: assess the frequency and quality of training, 
· Communication: assess the communication between the central unit and hospitals, 
technical support of central unit and the publication of results, 
· Evaluation: assess the evaluation of performance of system and the implementation of 
improvement. 
The OASIS evaluation tool has three outputs. The first and second output of OASIS provide a 
summary of the strengths and weaknesses of above ten sections and the contribution of each 
assessment criterion of the surveillance system. These aim to provide a general view of the 
structure and operation of the surveillance system and help to quickly identify areas for 
improvement. The third output provides the assessment results for ten attributes defined 
specifically by WHO and US CDC for an AMR surveillance system to represent the influence 
of the system’s organization and design on its performance. Each attribute is represented by a 
numerical value of 0-100 by combining the scores assessed for all assessment criteria 
contributing to the attribute. The results of the 10 attributes are visualized in a radar chart 
demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of the surveillance system.  
For our evaluation, we defined the ten attributes as follows: 
 Evaluation of the VINARES surveillance network  
 
51 
 
· Sensitivity: refers to the proportion of resistant cases detected by the surveillance 
system to all resistant cases in Vietnamese hospitals for each pathogen – antimicrobial 
combination, 
· Specificity: refers to the proportion of non-resistant cases detected by the surveillance 
system for each pathogen – antimicrobial combination, 
· Representativeness: how accurately the surveillance system describes the occurrence 
of AMR in the population by place and person, 
· Timeliness:  reflects the speed between steps in the surveillance system 
· Flexibility: ability to adapt to changing information needs or operating conditions with 
little additional time, personnel or allocated funds. 
· Reliability: ability to properly collect, manage, and provide data of the surveillance 
system without failure 
· Stability: refers to the reliability and availability (the ability to be operational when it 
is needed) of the surveillance system 
· Acceptability: reflects the willingness of persons and organizations to participate in the 
surveillance system;  
· Simplicity: the surveillance system should be as simple as possible in both its structure 
and ease of operation while still meeting its objectives;  
· Usefulness: the surveillance system is useful if it contributes to the prevention, control 
and improved understanding of AMR. 
OASIS has been applied mostly to animal health, but also to human health and AMR 
surveillance [176]. As an example, OASIS was used for the evaluation of a surveillance network 
of antimicrobial resistance in pathogenic bacteria from animal origin of 59 laboratories in 
France 2009) [175]. The surveillance system collected electronic or paper-based results of 
antibiograms from laboratories. The network was coordinated by two laboratories in Lyon and 
Ploufragan–Plouzané, France. The first assessment output displayed a global, good operation 
of the surveillance network, except for the surveillance procedures. It also identified the main 
areas for improvement in central and field institutional organization, training, and evaluation. 
The second output highlighted mainly a lack of representativeness and an improvement margin 
for sensitivity, specificity and flexibility. 
In this study, we applied this OASIS questionnaire to VINARES 1 and 2, each considered as 
one component of the surveillance system in Viet Nam. I used the OASIS questionnaire to 
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interview one lab staff and one coordinator who were directly involved in the projects. Data 
were also collected from official documents and publications of these projects. 
 
2.2.3. Quantitative assessment of the effectiveness attributes 
The results of SurvTool indicated the effectiveness attributes that the evaluation should focus 
on. We selected only five effectiveness attributes that are relevant for the surveillance system 
under evaluation in answering our research questions and based on expert opinion. These 
include sensitivity, coverage, representativeness, timeliness and cost. The description and 
assessment method for each of these five attributes are described in table 2.2. 
These assessments will be carried out separately for the following pathogen – antimicrobial 
combinations: A. baumannii - imipenem; P. aeruginosa - imipenem; E. coli - imipenem; E. coli 
– ESBL; K. pneumoniae - imipenem; K. pneumoniae – ESBL; S. aureus – MRSA. These 
combinations are suggested by WHO [177] and were the most common in VINARES. 
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Table 2.2: Description of the effectiveness attributes and their quantitative assessment methods  
Attribute Name Description Assessment method 
Sensitivity Surveillance sensitivity refers to the 
ability of the surveillance system to 
detect cases; AMR surveillance 
sensitivity refers to the proportion 
of individual inpatients having a 
resistant bacterial isolate that the 
surveillance system is able to 
detect.  
The number of patients with an infection caused by a resistant isolate detected in VINARES divided by 
the total number of patients with an infection caused by a resistant isolate in all hospitals in Viet Nam. 
We defined a case as a patient diagnosed to carry a resistant bacterial isolate, i.e. doctor decided based 
on clinical presentation of that patient and the AST returned a result of resistance, specific for each of 
the following pathogen – antimicrobial combinations: A. baumannii - imipenem; P. aeruginosa - 
imipenem; E. coli - imipenem; E. coli – ESBL; K. pneumoniae - imipenem; K. pneumoniae – ESBL; S. 
aureus – MRSA. 
  
Therefore, 
!"#$%&%'%&( = )*+*,  
*+ and *, are the number of de-duplicated resistant isolates detected by VINARES and the number of 
patients carrying a resistant isolate in Viet Nam, respectively. *, was unknown, therefore we estimated 
this by summing up the products of the estimated average number of patients carrying a resistant isolate 
and the number of hospitals by each category): 
*, =)- ./ 0 *+/
1
/23
 
 
Where the value of i varies refers to the type of hospital (national (i = 1), specialized (i = 2) and 
provincial (i = 3, including district)); ./ is number of hospitals of type i; *+/ is average number of cases 
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having a resistant isolate for a specific pathogen – antimicrobial combination in a hospital of type i, 
estimated from VINARES data. 
The numbers of hospitals in the periods 2012 and 2016 were obtained from the 2012 and 2015 health 
statistics yearbook of the MoH.  
 
Coverage The proportion of the target 
population that was included in the 
surveillance; the target population 
in VINARES is all hospital 
inpatients. 
 
Dividing the number of patients tested in VINARES and number of all patients in Viet Nam during the 
same period. In this analysis, we estimated coverage using three measures that can present the target 
population including the number of inpatients, the number of patient days, and the number of hospitals. 
Representativeness The extent to which the features of 
the population of interest are 
reflected by the population included 
in the surveillance activity. 
 
The distribution of bacteria by region will be compared with the distribution of population and of area. 
Timeliness Timeliness is usually defined as the 
time between any two defined steps 
in a surveillance system, the time 
points chosen are likely to vary 
depending on the purpose of the 
surveillance activity.  
The duration of data collection, transmission and report issue will be calculated. 
In this study, timeliness was assessed using four criteria:  
· time from antimicrobial susceptibility testing in laboratory to data collection to OUCRU; 
· time from requirement of laboratories to data technical support from OUCRU;  
· monthly External Quality Assessment (EQA) participation; and 
· time to report the data. 
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Costs 
 
 
 
Costs of the initial implementation 
and running of surveillance system. 
Implementation and annual cost were estimated from the total cost. This cost depends on the type of 
hospital. The total costs were obtained from financial documents of each surveillance project. A 
discount rate of 5% was applied so that the cost in different time points could be comparable*.  
 
The average cost-effectiveness ratio (ACER) will be used to compare the cost per outcome unit. ACER 
of one AMRSS represents cost per one effectiveness unit and it can be obtained by dividing the net cost 
of surveillance by the effectiveness: !
4567 = )89&:;)59$&<>&?9@"  
The cost for one hospital, one collected isolate, one resistant isolate, one priority specimen, one priority 
bacterial isolate, one workshop or training and one report or newsletter of each surveillance project were 
calculated. 
 
Following GLASS recommendations [50], priority specimens include: blood, urine, stool, cerebrospinal 
fluid, vaginal swabs, nasopharyngeal swabs, pus, wound swabs and sputum; priority bacteria [177] 
include: E.coli, Klebsiella spp., Acinetobacter spp., P. aeruginosa, S. aureus, Enterobacter spp., S. 
pneumoniae, H. influenzae and E. faecium. 
   
*People often put more value to current rather than future costs and effects. Therefore, economic evaluations need to discount the costs and benefits by adjusting the value of 
these by a discount rate for the future time when they occur. O’Mahony et al. [178] recommends countries with a differential discounting policy to also report outcomes for 
equal discounting at rates of 3 and 5%. 
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2.2.4. Evaluation protocol  
Of concern, while assessing the technical effectiveness of the AMR surveillance system in Viet 
Nam, were low sensitivity, bias and overestimation of the resistant proportions among 
community acquired infections (CAI) caused by the passive nature of the surveillance (i.e. 
collect all data generated by the microbiology laboratories, with limited clinical metadata). This 
may lead to biases as microbiological diagnosis is underused in most LMICs, it’s biased 
towards more severe or unresponsive infections, and it may render inadequate results due to 
antibiotic use prior to sampling and this cannot be assessed well because no clinical metadata 
are included in the surveillance here. 
The cost of the system was also considered. SurvTool provided an evaluation protocol based 
on the specific evaluation needs and context of AMR surveillance in Viet Nam (table 2.3). 
Based on the outputs of SurvTool, one functional attribute was quantified (surveillance system 
organization) to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system and the impact of the system 
function on its effectiveness and 4 effectiveness attributes (sensitivity, coverage, 
representativeness and timeliness) to compare the efficacy of the 2 components over the 2 
different periods. 
Table 2.3: AMRSS evaluation context in Viet Nam 
Context elements Description 
Alternative strategies to consider?  Increase number of hospitals & change ratio of 
hospital types 
Are you considering risk-based options? No 
Do you have a budget constraint for the surveillance 
system/components? 
Yes 
Do you know the current cost of your system and/or 
components? 
Yes 
Do you want to evaluate the whole system or some 
components in the system? 
The whole system strengths and weaknesses; the 
effectiveness of the different components 
Evaluation criteria Effectiveness, cost, non-monetary benefit 
Evaluation method Least cost analysis 
Evaluation question Assess the costs and effectiveness of surveillance 
components (out of two or more) to determine which 
achieves a defined effectiveness target at least cost, 
the effectiveness needs to be determined 
Geographical area Viet Nam 
Hazard name Antibiotic resistance of priority bacteria 
 Evaluation of the VINARES surveillance network  
 
57 
 
Hazard situation Endemic 
Legal requirements (Not Set) 
Stakeholder concerns about current approach Low sensitivity and bias and overestimate resistant 
proportion among CAI 
Strengths and weaknesses of the current surveillance 
approach? 
Strengths: collect multiple pathogen - antimicrobial 
susceptibility, easy, cheap; Weaknesses: low 
coverage and do not separate infection origin (HAI or 
CAI)  
Surveillance components to evaluate VINARES 1 and 2 
Surveillance objective Estimate prevalence 
Will you consider the costs of surveillance in your 
evaluation 
Yes 
CAI: Community-acquired infection; HAI: Hospital-acquired infection 
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Descriptive analysis of AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam 
VINARES 1 and VINARES 2 were two passive surveillance components based on the same 
hospital network, which aimed to collect routine AST results of selected hospitals across the 
entire country. All pathogens in all types of samples were collected and the laboratory results 
were submitted to the system. Both components had similar objectives: (1) to detect the 
proportion of resistant isolates in order to give recommendations for empiric therapy and (2) 
to monitor the prevalence of these resistant isolates to generate knowledge on the AMR 
situation in hospitals to trigger control actions on treatment used or on antibiotic use such as 
changes of practices and/or behaviours. These two components also used a similar surveillance 
protocol as described in table 2.4.  
The components varied in the number, type and location of the hospitals included in the 
surveillance activities: 16 for VINARES 1 and 13 for VINARES 2 (Figure 2.1). Three northern 
hospitals participated in VINARES 1 but did not participate in VINARES 2. The provincial 
hospital type was the largest group (7 hospitals); followed by specialized hospital (5 hospitals 
in 2012-13 and 3 hospitals in 2016-17) (table 2.5). Two specialized hospitals covered the 
Southern region in two periods; while three were in the Northern region in first period and only 
one in second period (Supplementary table S2.1).  
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Table 2.4: VINARES protocols from SurvTool outputs 
Characteristic Description 
Surveillance System Name AMRSS VIET NAM 
Hazard Name Antibiotic resistance of priority pathogen – antimicrobial combinations 
Based on the current disease 
status, what is the primary 
surveillance objective? 
Estimate resistant proportions 
a) Why is surveillance necessary Protect public health 
b) What will it accomplish To inform the selection of intervention measures 
Geographical Area Viet Nam 
Data collecting target Patient’s antibiogram 
Component name VINARES 1 / VINARES 2 
Target Species Human 
Geographical Area Covered Viet Nam 
Data Collection Point Clinical Microbiology laboratory 
Study Type Passive surveillance 
Type of data collected AST results generated from positive clinical specimens  
Target unit level Hospital 
Sampling unit Individuals 
Sampling design Multiple stage 
Notes / Comments Stratified hospital sampling, all patients/hospital 
Number of units in your target 
population 
16 (VINARES 1) / 13 (VINARES 2) 
Number of secondary units in 
your target population 
100-10000 
Describe who are the agents 
who will collect samples/ 
information. 
Microbiology labs 
Consider whether a data/sample 
collection protocol is available, 
or needs to be prepared. 
Passive surveillance: Doctor prescribes sampling a patient for 
microbiological diagnosis, all data from the lab are collected 
What will be the frequency of 
data/sample collection? 
Continuous 
Consider whether a data/sample 
transfer protocol is available. 
Yes 
Describe the frequency Monthly collection of data from hospitals 
Consider whether training is 
needed for data transfer. 
Yes (software training) 
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Microbiological analysis 
performed by 
Laboratory staff 
Analysis method AST method: Disk diffusion, MIC, E-Test 
Sample analysis frequency Right after receiving sample from doctor 
Expected load of samples to be 
analysed monthly? 
Depend on hospital 
Epidemiological data collected No 
Results disseminator OUCRU 
Target of results dissemination MoH and hospitals  
Results dissemination method Annual report 
 
  
Figure 2.1: Location of hospitals in VINARES 1 and VINARES 2 components 
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Table 2.5: Distribution of hospitals in VINARES 1 and VINARES 2 components by region and by hospital type 
n  VINARES 1 
(16 hospitals) 
VINARES 2 
(13 hospitals) 
Region   
Red River Delta 6 3 
Northeast 1 1 
North Central 1 1 
South Central Coast 3 3 
Central Highlands 1 1 
Southeast 3 3 
Mekong Delta River 1 1 
Hospital type   
National 4 3 
Provincial 7 7 
Paediatric 2 1 
Surgical 1 0 
Tropical disease 2 2 
 
In this surveillance system AST results from bacteria isolated from patients admitted to hospital 
were collected. Specimens were collected from patients as part of clinical care only, not for 
surveillance purposes. The microbiology lab conducted AST also as per standard of care only, 
not for surveillance purposes. AST results were submitted to the coordinating centre (including 
OUCRU and the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases (NHTD)) every month (for 
VINARES 1) or every three months (for VINARES 2). OUCRU provided technical support to 
the laboratories to improve quality and capacity and distributed UK-NEQAS EQA panels. A 
report for each cycle of surveillance was shared with MoH and other international institutions 
in Viet Nam including WHO and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates actors and their actions in the system. 
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Figure 2.2: Organization of AMRSS in Viet Nam 
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2.3.1.1. Strengths and weaknesses of the surveillance system 
Strengths and weaknesses were assessed for the 10 critical aspects of the AMR system surveillance in 
Viet Nam (Table 6). Surveillance procedures with passive components were found to be the most 
limiting aspect of the current system (22% satisfaction) which confirmed the need to assess the 
performances of the system components to improve its design. 
Table 2.6: Strengths and weaknesses of the 10 critical aspects of the AMRSS in Viet Nam 
Critical aspect Score 
(out of 100) 
Description 
Objectives  
 
100 The objectives were fully described and appear in an official 
document. 
Central organization 67 There was a steering committee consisting of representatives from 
MoH, NHTD, Hospital for Tropical Diseases of Ho Chi Minh City 
and OUCRU in which the role of each member was defined. But 
this committee did not include all partners and the meeting 
frequency of the committee was low. 
Field institutional 
organization 
(Participating hospital)  
79 Hospitals worked independently, with minimum supervision from 
the central organization. The human and financial resources of the 
field units were sufficient. There was a common data management 
procedure for all hospitals.  
This network covered only a part of the country. The role of the 
hospital staffs was included in an official document but no 
coordination meeting was organized. 
Laboratory 74 All laboratory staffs were well trained and received support from 
central unit. However, submitting data was not timely. 
Surveillance tools 74 There was a comprehensive and formalized protocol for AMR 
surveillance. Sensitivity and specificity of AST method was good, 
but there was not a tracking/recording tool for cases with unclear 
results. 
Surveillance procedures 30 VINARES achieved a good score for the passive surveillance 
components. However, due to having no active component, the 
score was lower. 
Data management 48 Material and financial resources for data management and analysis 
were provided adequately. However, the data validation procedure 
was not established and data was not analysed regularly. 
Training 93 Initial training was implemented for all laboratory staffs when 
joining the surveillance system and advanced training was carried 
out regularly. Material and resources for training were sufficiently 
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provided by the central organization as reported in the staff 
interviews. 
Communication 71 Information bulletin was disseminated every quarter, but only one 
report and no scientific article was released in the end of 
surveillance component. The assessments in the form of reports, 
annual meetings, or regular summaries were not returned 
systematically to hospitals 
Evaluation 0 The central organization did not implement an evaluation for the 
surveillance system. The performance of the system was not 
reviewed and no corrective measure was applied.  
 
2.3.1.2. Influence of the system design on its performance 
The second output of OASIS indicates the overall influence that the system design and 
organization have on the ten performance attributes. The percentage associated with a 
performance attribute represents its level of functionality corresponding to the quality of the 
organization and design of the system (figure 2.3). The current system organization was found 
to impact most its flexibility (35%); representativeness (42%), timeliness (57%) and sensitivity 
(65%); specificity acceptability and reliability were also impacted (Table 2.7). The system was 
relatively strong in terms of stability, utility, and simplicity. Table 2.7 describes the problems 
identified in the system that have affected its performance attributes. 
  
Figure 2.3: Impact of the AMR surveillance system process in Viet Nam on the 10 quality performance 
attributes as assessed by OASIS tool 
 
65%
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80%
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Table 2.7: Problems of the AMRSS  that affects its performance attributes 
Attribute  Reduction 
(%) 
Problems that affects the system’s attributes 
Representativeness  58 No active surveillance for inpatients in the country. 
The passive surveillance network did not cover the whole country. 
Only big national and provincial hospitals participated in the surveillance 
network, causing a sampling bias. 
Flexibility  46 The flexibility of system was low because no system evaluation was 
performed. As a consequence, the strengths and weaknesses were not 
identified and the central unit could not have any corrective measures. 
Timeliness  43 Hospitals did not adhere to the deadline of submitting AST results to the 
central unit, so the analysis and report were also delayed. 
A dedicated support team was not available. The questions and problems 
of hospitals in the network were not solved in time (e.g. technical issues 
with computers. 
Specificity  28 Advanced training was organized regularly  
There was not any awareness raising programs for data sources in 
surveillance network. 
Sensitivity  31 Advanced training was organized to maintain the quality of performance of 
staffs and fix problems timely. 
No active surveillance was available so the probability to detect new and 
rare AMR was low. 
The report was not returned systematically to participants 
Reliability  35 Quality control was applied to assure the accuracy of microbiological 
results. 
The verification of data submitted from hospitals was not performed 
regularly by OUCRU. 
System evaluation was not performed to have corrective measures. 
Analysis deadlines at the hospitals (including formalization, 
standardization, verification, transfer of results) to the central unit were not 
adhered. It could lead to data loss problems or persisting unsolved issues. 
Acceptability  35 The enthusiasm of hospitals diminished because the reports and scientific 
articles on surveillance results were not released regularly. 
The report on AST results was returned to hospitals only once per year. 
The financial and material resources for hospitals were not highly adequate. 
Simplicity  25 The central unit role has been defined, but not all partners participated in it. 
The definition of AMR case was not very simple. 
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Utility  22 Data exploitation was not performed regularly, so the surveillance unit 
could not give feedback. Moreover, the reports and scientific articles on 
surveillance results were not released regularly, so the participants did not 
receive much benefit from the surveillance system. 
Stability  20 Human resource: the number of people who worked full time for the central 
unit was not sufficient. 
Sampling sites: the surveillance network did not cover the whole country. 
Result dissemination: the reports and scientific articles on surveillance 
results were not released regularly. 
 
2.3.2. Coverage and Representativeness 
The number of isolates that were analysed and for which data were submitted increased from 
25,742 in VINARES 1 to 42,553 in VINARES 2. Coverage was estimated using three 
indicators: the number of inpatients, the number of patient-days per year, and the number of 
hospitals in the network. These indicators are not perfect denominators to evaluate coverage, 
however they are the best indicators with data available.  
Data in VINARES were collected by a survey at the beginning of project. The denominator 
(Viet Nam’s data) was obtained from national statistics yearbook [179]. The analysis was done 
for 2012 only, 2016 data were not available. Table 2.8 indicates that the coverage of VINARES 
2 was lower than VINARES 1, but both were lower than 5%. Considering the number of 
inpatients and patient days, the coverage of VINARES 1 was 6.4% and 8.2% respectively, 
higher than the coverage of the number of hospitals. 
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Table 2.8: Coverage of VINARES 1 and VINARES 2 based on number of inpatients, number of patient days 
and number of hospitals 
 VINARES 
1 
Viet Nam 2012 Coverage of 
VINARES 1 
(%) 
VINARES 
2 
Viet Nam 
2016 
Coverage of 
VINARES 2 
(%) 
Number of 
inpatients 
849 306 13 187 559 6.4% NA   
Number of 
patient 
days 
7 424 372 90 872 997 8.2% NA   
Number of 
hospitals(a) 
16 492 
(18 : 145: 329) 
3.3% 13 576 
(23 : 188: 
365) 
2.2% 
(a): national (including general and leprosy hospitals), specialized, provincial (including general and leprosy 
hospitals), other branches and private hospitals were taken in account. other branches and private hospitals are 
considered as provincial hospitals. 
The representativeness of isolate collection by region was assessed by comparing the 
distribution of E. coli, K. pneumoniae, A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa in VINARES with the 
distribution of population and with area of each region. The results of VINARES highlighted 
the important contribution of the Red River Delta and the Southeastern region in two periods. 
Table 2.9 shows the Red River Delta contributed from 37% to 52% of isolates in 2012-2013 
period, while this region occupied 21% of population and 5% of area. In 2016-2017 period, the 
Southeastern region contributed a very high P. aeruginosa proportion. The Mekong Delta’s 
population and area occupied a large proportion of Viet Nam, however it contributed less than 
10% of isolates. The North-western region did not contribute any isolate. The contribution of 
the Central Highlands and Southeastern regions were decreased the most due to the fact that 
three hospitals in Red River Delta withdrew from the network (figure 2.4). 
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Table 2.9: Distribution of bacteria by region (Red River Delta : Northeast : Northwest : North Central : South 
Central : Central Highlands : Southeast : Mekong Delta River) 
Percentage (%) VINARES 1 Viet Nam 
2012 
VINARES 2 Viet Nam 2016 
E. coli(a) 45 : 4 : 0 : 4 : 26 : 2 : 
16 : 3 (n=4437) 
Population(b) 
21 : 7 : 6 : 13 : 
11 : 5 : 20 : 17 
 
Area 
5 : 14 : 16 : 15 
: 13 : 16 : 7 : 
12 
 
28 : 2 : 0 : 1 : 12 : 1 : 
6 : 3 
Population(b) 
22 : 7 : 6 : 12 : 10 
: 6 : 18 : 19 
 
Area 
5 : 14 : 16 : 15 : 
13 : 16 : 7 : 12 
 
K. pneumoniae (a) 45 : 2 : 0 : 3 : 30 : 1 : 
13 : 6 (n=2206) 
45 : 2 : 0 : 3 : 30 : 1 : 
13 : 6 
A. baumannii (a) 37 : 0 : 0 : 4 : 27 : 1 : 
25 : 6 (n=1668) 
37 : 0 : 0 : 4 : 27 : 1 : 
25 : 6 
P. aeruginosa(a) 52 : 4 : 0 : 3 : 22 : 1 : 
12 : 5 (n=2326) 
13 : 6 : 0 : 5 : 16 : 4 : 
53 : 4 
Note: NA: Not available; (a): Distribution of bacteria (b): Distribution of population and area by region 
Provincial hospitals had a similar contribution to the total number of isolates between the 2 
periods (40%) (figure 2.5). The contribution of the national hospitals increased in VINARES 
2 both in number and percentage of isolates, despite their reduced number in this component. 
Surgical hospitals contributed more than 20% of isolates in 2012 but it did not participate in 
VINARES 2, that could have led to a bias in the result. 
  
A - VINARES 1                        B - VINARES 2 
Figure 2.4: Number of isolates detected per region by the AMRSS components: A- VINARES 1; B- VINARES 
2 
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A - VINARES 1                       B - VINARES 2 
Figure 2.5: Number of isolates detected per hospital type by the AMRSS components: A- VINARES 1; B- 
VINARES 2 
E. coli, Klebsiella spp. and Acinetobacter spp. were the most frequently isolated bacteria. They were 
mostly detected in the Red River Delta and Southeastern regions, where the two largest cities of Viet 
Nam (Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city) are located. The proportion of these bacteria in the Centre and the 
South were higher than in the North (figure 2.6 – VINARES 1(a) and (b)). Between VINARES 1 and 
2, the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta regions contributed the least to the number of priority 
bacteria isolates, which is line with their lower contribution to the total number of isolates to the system 
(figure 2.4). 
 
VINARES 1 (a) 
 
VINARES 1 (b) 
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VINARES 2 (a) 
 
VINARES 2 (b) 
Figure 2.6: Number and percentage of priority bacteria by region in VINARES 1 and VINARES  2 projects 
Seven provincial hospitals reported around 40% of total priority bacteria. The proportions of bacteria 
were similar across species at the provincial hospitals; the distribution was more heterogeneous at the 
national level (figure 2.7). The contribution of E. coli and Klebsiella spp. bacteria in the surgical hospital 
was the highest (figure 2.5a) which could lead to a bias in their detection in VINARES 2 component 
which has no representation of this hospital type. However, the surgical hospital did not provide a 
representative detection of all the priority bacteria (no detection of E. faecium, H. influenzae and S. 
pneumonia in such hospitals). 
 
VINARES 1(a) 
 
VINARES 1(b) 
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VINARES 2(a) 
VINARES 2(b) 
Figure 2.7: Number of priority isolates by hospital type in VINARES 1 and VINARES 2 projects 
2.3.3. Timeliness 
Timeliness was assessed using four criteria as described in table 2.10.  Most of laboratories sent 
antimicrobial susceptibility testing data on time (monthly in VINARES 1 and quarterly in VINARES 
2). The feedback or support for data management was prompt. Laboratories participated monthly EQA; 
among them 14 laboratories always sent assessment results on time. The information bulletin was 
published quarterly in VINARES 1, containing updated information to all laboratories. No information 
bulletin was sent in VINARES 2. 
Table 2.10. Evaluation of timeliness of VINARES surveillance component activities 
Time of activity VINARES 1 VINARES 2 
Time from resistance detection in 
laboratory to data collection to 
OUCRU 
90% lab sent data monthly; 10% sent 
data up to 3 months  
 
All laboratories sent data within 
3-6 months 
Data technical support from 
OUCRU 
Within 1 week since requirement Within 1 week since 
requirement 
Monthly EQA participation 14/ 16 laboratories uploaded result 
on time 
12/ 13 laboratories uploaded 
result on time 
Report Quarterly information bulletin  
Annual report (2013) 
Paper (2016, 2019) 
No information bulletin;  
Annual report (2017) 
 
2.3.4. Sensitivity 
We used the number of hospitals (table 8) and the estimated average number of resistant isolates per 
type of hospitals to calculate the denominator. From the statistical yearbook, there were 492 and 576 
national, specialized and provincial hospitals for 2012 and 2016, respectively [179]. Table 2.11 
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summaries the sensitivities of seven pathogen – antimicrobial combinations in VINARES. The 
sensitivities are in the 2-5% range and stay similar between two periods. 
Table 2.11: Estimated average number of resistant bacterial isolates in a hospital, number of resistant isolates in 
VINARES 1 and 2 (*+), estimated number of resistant isolates in Viet Nam (*,) and sensitivity of each 
pathogen – antimicrobial combination 
 Number of resistant isolates in a hospital BC BD Sensitivity 
VINARES 1 type 1 
(National) 
type 2 
(Specific) 
type 3 
(Provincial) 
   
A. baumannii - 
imipenem 
123 63 25 1004 19574 5% 
P. aeruginosa - 
imipenem 
62 256 86 1766 66530 3% 
E. coli - 
imipenem 
115 287 192 2972 106853 3% 
E. coli - ESBL 42 309 99 1929 78132 2% 
K. pneumoniae 
- imipenem 
27 122 74 1093 42522 3% 
K. pneumoniae 
– ESBL 
89 163 74 1526 49583 3% 
S. aureus - 
MRSA 
64 128 110 1584 55902 3% 
VINARES 2       
A. baumannii - 
imipenem 
640 135 60 2745 62000 4% 
P. aeruginosa - 
imipenem 
147 97 93 1383 55562 2% 
E. coli - 
imipenem 
140 18 30 684 17554 4% 
E. coli - ESBL 715 132 220 4081 121561 3% 
K. pneumoniae 
- imipenem 
147 55 40 886 28321 3% 
K. pneumoniae 
– ESBL 
177 49 71 1175 39198 3% 
S. aureus - 
MRSA 
275 190 61 1822 64310 3% 
*+: number of resistant isolates in VINARES 1 and 2; *,: and estimated number of resistant isolates in Viet 
Nam  
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2.3.5. System costs 
The implementation cost of VINARES 1 was 434,000 USD. Applying discount rate of 5% for 4 years 
later, the equivalent cost in 2016 was 434,000*(1.05^4) = 528,000 thousand USD. VINARES 2’s cost 
was 379000 USD. Table 2.12 shows the outcome of each component and cost for each outcome unit. 
In general, the VINARES 2 component had lower cost for one outcome. 
Table 2.12: Cost per one outcome unit of the AMRSS 
 VINARES 1 (528000 USD) VINARES 2 (379000 USD) 
Outcome Number of 
outcomes 
ACER(a) Number of 
outcomes 
ACER 
Laboratory 16 33000 13 29154 
Collected isolates 33084 16 75051 5 
Isolates for analysis 25742 21 42553 9 
Priority specimen 14737 36 31308 12 
Priority bacteria 17369 30 26001 14.6 
Workshop and trainings 4 132000 4 94750 
Report and newsletter 5 105600 1 379000 
(a) ACER: average cost-effectiveness ratio 
 
2.4. Discussion 
In this study we used SurvTool and OASIS to assess the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam 
in the period 2012-2017 through the VINARES components, and we pointed out the strengths 
and weaknesses of the system and identified the aspects that could be improved. These areas 
for improvements can be applied to the current national AMR surveillance system because it 
is based on VINARES in terms of methods and participating sites. 
Overall, the system organization was correctly established with clear objectives and a well-
defined technical committee who led the system to perform in the right directions. However, 
the timeliness and flexibility of the system could be improved by a higher frequency of 
meetings and communication flow between the central unit and the participating hospitals. As 
shown in this evaluation, the low frequency of meetings in VINARES led to slow responses 
and feedback to issues from the central unit, thus the timeliness and flexibility attributes were 
significantly decreased.  
The quality of laboratory activities was assured because of the fully provided resources and 
well-qualified staffs. But the delay in submitting data from the lab staff might be a reason of 
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declining the timeliness of surveillance system. In addition, data management and analysis 
were done manually. Data transferring by email was dependent mostly on the hospitals. 
Another issue was the lack of formalized data processing procedures that affected the simplicity 
and flexibility of the system, e.g. it was difficult for a new staff to take over the work.  
The acceptability and enthusiasm of hospitals were negatively affected by the frequency of 
data exploitation and reporting. All above laboratory and data issues could be improved 
significantly by establishing an automated system: data submitting reminder, data validation, 
analysis and reporting. The communication and support should be easier to increase the 
timeliness and acceptability. Email and telephone communication were not enough to describe 
all issues and feedback. An internet-based communication system might be implemented to 
have an efficient discussion. 
One important objective of AMR surveillance systems is to provide accurate estimates of the 
resistant proportions of priority pathogens to inform control actions and to guide empirical 
therapy. The surveillance components evaluated here include a good representativeness of 
hospitals in terms of hospital types and geographic areas, and therefore AMR data collected 
from this system can provide a representative picture of the AMR situation of the country. One 
limitation was that the network did not include smaller hospitals such as district hospitals; one 
might expect that the level of resistance is lower in these smaller hospitals. However, due to 
limited or non-existent microbiology laboratory capacity in the smaller hospitals, we do not 
have data to understand the actual AMR prevalence in these settings. In addition, with the 
objectives of AMR surveillance in the VINARES project, it was not feasible to set up active 
surveillance components to enhance the sensitivity and the ability to detect rare resistance. 
Based on the outputs of the evaluation using SurvTool and OASIS, the score for sensitivity and 
specificity of the surveillance system was reduced due to lack of an active surveillance 
component, however, this output is only applicable when future AMR surveillance systems are 
required to detect rare resistance and subtle changes in the number of resistant cases in the 
country. Establishing an active surveillance system for AMR can be resource-consuming and 
need to be considered carefully depending on the primary objectives of the surveillance [66]. 
In this evaluation, sensitivity was estimated using the assumption that the numbers of resistant 
patients were similar all the hospitals of a given type. In addition, the surveillance cost only 
included the costs contributed by the VINARES project and did not take into account any other 
investment costs by the participating hospitals. These factors should be taken into consideration 
when applying similar assessment to other surveillance systems. 
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In this evaluation, sensitivity was estimated using the assumption that the numbers of resistant 
patients were similar all the hospitals of a given type. In addition, the surveillance cost only 
included the costs contributed by the VINARES project and did not take into account any other 
investment costs by the participating hospitals. These factors should be taken into consideration 
when applying similar assessment to other surveillance systems. 
This evaluation is the first evaluation of the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam. Since this 
was done after the VINARES projects have completed, most assessments were conducted 
retrospectively. In the future, in order to improve the performance of the surveillance systems, 
evaluation protocols should be developed and integrated from early on to provide feedback in 
time for improvement and enable the systematic and timely corrections.  
One limitation of this evaluation was the lack of good data to adequately perform assessments 
of the effectiveness attributes. As a result, alternatives of data sources were used which were 
mostly of poor quality in attempt to analyse some of these attributes. For example, 
representativeness was assessed by the number of regions in network. We did not have data for 
further assessment of representativeness in each bacteria or disease. Likewise, the sensitivity 
assessment might be biased toward underestimation as the hospitals in the surveillance network 
were major secondary and tertiary hospitals of Viet Nam and the proportion of resistant cases 
among patients might be higher than the overall proportion in the country. Sensitivity was 
lower among E. coli and K. pneumoniae – these bacteria are found commonly as pathogens in 
the community - and was higher among A. baumannii – bacteria found frequently as pathogens 
in ICU because the coverage of provincial hospitals in VINARES was lower than national and 
specialized hospitals. It is therefore premature and difficult to interpret and draw any 
conclusions on these attributes. 
Regarding the costs of the surveillance system, the VINARES 2 cost per outcome unit was 
lower than in VINARES 1 for two reasons. VINARES 2’s total cost was lower than VINARES 
1 as it was inherited from VINARES 1. No investment on initial setting up such as network 
settlement, materials and training were required for VINARES 2. Moreover, there were more 
patients who had samples collected and AST done in 2016 than in 2012 which explained the 
lower cost per isolate in the 2016 period. 
This is the first study which applied the SurvTool for the evaluation of AMR surveillance 
systems in human health. In comparison with an evaluation of gonococcal AMR surveillance 
in Australia which was carried out in 2005 using the guidelines for the evaluation of 
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surveillance systems developed by US CDC [52], this study had different definition of 
effectiveness attributes, although this guideline proposed the same performance attributes that 
were already mentioned in SurvTool. The simplicity, flexibility, sensitivity, representativeness, 
timeliness and acceptability attributes were evaluated. Similar to our study, their evaluation did 
not have control data to quantify sensitivity in terms of probability of detection; but the 
sensitivity was assessed differently - by comparing the increasing resistant cases in the 
surveillance system with the report from a reference laboratory. The timeliness was simply 
assessed by representing the frequency of releasing the report: quarterly and annual reports 
within six months of the end of the reporting period. According to WHO, this frequency was 
adequate for reporting AMR trends [180]. So, the annual report of AMRSS of Viet Nam could 
be considered as not sufficient.  
In comparison with other AMRSS reviewed previously, the VINARES surveillance system 
shared a similar limitation in terms of a lack of population data in order to have accurate 
assessments. VINARES had similar timeliness in terms of feedback, data update and reporting 
in comparison to S42 and S54. VINARES targeted a wider range of pathogens, type of hospitals 
and regions of Viet Nam, unlike the previous systems that only targeted a specific pathogen 
(e.g. S54) or only included a type of medical laboratories (e.g. S66). Regarding the estimated 
coverage, VINARES appeared to have a lower coverage than some other AMRSS including 
S54 and S38. 
Since 2016, this network of hospitals has been officially recognized as the national surveillance 
network for AMR by the MoH in Viet Nam (decision 6211) with continuing EQA, surveillance 
protocols and data submission portal in development. This set-up should allow the national 
network to start operating smoothly based on the strengths of VINARES. The organization and 
objectives of the AMR surveillance system in the VINARES period 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 
were well defined. The surveillance tool and training as set up in VINARES was sufficient for 
a sustainable AMR surveillance system in a low-resourced setting such as Viet Nam.  
Two areas for improvement that might be applied to the current national surveillance system 
are: (1) to develop and establish an automatic data management and reporting system along the 
surveillance process to improve the passive detection and reporting of AMR and (2) to develop 
an adapted evaluation protocol to systematically and regularly assess the performance and 
effectiveness of the surveillance system. 
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Since 2016, the national surveillance network is led by the Medical Services Administration 
within the Viet Nam MoH and has received support through the Fleming Fund pilot grant (held 
by OUCRU) and the Global Health Security Agenda with US CDC and PATH as main 
partners. The Fleming Fund country grant replaced the pilot grant funding and is held by 
FHI360 with subcontracts to PATH and OUCRU. Recently, three university hospitals (in the 
north, central and south of Viet Nam) were added to the network. Regular laboratory trainings 
have been conducted by OUCRU and its host, the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases. 
Monthly UK-NEQAS panels for identification and AST are distributed and results are collected 
by OUCRU. Failure to submit the right result is fed back and discussed with the labs and extra 
training is conducted where needed. PATH has developed a website and portal for sites to 
submit AMR data from WHONET and all laboratories have been provided with laptops with 
WHONET translated into Vietnamese installed. A ministerial committee is developing a 
surveillance protocol based on GLASS, with relevant vaccine-preventable and locally relevant 
pathogens added, with the aim to also collect sufficient clinical metadata for the data to inform 
clinical decision-making and treatment guidelines.  
To increase the utility of AMR surveillance data, a pilot research project “A Clinically-
Oriented Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network) (ACORN) has been initiated 
recently in the Oxford Tropical Network (OUCRU and Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine 
Research Unit-  MORU) aiming to establish an efficient and pragmatic protocol compatible 
with GLASS to capture clinical data for linking with microbiology data in the surveillance 
system in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos [181,182]. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This evaluation reveals the strengths and weaknesses of VINARES’s surveillance system in two 
periods. It could be a reference for researchers and public health organizations in establishing an 
efficient AMRSS. The type of hospitals has an effect on the efficacy of AMRSS. The objective of the 
system was clear, central and hospital units were well structured, and the surveillance protocol was 
consistent over time; all of these factors allow trends in AMR over time to be identified. Although 
VINARES has low coverage and sensitivity based on the comparison with the national statistics, the 
structure of VINARES could be considered sufficient to capture the overall AMR situation in a LMIC 
setting such as Viet Nam. The result suggests appropriately building a core network of participant 
hospitals can help to increase the effectiveness and decrease the cost per income unit. Further evaluation 
should be undertaken to optimize the effectiveness of AMRSS based on the backbone of VINARES as 
it is now the national surveillance system for AMR in Viet Nam.
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Chapter 3 
 
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of 
VINARES project in two periods:  
2012-2013 and 2016-2017 
 
 
 
During the time of implementation, the VINARES project generated AMR data for two time 
periods: 2012-2013 and 2016-2017. These datasets are important in providing an understanding 
of the overall AMR patterns for infection-causing bacteria in the hospitals in the network, 
informing clinical treatment in practice and supporting design and evaluation of control 
interventions. For my PhD thesis, these data are necessary as baseline data inputs to evaluate 
the VINARES surveillance system and optimize the AMR surveillance systems through 
modelling the effectiveness and costs of hypothetical surveillance systems in chapter 4.  
This chapter presents the work of analysing these two datasets that have formed two peer-
reviewed articles, one has been published in Journal of Global Antimicrobial Resistance [183] 
and one will be submitted soon. 
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3.1. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing and antibiotic consumption results from 
16 hospitals in Viet Nam- the VINARES project, 2012-2013. 
3.1.1. Introduction 
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) among common bacterial pathogens is recognized as a global 
health threat, leading to a significant increase in healthcare costs, treatment failures and deaths 
[155]. The issue is more pressing in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) like Viet Nam 
where the burden of resistant infections is disproportionate, while data and evidence on the 
exact burden and epidemiology are scarce [31].  
Overuse and inappropriate use of antibiotics is an important driver for the emergence and 
spread of AMR. The World Health Organization (WHO) has introduced a six-point policy 
package on World Health Day 2011, including surveillance of antimicrobial resistance and use 
and rational antimicrobial use [184], which served as the framework for the Global and most 
National Action Plans of member states. WHO also published a comprehensive set of 
recommendations to track antimicrobial use and resistance in bacteria, and to ensure a better 
use of antibiotics and reduce antimicrobial use in animal husbandry [64]. In Viet Nam, there is 
substantial overuse of antimicrobial drugs, both in the animal health sector and in hospitals and 
the community in the human health sector [185][164]. An observational study of antibiotic sales 
in northern Viet Nam showed high proportions of transactions at pharmacies that included 
antibiotics: 24% in the urban sites and 30% in the rural sites, the large majority without 
prescription [186]. 
Since 1988, a number of national and international efforts have been made to implement AMR 
surveillance in Viet Nam, at different scales. Table 3.1.1 describes the objectives, scale and 
results of each project.  
The Viet Nam Resistance network (VINARES) was launched in 2012 as a collaboration 
between the Ministry of Health, the Vietnamese Infectious Diseases Society, the Oxford 
University Clinical Research Unit-Viet Nam (OUCRU) and Linköping University, Sweden 
together with 16 hospitals across the country [166]. Here we describe the Antimicrobial 
Sensitivity Testing (AST) results from isolates from clinical specimens from the microbiology 
laboratories and the antimicrobial consumption data from the pharmacies from the VINARES 
hospitals between October 2012 and September 2013. These results provide an update on 
earlier results published in the situation analysis ([164]) and allow for recommendations of 
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improvement of data collection to use as evidence for design and implementation of targeted 
interventions to tackle antibacterial overuse and resistance in Viet Nam. 
3.1.2. Methods 
Data collection 
The VINARES network was described previously [166]. Sixteen hospitals were included, 
among which seven in the northern, three in the central and six in the southern region of Viet 
Nam; including 7 national and 9 provincial level hospitals; 2 tropical diseases, 2 paediatric and 
one surgical hospital(s) (figure 3.1.1). Antibiotic consumption was reported monthly by 
pharmacy department. Each department was provided with a laptop and an Excel file to enter 
the detail antibiotic consumption in ICU ward and in whole hospital. In few cases, patients had 
to buy outside medicine that was not available in pharmacy department (e.g. colistin). We 
ignored this situation but it did not affect to the result as it was very rare. 
A baseline laboratory assessment was conducted at the 16 participating hospitals. Laboratories 
were provided with American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) reference strains for internal 
quality control and were enrolled to the monthly UK-NEQAS identification and AST external 
quality assessment programme. Each laboratory performed identification and susceptibility test 
on an isolate sent monthly by UK-NEQAS and uploaded the result on their website. UK-
NEQAS assessed the test results and returned the report to OUCRU. Each microbiology 
laboratory was also provided a laptop, surveillance database software (WHONET) [173], and 
up-to-date Vietnamese-translated Clinical Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) guidelines 
(M100-S22) [73]. Staff from all participating sites were trained during several workshops on 
microbiology methods and the use of WHONET. A helpdesk was set up to address any issues 
throughout the project. Reported data including AST results from bacterial isolates from 
clinical specimens sent in for routine diagnostics and hospital-wide antibiotic consumption in 
the 16 participating hospitals were sent monthly from October 2012 to September 2013. AST 
results were entered manually into WHONET or exported from automated AST as VITEK2 
(bioMérieux, Marcy l’Étoile, France) or LABCONN (Labsoft, Viet Nam) using BacLink 
(provided with WHONET). There were four hospitals that used automated systems, 11 used 
manual and one used both. A configuration file was developed for each laboratory to convert 
data. Both AST and antimicrobial usage data were submitted regularly or on request by email. 
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Table 3.1.1: Objectives, scale and results of AMR surveillance projects which were implemented between 1990-2017 in Viet Nam .   
Project Year Scale Vietnamese sites Description Result of program 
NPSAR (former 
ASTS) [162] [163] 
1988 – 
2006 
Viet Nam 9 (in 1988) 
31 (1993) 
NPSAR – implemented by MoH - was a 
national surveillance program for AMR. 
Bacteria causing infectious diseases in in-
patients and out-patients were isolated and 
tested for antimicrobial susceptibility. 
Escherichia coli producing ESBL: 7.7% 
(42/548) 
Klebsiella pneumoniae producing ESBL: 23.7% 
(115/485) 
ANSORP [32] 1996 Asia 1 Children’s Hospital 2, HCMC, participated in a 
project of surveillance for pneumococcal 
resistance among clinical Streptococcus 
pneumoniae isolates that were collected from 
14 centres in 11 countries in Asia and the 
Middle East between 2000 and 2001.  
Proportion of penicillin non-susceptibility S. 
pneumoniae (71.4%) in Viet Nam, highest 
among participant countries. 
Amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (AMC) resistance 
rate was 22.2%. 
ANSORP [33] 2004 - 
2006 
Asia 1 A prospective, multinational surveillance study 
with molecular typing analysis that was 
performed to understand the changing 
epidemiology of Staphylococcus aureus 
infections in Asian countries.  
University of Medicine and Pharmacy in 
HCMC, Viet Nam reported hospital- and 
community-acquired S. aureus were 74.1% and 
30.1%, respectively. Second highest rates of 
MRSA among participants, lower than Sri 
Lanka. 
Multi-centre 2008-2009 Global 3 This study assessed the variation in 
management and adherence to treatment 
guidelines of S. aureus bacteraemia treated 
consecutively over one year in eight centres in 
80 patients (19%) from Viet Nam had 
methicillin-resistant S. aureus bacteraemia. 
 Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of VINARES project: 2012-2013  
 
81 
 
evaluation study on 
S. aureus 
bacteremia [187] 
the United Kingdom, three in Viet Nam and one 
in Nepal.  
GARP[164] 2009 Global 15 GARP-Viet Nam and Oxford University 
Clinical Research Unit (OUCRU) collaborated 
with the Vietnamese MoH to set up new 
antibiotic resistance surveillance program. A 
cross-sectional study was performed to collect 
antibiotic resistance and antibiotic use data 
from 15 participating hospitals 2009. 
E. coli resistant to cefuroxime (30-80%), to 
SXT from 60-80%. 
E. coli and K. pneumoniae producing ESBL 
were 15%-57% and 7%-73%, respectively. 
40% of Pseudomonas aeruginosa and 60% of 
Acinetobacter spp. were resistant to 
ceftazidime. 
 
SOAR [165] 2009-2011 Global 11 A study on AMR surveillance of respiratory 
pathogens. Isolates of S. pneumoniae and H. 
influenzae were obtained from clinical materials 
taken from adults and paediatric patients with 
community-acquired respiratory infections. 
 
  
47.8% and 93.1% of S. pneumoniae were non-
susceptible to penicillin and resistant to 
azithromycin.  
40.5% of Haemophilus influenzae produced β-
lactamase. 
Resistances to AMC for S. pneumoniae and H. 
influenzae were low (3.1% and 2.6%, 
respectively). 
SMART [188] 2009 – 
2011 
Global 4 A study on antimicrobial susceptibility rates in 
aerobic Gram-negative bacteria causing intra-
ESBL positive in E. coli and K. pneumoniae 
were 48.1% and 39.5%, respectively.7.7% of 13 
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abdominal infections in Viet Nam (2 sites in 
HCMC and 2 sites in Hanoi). 
P. aeruginosa isolates were resistant to 
ceftazidime but none to ciprofloxacin. 
AMR: Antimicrobial Resistance; NPSAR: National Program for Surveillance in Antimicrobial Resistance; ASTS: Antimicrobial Sensitivity Testing Study; MoH: Ministry of 
Health; ESBL: Extended spectrum beta-lactamase; AMC: Amoxicillin/clavulanic acid; ANSORP: Asian Network for Surveillance of Resistant Pathogens; HCMC: Ho Chi 
Minh City; MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; GARP: Global Antibiotic Resistance Partnership; SXT: Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; SOAR: Survey of 
Antibiotic Resistance; SMART: Study for Monitoring Antimicrobial Resistance Trends. 
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All duplicate isolates for the same patient (identical specimen type and bacterium) in the AST 
dataset were excluded following WHO recommendations [39]. Results obtained by disk 
diffusion (DD) and minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) methods were combined. If both 
were performed the MIC result was used. Reported resistance rates are the proportion of 
bacteria with the AST showing resistance (result = R). Intermediate susceptible isolates (result 
= I) were not considered as resistant. Results were accepted, analysed and reported as is, and 
generally no confirmatory testing of unexpected results or rare phenotypes in reference or 
central laboratories was performed according to current practice in most LMICs.   
 
Figure 3.1.1: Location, speciality, and type of the 16 participating hospitals in the VINARES 2012-2013 project. 
Source: doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001429.g001  
Data analysis 
The number and proportion of nine indicator bacteria (Acinetobacter spp., Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, Haemophilus influenzae, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella spp., Staphylococcus aureus, 
Enterobacter spp., Enterococcus faecium and Streptococcus pneumoniae) were described 
overall, by patient age group, sex and specimen type. 
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An S. aureus isolate was counted as MRSA if it tested resistant to oxacillin or cefoxitin in 
screening. Similarly, S. pneumoniae isolates were counted as reduced susceptible to penicillin 
if resistance to oxacillin by disk diffusion was reported (also if unconfirmed by MIC testing). 
Resistance rates were reported for all specimens combined and for a subgroup of invasive 
isolates from blood and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). The proportion assessed by disk diffusion 
or MIC was reported if applicable. A sample was considered resistant to an antibiotic class if 
it was resistant to at least one antibiotic agent in that class as per CLSI guidelines. 
The antibiotic consumption was summarized in number of Defined Daily Dose per 1 000 bed 
days (DDD/1000 patient-days). The Defined Daily Dose is the assumed average maintenance 
dose per day for a drug used for its main indication in adults, which can be obtained from the 
WHO Antimicrobial DDD Quick Reference List [153]. The DDD/1000 patient-days was 
calculated by antibiotic class and did not depend on bed size of hospital. 
For each pathogen – antimicrobial combination, the resistant proportion was calculated as the 
ratio between the number of resistant isolates and number of tested isolates for that drug. All 
hospitals were anonymized and coded from H1 to H16. R software (version 3.1.11) was used 
for the analysis [189]. 
3.1.3. Results 
3.1.3.1. Distribution of bacteria and antibiotics 
AST results were reported for 26,808 isolates from the VINARES network between October 
2012 and September 2013. After de-duplication and removal of fungi, 24,732 bacterial isolates 
were included in the analysis.  
The most commonly isolated organisms were: E. coli (4,437 isolates, 18%), Klebsiella spp. 
(3,290 isolates, 13%) – including 2,206 K. pneumoniae isolates (9%), Acinetobacter spp. 
(2,895 isolates, 12%) – including 1,668 A. baumannii isolates (7%), P. aeruginosa (2,326 
isolates, 9%), S. aureus (2,039 isolates, 8%), Enterobacter spp. (1,067 isolates, 4%), S. 
pneumoniae (813 isolates, 3%), H. influenzae (404 isolates, 2%) E. faecium (98 isolates, 1%). 
Gram-negative bacteria accounted for 69% (17,065 isolates) and Gram-positive for 31% (7,667 
isolates). Sputum was the most frequently reported specimen (3,625 isolates, 15%); followed 
by blood (3,222 isolates, 13%). Eleven percent of total isolates were recovered from blood and 
CSF. 
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The distribution of isolates by gender and age of patient and type of specimen for the nine 
indicator bacteria is summarized in supplementary table S3.1.1. Among 17,369 common 
bacteria (E. coli, K. pneumoniae, A. baumannii, P. aeruginosa, S. aureus, Enterobacter spp., 
S. pneumoniae, H. influenza and E. faecium), a higher proportion was isolated from male (66%) 
than from female patients (34%), reflecting the usual hospital population in Viet Nam. E. coli, 
K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa and Acinetobacter spp. (including A. baumannii) were mainly 
reported from adults aged over 20, while S. aureus and S. pneumoniae were more commonly 
reported from children aged 10 years or less.  
The distribution of bacteria was stratified by hospitals and by region separately (figure 3.1.2). 
Acinetobacter spp. were found mostly in two major general hospitals (H2 and H4). H. 
influenzae was isolated mainly from children, with more than 50% from one paediatric hospital 
(H11). The proportion of E. coli was similar across the three regions and, overall, the pathogen 
distribution appeared similar across regions too. 
 
Figure 3.1.2: Percentage of bacteria by hospitals (a) and by regions (b) of 16 hospitals in VINARES 2012-2013 project.  
Antibiotic consumption was summarized by hospital and region separately. One hospital (H2) 
did not provide consumption data. The average antibiotic consumption was 918 DDD/1,000 
patient-days per hospital. Hospitals in the central and southern region had similar antibiotic 
consumption rates (1,079 and 1,026 DDD/1000 patient-days, respectively), while a lower rate 
was reported on average from hospitals in the northern region (799 DDD/1000 patient-days, 
after excluding a paediatric hospital). Most commonly used antibiotics were third-generation 
cephalosporins (223 DDD/1000 patient-days, 24%), fluoroquinolones (151 DDD/1000 patient-
days, 16%), second-generation cephalosporins (112 DDD/1000 patient-days, 12%), penicillin 
combinations (111 DDD/1000 patient-days, 12%), followed by aminoglycosides (54 
DDD/1000 patient-days, 6%), penicillins with extended spectrum (53 DDD/1000 patient-days, 
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6%), fourth-generation cephalosporins (49 DDD/1000 patient-days, 5%), carbapenems (35 
DDD/1000 patient-days, 4%) and glycopeptides (10 DDD/1000 patient-days, 1%). Overall, 
third-generation cephalosporins were the largest group in all regions, followed by 
fluoroquinolones (figure 3.1.3). Two thirds of second-generation cephalosporins were used in 
the central region. 
 
Figure 3.1.3: Antibiotic consumption in number of Defined Daily Dose / 1000 patient-days by hospitals and regions, 
collected from 15 hospitals of VINARES 2012-2013 period. One hospitals did not provide data.  
3.1.3.2. Antimicrobial susceptibilities 
General 
The proportion of isolates having AST varied by hospital; more ASTs were performed at 
national hospitals than in provincial hospitals (supplementary table S3.1.2). Vancomycin-
susceptibility test for E. faecium and imipenem-susceptibility test for P. aeruginosa were the 
most frequently carried out across the hospitals (98% and 76%, respectively). Four hospitals 
(H3, H4, H8, H12) had tested more than 95% of reported isolates. 
Figure 3.1.4 illustrated the resistant proportions of each pathogen – antimicrobial combination 
and its relationship with the amount of antibiotic used and the number of isolates. Second-
generation cephalosporins are not included in figure 3.1.4 because most hospitals did not test 
for these. More than 50% of Enterobacteriaceae were resistant to third-generation 
cephalosporins and fluoroquinolones. Carbapenem-resistant proportions were highest among 
Acinetobacter spp. (around 75%), followed by P. aeruginosa (around 50%) and lowest in 
Enterobacteriaceae (around 25%). S. aureus and E. faecium were susceptible to vancomycin, 
but the susceptibility results of E. faecium should be interpreted with caution because of the 
low numbers. S. pneumoniae was susceptible while nearly 50% of H. influenzae were resistant 
to combinations of penicillins.  
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Figure 3.1.4: Resistant proportion, number of isolates and number of  Defined Daily Dose/1000 patient-days per antibiotic 
group of 15 hospitals in VINARES 2012-2013 project. 
For each pathogen – antimicrobial combination, the resistant proportion was shown in bottom left figure; the number of isolates 
for each organism was in top left and the number of DDD/1000 patient-days of antibiotic group was in bottom right. The 
resistant proportion was calculated for 15 hospitals that provided antibiotic consumption data. DDD/1000 patient-days figure 
illustrates the amount of antibiotic used for all bacterial treatment, not for any specific bacteria. Untested or clinically irrelevant 
pathogen – antimicrobial combinations were not shown. 
 
AST results of Gram-positive bacteria 
Table 3.1.2 showed AST result for S. aureus, S. pneumoniae and E. faecium. S. aureus was 
isolated from 2,039 specimens. 258 (13%) were from blood and CSF. Among 1,580 tested, 
1,098 (69%) S. aureus isolates were identified as MRSA. Similar resistance rates were 
observed for isolates from blood and CSF isolates from all specimens. D-test for induced 
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clindamycin resistance was not separately reported, therefore resistance may be 
underestimated. 
Results from 813 S. pneumoniae isolates included 87 from blood and CSF. 99% (353/358) 
ceftriaxone, 39% (86/221) penicillin and 54% (349/641) vancomycin susceptibility tests were 
done / confirmed using E-tests. 115/344 isolates (33%) of S. pneumoniae showed reduced 
susceptibility to penicillin; the corresponding percentage in blood and CSF isolates was 7/30 
(23%). S. pneumoniae susceptibility to penicillin was screened using oxacillin disks; 86 isolates 
were confirmed by penicillin MIC test. Out of 194 oxacillin disk diffusion results showing 
resistance, 87 (45%) were not confirmed by penicillin susceptibility test. Regarding blood and 
CSF specimens, there were 6 isolates confirmed by penicillin MIC test, and they were all 
susceptible. 10 isolates (2%) of S. pneumoniae were resistant to vancomycin (2/10 of resistant 
isolates were confirmed by E-test). These results were not confirmed in a reference laboratory 
or molecularly, and this should be interpreted with caution. 
Among 98 E. faecium isolates, only one amoxicillin susceptibility test was done. 78% of 
isolates were vancomycin susceptible while the proportion of normal-level gentamicin-
susceptibility was lower than 50%. 
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Table 3.1.2: Antimicrobial susceptibility results of S. aureus, S. pneumoniae and E. faecium isolated in 16 hospitals of the VINARES 2012-2013 project 
Resistance  
/ Tested isolates (%) 
S. aureus S. pneumoniae E. faecium 
All specimens 
(n = 2039) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 258) 
All specimens 
(n = 813) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 87) 
All specimens 
(n = 98) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 24) 
MRSA 1098/1580 (69) 145/197 (74)     
Vancomycin 22/823 (3) 2/135 (1) 10/641 (2) 1/74 (1) 21/96 (22) 3/24 (12) 
Ciprofloxacin 456/1277 (36) 71/189 (38) 2/12 (17) 0/0 (NT)   
Erythromycin 985/1315 (75) 103/143 (72) 246/289 (85) 26/29 (90)   
Clindamycin 639/907 (70) 74/118 (63)     
Gentamicin 435/1155 (38) 55/135 (41)   26/46 (57) 8/9 (89) 
Levofloxacin 333/852 (39) 40/125 (32)     
SXT 261/1156 (23) 41/141 (29)     
Penicillin   115/344 (33)* 7/30 (22)**   
Ceftriaxone   90/358 (25) 9/52 (17)   
Amoxicillin     1/1 (100) 0/0 (NT) 
CSF: Cerebrospinal fluid; MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SXT: Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; * screened with oxacillin, 86 isolated were confirmed 
by MIC method and only one isolate was resistant to penicillin; ** screened with oxacillin, only 6 isolates was confirmed by MIC method and all were susceptible to penicillin; 
Untested or clinically irrelevant pathogen – antimicrobial combinations were not shown
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AST results of Gram-negative bacteria 
Enterobacteriaceae’s susceptibility for amikacin, cefotaxime, ciprofloxacin, gentamicin, 
imipenem, tobramycin and trimethoprim / sulfamethoxazole are shown in table 3.1.3. Among 
the 4,437 E. coli submitted, 527 (12%) were from blood and CSF and 992 (23%) from urine. 
More than 80% of ASTs for E. coli were carried out by disk diffusion. Resistance was above 
50% for third-generation cephalosporins and fluoroquinolones. Lower resistance levels were 
seen for imipenem and amikacin. Resistance rates among all isolates were generally higher 
than proportions observed in blood and CSF isolates (p < 0.0001 for cefotaxime and 
ciprofloxacin; p = 0.03 for SXT). 
Of the 3,290 available Klebsiella spp. isolates, 2,206 were K. pneumoniae. Resistance rates to 
third-generation cephalosporins and carbapenems were 68% and 16%, respectively. Similar to 
E. coli, proportions of resistance to cefotaxime, ciprofloxacin and SXT were also lower among 
blood and CSF than all isolates (p < 0.0001 for all).  
Among the 1,067 Enterobacter spp. isolates (82 from blood and CSF) 21% of isolates were 
resistant to carbapenems. 
Table 3.1.4 showed the AST results of Acinetobacter spp., P. aeruginosa and H. influenzae. 
Results from 2 895 Acinetobacter spp. (including 1,668 A. baumannii) were submitted. Data 
on colistin was available from only one hospital and 2 of 333 isolates were found to be resistant. 
Results showed very high resistant proportions for all antibiotics, from 68% (amikacin) to 77% 
(ceftazidime). Resistant proportions of Acinetobacter spp. for imipenem and amikacin in blood 
and CSF were lower than in other specimens (p < 0.0001 for both). 
Of the 2,326 P. aeruginosa isolates submitted, 154 were from blood and CSF. The resistance 
rate to ceftazidime was 33%, similar to blood and CSF specimens. 33% of isolates were 
resistant to imipenem while 39% were aminoglycosides-resistant. Blood isolates had lower 
aminoglycosides-resistance levels in comparison with all isolates (p=0.04).  
H. influenzae was isolated from 404 specimens; including 10 from blood and CSF. 160 (71%) 
isolates were resistant to ampicillin. The resistance rate to amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (AMC) 
and cefotaxime were 39% and 44%, respectively. 
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Table 3.1.3: Antimicrobial susceptibility results of E. coli, Klebsiella spp., Enterobacter spp. isolated in 16 hospitals of VINARES 2012-2013 project 
 Resistance  
/ Tested isolates (%) 
E. coli Klebsiella spp. Enterobacter spp. 
All specimens 
(n = 4437) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 527) 
All specimens 
(n = 3 290) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 413) 
All specimens 
(n = 1067) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 82) 
Amikacin 321/2936 (11) 36/394 (9) 638/2 163 (29) 61/329 (19) 149/768 (19) 11/58 (19) 
Cefotaxime  2342/4192 (56) 240/514 (47) 1479/2227 (66) 101/190 (53) 483/802 (60) 25/48 (52) 
Ciprofloxacin 1758/3052 (58) 188/397 (47) 1222/2305 (53) 139/332 (42) 277/741 (37) 28/63 (44) 
Gentamicin 1285/2655 (48) 111/282 (39) 1042/1989 (52) 99/233 (42) 294/760 (39) 21/47 (45) 
Imipenem 180/2977 (6) 15/403 (4) 393/2 294 (17) 64/361 (18) 144/665 (22) 12/70 (17) 
SXT 1994/2803 (71) 196/298 (66) 1242/2007 (62) 118/236 (50) 360/709 (51) 24/51 (47) 
Tobramycin 502/1309 (38) 52/247 (21) 588/1377 (43) 65/236 (28)  142/386 (37) 16/48 (33) 
 CSF: Cerebrospinal fluid; SXT: Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole 
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Table 3.1.4: Antimicrobial susceptibility results of Acinetobacter spp., P. aeruginosa, H. influenzae isolated in the VINARES 2012-2013 project 
Resistance  
/ Tested isolates (%) 
Acinetobacter spp. P. aeruginosa H. influenzae  
All specimens 
(n = 2895) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 313) 
All specimens 
(n = 2326) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 154) 
All specimens 
(n = 404) 
Blood and CSF 
(n = 10) 
Amikacin 1347/1993 (68) 82/188 (44) 329/1556 (21) 13/82 (16)   
Cefotaxime      118/270 (44) 5/10 (50) 
Ciprofloxacin 1298/1733 (75) 74/207 (36) 496/1527 (32) 33/120 (28) 17/269 (6) 0/10 (0) 
Gentamicin 1385/1837 (75) 130/214 (61) 566/1456 (39) 33/106 (31)   
Imipenem 1495/2138 (70) 110/244 (45) 578/1765 (33) 36/129 (28) 33/341 (10) 0/10 (0) 
SXT 1258/1799 (70) 86/192 (45)   46/60 (77) 3/5 (60) 
Ceftazidime 1650/2146 (77) 124/242 (51) 602/1826 (33) 43/133 (32)   
TCC 771/1128 (68) 47/141 (33)       
AMC     109/276 (39) 2/5 (40) 
Erythromycin     3/3 (100) 0/0 (NT) 
Ampicillin     160/226 (71) 3/5 (60) 
CSF: Cerebrospinal fluid; SXT: Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; TCC: Ticarcillin/clavulanic acid; AMC: Amoxicillin/clavulanic acid.
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3.1.4. Discussion 
We describe the AST and antibiotic usage results reported from the VINARES network in Viet 
Nam between 2012 and 2013. Overall, the data showed high proportions of AMR among all 
tested bacteria across all hospitals in the network. Our results also show large variations in the 
resistant proportions between hospitals. This highlights the importance of continuous 
monitoring of local antibiotic use and bacterial resistance - one of the core strategies in the 
National Action Plan on combatting drug resistance [156]. Overall, we find lower proportions 
of resistance in samples taken among isolates from blood and CSF samples, likely reflecting 
different proportions of hospital acquired isolates among sample-types. 
Cephalosporins, fluoroquinolones and penicillin covered 70% antibiotic use. Hospitals were 
more likely to use fluoroquinolones and less likely to use cephalosporins in 2012 (16%) than 
in 2008 (11%) [185]. This may be explained by the change of antimicrobial susceptibility 
between the two periods. 
The antibiotic use DDD/1000 patient-days provides a rough indication that 91% of patients in 
hospitals were on antibiotic treatment. However, DDD/1000 patient-days is not an appropriate 
measure to study the impact of antimicrobial stewardship because DDD/1000 patient-days can 
be misrepresented by use of combination therapy or use of higher dosages for certain 
indications or guided by therapeutic drug monitoring (not yet practiced in Viet Nam). This 
biases towards higher DDD/1000 patient-days, and thus an overestimate of antibiotic use. As 
evidence of these biases in DDD/1000 patient-days measurements, a monthly point prevalence 
study conducted in ICUs within VINARES reported that the proportion of patients receiving 
antibiotics at survey time was 85% (2787 of 3287) and that 60% of patients were prescribed 
more than one antibiotic [190]. This result was higher compared to the point-prevalence 
conducted in 2008 (67% (5104 of 7571) of patients receiving antibiotics) [185]. Two possible 
explanations were that 16/36 participating sites of the previous study were district-level 
hospitals with an expected lower usage and that there has been an increase of usage of antibiotic 
in hospitals over time. The global report of antibiotic consumption also stated an increase of 
20-25 DDD/1000 patient-days in Viet Nam in 2010-2015 period [191].  
The number of days of antimicrobial therapy (DOT) can be used along with DDD/1000 patient-
days to report antibiotic consumption practices in hospital, which offers more clinical relevance 
[192]. DOT reports the administration of a single agent on a given day regardless of the number 
of doses administered or dosage concentration [193], and this avoids the overestimation of 
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usage. DDD/1000 patient-days allows the comparison of antibiotic use across countries and 
hospitals, while DOT could make conclusions about the relative use of one antibiotic compared 
with another [193]. The measurement of DOT might be difficult for most of hospitals [192]. 
The measurement of antibiotic use by DDD/1000 patient-days and DOT per 1000 patient-days 
were dissimilar because the administered dose is dissimilar from the DDD recommended by 
the WHO, according to a study on 130 hospitals in US [193]. 
We reported similar levels of resistance among four gram-negative bacteria including E. coli, 
K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa and Acinetobacter spp. compared to the GARP situation 
analysis [164]. Further studies to evaluate the changes in antibiotic consumption and the likely 
effect on resistance levels at hospitals are warranted to prioritize targets of intervention. In 
addition, linking microbiology and susceptibility data with clinical data should be aimed for in 
this surveillance network to allow assessment of the origin of the infection (community versus 
hospital acquired) for better informing evidence-based guidelines. 
In the GARP situation analysis, an MRSA proportion of between 30 to 64% was reported [164]. 
An evaluation from 2008-2009 in three hospitals in Viet Nam revealed an MRSA proportion 
of 19% in 80 patients with S. aureus bacteraemia [187]; while here we report 61% of MRSA in 
blood and CSF specimens. Better and more comprehensive surveillance methodology may 
explain the higher proportions of MRSA bacteraemia. In VINARES, all MRSA tests were done 
by oxacillin or cefoxitin disc diffusion test, which is a reliable proxy for detection of MRSA 
[194]. 
More than 50% of S. pneumoniae were non-susceptible to penicillin. This was also confirmed 
in a recent review by WHO [8], showing the result of penicillin non-susceptibility from 47-
48% in 2 countries in the South-East Asia and 17-64% in 10 countries of Western Pacific 
region. However, the extent of the problem is uncertain to determine partly due to variations in 
how reduced susceptibility is being reported and large proportions of intermediate results. The 
SOAR study reported 48% (138/289) of penicillin-non-susceptibility among S. pneumoniae 
[165].  
Carbapenems were still mostly active against the tested Enterobacteriaceae. Compared to 2009, 
there was a slight increase of resistance to imipenem among E. coli (from 2% to 6%) and 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (from 10% to 17%) [164]. Most imipenem-susceptibility tests for 
Enterobacteriaceae were done by disk diffusion, but this may not be as reliable as the broth 
microdilution or other methods [195]. Klebsiella spp. showed increased resistance to third-
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generation cephalosporins in comparison with 2009 situation analysis study (from 40% to 
66%). Fourth-generation of cephalosporins also had less effect on these species. For E. coli, 
we showed similarly high resistant proportions to the conventional agents used for treatment 
such as SXT and third-generation cephalosporins in comparison with the 2009 situation 
analysis (from 60-80%) [164]. These data showed the persistent and increasing problem of 
Enterobacteriaceae resistance to third-generation cephalosporins in the hospital settings. Even 
though resistance to carbapenems in our report is still low, the levels tend to increase in 
comparison with the 2009 situation analysis and are likely to continue increasing unless 
effective interventions are undertaken.  
P. aeruginosa was still susceptible to ceftazidime, ciprofloxacin and imipenem with a resistant 
proportion around 30%. The 2009 situation analysis showed similar proportions, around 40% 
resistance to ceftazidime and ciprofloxacin in 2009 [164]. Data from VINARES are more likely 
to reflect the actual resistant proportiongiven the improved and quality assessed 
microbiological and reporting practices. P. aeruginosa was among the three most common 
aetiologies of hospital acquired infections in ICUs in Viet Nam in the same period [190]. This 
point prevalence survey showed higher resistant proportions of P. aeruginosa to carbapenems 
(55.7%) compared to our surveillance results, reflecting the larger burden of resistance in the 
ICU settings.  
In our study, Acinetobacter spp. also showed 70% resistance to imipenem, while the proportion 
reported in the 2009 situation analysis was only 40% [164]. High carbapenem resistance in 
these organisms raised a great concern for treatment alternatives, as colistin is usually the last 
resort and an increase in colistin resistance is likely to happen. Colistin resistance was only 
assessed at one hospital in our network, and 0.6% of 333 tested isolates showed resistance 
using E-test / VITEK (which are not the recommended standard). Higher levels of carbapenems 
(85%) and colistin (1.3 [n=78] and 31.6% [n=38]) resistance were reported from two hospitals 
(of the three provincial and university hospitals participating in VINARES) in southern Viet 
Nam in another study from 2012-2014 [196].  
VINARES reported higher AMC resistance H. influenzae in comparison to SOAR (39% and 
2.6%, respectively). This could be the result of increasing rate over time, or due to large overlap 
between participating hospitals. The SOAR samples were came from outpatients, whereas ours 
were from samples sent to the microbiology laboratories. As microbiology is underutilised in 
Viet Nam (and other LMICs) this probably represents a population with more advanced 
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infections or a more extensive history of pre-treatment and thus selection of resistance 
pathogens. This is very illustrative of how the current AMR surveillance overestimates 
resistance because of this underuse and lack of clinical metadata and denominators. 
AST was not conducted for all reported isolates and this could have introduced bias in the 
reported resistant proportions. Three explanations can be given: first, some ASTs are only 
indicated based on the results of another (e.g. in S. aureus vancomycin was only tested for 
MRSA); second, ASTs may have been only indicated when the isolates were suspected to be 
the etiological pathogen causing clinical manifestations; and third, ASTs may have been 
ordered because of failure in empirical treatment.   
For future efforts to conduct antimicrobial resistance surveillance and to provide more useful 
data for guiding local clinical treatment and public health research, it is important for clinical 
microbiology laboratories to be strengthened and better utilized. Currently, the number of 
samples coming to the laboratory is low in comparison with the number of admitted patients. 
It is likely that the more severe patients, transferred patients, patients failing primary treatment 
and patients with hospital acquired infections are overrepresented among patients from whom 
samples are sent to the laboratory. Clear clinical diagnostic and treatment guidelines, with 
consistent microbiological testing on suspicion of infectious aetiology, could partially 
overcome this bias. Clinical data should also be considered to be part of the surveillance data. 
This could include clinical syndrome, date of admission, transfer status and antibiotic use while 
sampled. 
3.1.5. Conclusion 
This project demonstrates an initiative with a large network of hospitals to monitor AMR in 
Viet Nam. Resistant proportions to common antibiotics in 16 hospitals were remarkably high, 
most have increased since the 2009 situation analysis. Policy development for pharmacies both 
in hospitals and in the community requires a structured solution to address this problem. AMR 
surveillance could be improved by enhancing capacity of clinical microbiologists through 
advanced training and upgrading WHONET program with more control of data entry and a 
pre-defined global configuration. Clinical data should be included in the reports from the 
hospitals in the future. External quality assurance is also recommended for all testing 
performed in the laboratory.
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3.2. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results from 13 hospitals in Viet Nam – 
the VINARES project, 2016-2017 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In a 2015 estimate based on data from the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network (EARS-Net), over 33,000 people die each year in the European Union as a direct 
consequence of a drug resistant bacterial infection [197]. Data in low- and middle-income 
countries are rare, but a recent estimate from Thailand that 19,122 of 45,209 (43%) deaths in 
patients with hospital-acquired infection due to multiple drug resistance (MDR) bacteria 
suggests these number may be higher [25].  
In their 2014 review, Rossolini et al. indicated an out-of-control crisis for Gram-negative 
pathogens particularly with the worrisome emergence and spread of carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae, especially in the hospital environment, while Gram-positive pathogens 
appear to be relatively under control [198].  
In May 2015, the World Health Assembly adopted a Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial 
Resistance, which highlighted the need to improve awareness and understanding of 
antimicrobial resistance and to strengthen the knowledge and evidence-based decisions through 
surveillance and research [36]. The review by the World Health Organisation (WHO) pointed 
out the lack of a global consensus on methodology and data collection for AMR surveillance. 
In addition, routine surveillance often uses samples from severe cases including those with 
hospital acquired infections and those with treatment failure, leading to an under-representation 
of samples from patients with community-acquired infections (CAI) and failure of the data to 
properly inform treatment guidelines [8]. As a response to this situation, WHO introduced that 
same year the Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS). GLASS aims 
to enable standardized, comparable and validated AMR data collection and analysis, and 
sharing of AMR data across countries to inform decision-making and action [39]. 
AMR surveillance activities were initiated in Viet Nam in 1988 with several specific programs 
as summarised previously [183], including VINARES, a network of 16 hospitals throughout 
the country collecting data on antimicrobial consumption, susceptibility testing results and 
hospital-acquired infection prevalence [166,183,190,199].  
These projects highlighted high proportions of resistance among several WHO GLASS priority 
pathogens: carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (40% in the Global Antibiotic 
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Resistance Partnership (GARP) in 2009 [164] and 70% in VINARES in 2012 [183]); 
Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae producing extended spectrum beta-lactamase 
(ESBL, 30% and 43% in 2009, respectively); carbapenem-resistant E. coli (2% in 2009 [164] 
and 6% in 2012 [183]) ; carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae (10% in 2009 [164] and 17% in 
2012 [183]); Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), reported at 30.1% for 
hospital-acquired infections in 2004 [33] and at 69% in 2012 [183]. 
In 2013, the Viet Nam Ministry of Health published its national action plan on AMR, including 
strengthening and improving the national surveillance system on the use of antimicrobials and 
drug resistance [156]. In 2015, Viet Nam received a pilot funding from the Fleming Fund to 
establish a National AMR surveillance network and reference laboratory [199]. The VINARES 
network was recognised in 2016 by the Ministry of Health as the national AMR surveillance 
network and will continue to receive support from the Fleming Fund as part of the country 
grant for Viet Nam. The national AMR surveillance network also receives support from the US 
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) and Program for Appropriate 
Technology in Health (PATH) as part of the Global Health Security Agenda. A surveillance 
protocol based on GLASS and the Fleming Fund roadmap is being developed by the Ministry 
of Health with support from US CDC, WHO and Oxford University Clinical Research Unit 
(OUCRU). Data collection as part of a project on development on evidence based guidelines 
restarted in 2016 [199]. 
In this paper, we present the Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (AST) results from isolates 
from clinical specimens from 13 microbiology laboratories participating in VINARES between 
June 2016 and May 2017. These results provide an insight in the dynamics of AMR and an 
update on the earlier results published based on data from the VINARES for the 2012-2013 
period [183]. 
3.2.2. Methods 
3.2.2.1. Data collection 
The VINARES network was described previously [166,183]. In 2016-2017, 13 hospitals (7 
provincial, 3 specialised and 3 national) continued participating in the network of which 4 were 
in the northern, 5 in the central and 4 in the southern region. Among these, there was 1 
paediatric and 2 infectious diseases hospitals (figure 3.2.1).  
WHONET was used for data entry, management and analysis [173]. Routine AST data at the 
participating laboratories was entered into WHONET 5.6 by hospital technicians or was 
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exported from automated systems including VITEK2 (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Étoile, France) or 
Phoenix automated microbiology system (BD Diagnostic Systems, Sparks, MD) using 
LABCONN (LabSoft, Viet Nam). Raw data files were extracted and submitted by email to 
OUCRU. Files were converted to WHONET format using BacLink, a free tool included in 
WHONET [200]. All data files were combined in a single file. Data files were checked for 
common errors and compatibility (language and file structure).  
3.2.2.2. Statistical analysis 
For the current report, we focused on eleven priority pathogens: Acinetobacter baumannii, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Enterobacter spp., 
Enterococcus faecium, Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus 
influenzae, Salmonella spp. and Shigella spp. [177]. Data were de-duplicated, so that one isolate 
represents one patient. Only the first isolate per patient, per pathogen, per reporting period, per 
stratification level (hospital) was included. This also minimizes bias associated with reporting 
of repeated cultures [39]. Local specimen types were converted into specimen types understood 
by WHONET. 
AST results were categorised according to Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) 
2018 guidelines as follows: susceptible, intermediate, resistant and unknown. Intermediate 
susceptibility was not considered resistant, unless otherwise indicated. For each pathogen and 
antimicrobial under surveillance, the proportion of patients with growth of resistant bacteria 
was calculated in all specimens, and separately in specimens from Intensive Care Units (ICU), 
invasive specimens (blood and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF)) or stool specimens (for Shigella spp. 
and Salmonella spp.). AST results were interpreted by WHONET (version 5.6), then 
summarized in the R software [189]. 
MRSA was assessed by oxacillin and cefoxitin screening. As not all hospitals used molecular 
or other confirmation testing, an S. aureus isolate was considered MRSA if it was resistant to 
one of these two antimicrobials. In 2012-13, reduced susceptibility to penicillin in S. 
pneumoniae was mostly detected using oxacillin screening [183]. In 2016-17 this was more 
commonly done directly by penicillin susceptibility testing using both disk diffusion and MIC 
in automated systems.  
We included five antibiotic classes in the current report: carbapenems (imipenem, meropenem 
and ertapenem), aminoglycosides (amikacin, gentamicin and tobramycin), fluoroquinolones 
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(ciprofloxacin and levofloxacin), macrolides (azithromycin, erythromycin and clindamycin) 
and cephalosporins (ceftriaxone and cefepime). 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1: Location, speciality, and type of the 13 participating hospitals in the VINARES 2016-2017 project. 
An analysis of antibiotic resistance by hospital type was carried out. Three hospital types were 
considered: national and provincial level general and specialised hospitals, as shown in figure 
3.2.1. Among the 16 hospitals participating in VINARES 2012-2013, three (one national and 
two specialised, all in the northern region) did not participate in 2016-2017 period. Data of 
each hospital type were pooled and analysed. This analysis served to compare susceptibility 
between hospital types. Only the pathogen-antimicrobial combinations with the highest sample 
numbers were selected, including imipenem-resistant A. baumannii, E. coli, ESBL-producing 
E. coli and MRSA. 
3.2.3. Results 
Distribution of bacteria and antibiotics 
Between May 2016 and April 2017, hospitals submitted results from 75,051 specimens. Among 
them, 22,752 records were unknown or reported no growth, 48,084 were Gram-negative and -
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positive bacteria, 882 were fungi, 1,454 were anaerobes, 1,864 were mycobacteria and 15 were 
parasites. 
After removal of negative cultures, fungi, anaerobes, mycobacteria and parasites and 
deduplication, 42,553 isolates were included in this analysis; including 30,222 (71%) Gram-
negative and 12,331 (29%) Gram-positive bacteria. Among all isolates, 8,793 (21%) were from 
ICUs and 7,439 (18%) were from invasive infections. 
E. coli and S. aureus were the most frequently detected species with 9,092 (21%) and 4,833 
isolates (11.3%), respectively; followed by K. pneumoniae (3,870 isolates – 9%) and A. 
baumannii (3,710 isolates – 9%). Bacteria were mainly isolated from sputum (8,798 isolates – 
21%), blood (7,118 isolates – 17%) and urine (5,202 isolates – 12%); 321 isolates (1%) were 
from cerebrospinal fluid (CSF).  
3.2.3.1. Susceptibility of Gram-positive bacteria 
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of bacteria in all specimens, in invasive specimens 
or stool and in ICU specimens were shown in table 3.2.1 to 3.2.3, respectively.  
Since not all isolates were tested for all listed antibiotics, the denominator of each susceptibility 
test was different and smaller than the number of isolates collected. There were 4,833 S. aureus 
isolates, including 715 (15%) from blood and CSF and 690 (14%) from ICU. 73% (1,824/2,510 
isolates) of S. aureus were MRSA, 71% (372/521) in blood and CSF and 69% (185/270) in 
ICU. The non-susceptible vancomycin proportion was low (2% (45/2,680) in all specimens 
and 1% (7/565) in blood and CSF). No confirmatory testing for vancomycin was reported. The 
proportion resistant to macrolides was 83% (3,861/4,661) in all specimens and 79% (545/693) 
in blood and CSF. 
E. faecium was isolated from 296 specimens, 51 (17%) from blood and CSF and 65 (22%) 
from specimens collected in ICU. 34/46 isolates (74%) were aminoglycoside-resistant. 99/290 
isolates (34%) of E. faecium were resistant to vancomycin (VRE) (19% of VRE tests were 
done by MIC method). 22 of 64 isolates (36%) from ICU were reported as vancomycin-
resistant. 78% of E. faecium isolated from blood and CSF were high level resistant to 
aminoglycosides, however the number of isolates from blood and CSF was very low (n=9). 
1367 S. pneumoniae were isolated; including 160 from blood and CSF and 184 from specimens 
collected in ICU. The penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae proportion was 83% (657/794) in all 
specimens, but much lower in blood and CSF (42%, 42/100 isolates) and among isolates from 
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specimens collected in ICU (51%, 42/83 isolates). 691/794 (87%) of penicillin susceptibility 
tests were done by MIC method. 58/356 (16%) S. pneumoniae isolates were cephalosporins-
resistant; resistance rate was lower among ICU isolates (11%, 10/94). Two isolates (0.2%) were 
recorded as resistant against vancomycin, none of them were from blood/ CSF or ICU. 
3.2.3.2. Susceptibility of Gram-negative bacteria 
Proportion of K. pneumoniae isolated from ICUs was 28% (1,069/3,870), 11% (1,016/9,092 
isolates) for E. coli and 17% (230/1,322) for Enterobacter spp. 
The proportion of E. coli carrying ESBL was 59% (4,085/6,953) and 40% (1,186/2,958) in K. 
pneumoniae. Carbapenem-resistance among E. coli, Enterobacter spp. and K. pneumoniae 
were 11% (961/8,830), 27% (1,049/3,816) and 29% (376/1,298), respectively. 
Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole-resistant Enterobacteriaceae ranged from 47% (215/454) of 
K. pneumoniae in blood and CSF to 76% (700/925) of E. coli in ICU. 
The number of isolates of A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa were similar. A high proportion of 
A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa isolates were from ICU (32% (1,176/3,710) and 33% 
(1,158/3,461), respectively). Ceftazidime-resistant proportions of A. baumannii in all 
specimens and in ICU were 2,743/3,298 (83%) and 866/958 (90%). These resistant proportions 
in P. aeruginosa were 1,378/3,231 (43%) and 574/1,062 (54%). Carbapenem-resistant 
proportions of A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa were 79% (2,855/3,622) and 45% 
(1,514/3,376), respectively.  
Of 1,085 H. influenzae isolates submitted, 146 were from ICU and 12 were from blood and 
CSF. The proportion of ampicillin-resistant H. influenzae was 88% (804/911) among all 
isolates; this proportion was higher among isolates collected on ICU (92/98 isolates – 94%). 
Three percent (18/664) of H. influenzae isolates were cephalosporins-resistant, while none 
were found resistant to carbapenems.  
Salmonella spp. and Shigella spp. susceptibility were investigated in all specimens and in stool. 
Among 277 isolates of Salmonella spp., there were 32 isolates from stool; only 18 isolates from 
ICU (table 4). Fluoroquinolones-resistant Salmonella spp. in all specimens and in stool were 
7% (18/253 and 11% (3/27), respectively. Among 53 Shigella spp. isolates, 70% came from 
stool. 7/46 (15%) of Shigella spp. were fluoroquinolone-resistant. 
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3.2.3.3. Susceptibility by hospital type 
The carbapenems- and cephalosporins resistant, ESBL and MRSA of A. baumannii, E. coli and 
S. aureus in national, provincial general and specialised hospitals are compared as the number 
of tests of these pathogen-antimicrobial combinations were high enough to produce reliable 
result. The detail is shown in supplementary table S3.2.1. A. baumannii had the highest 
carbapenem resistant proportion in national, followed by specialised and provincial hospitals 
(Chi-squared test, p < 0.0001). E. coli showed a different ESBL positive proportion between 
national and provincial hospitals (Chi-squared test, p < 0.0001). MRSA proportions increased 
from provincial, to specialised, to national hospitals (Chi-squared test, p < 0.0001). 
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Table 3.2.1: Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of 11 bacteria in all specimens of 13 hospitals in VINARES 2016-2017 project 
Resistant / Tested 
(%) 
A. 
baumannii 
(N=3710) 
E. coli 
(N=9092) 
E. 
faecium 
(N=296) 
Enterobacter 
spp. 
(N=1322) 
H. 
influenzae 
(N=1085) 
K. 
pneumoniae 
(N=3870) 
P. 
aeruginosa 
(N=3461) 
S. aureus 
(N=4833) 
S. 
pneumoniae 
(N=1367) 
Salmonella 
spp. 
(N=277) 
Shigella 
spp. 
(N=53) 
Carbapenem 2855/3622 
(79) 
961/8830 
(11) 
 376/1298 
(29) 
0/1065 
(0) 
1049/3816 
(27) 
1514/3376 
(45) 
  1/195 (1) 1/19 
(5) 
Aminoglycosides 2686/3641 
(74) 
4188/8785 
(48) 
34/46 
(74) 
637/1297 
(49) 
 1756/3780 
(46) 
1457/3389 
(43) 
1674/4090 
(41) 
 48/78 
(62) 
4/5 
(80) 
Fluoroquinolones 2929/3589 
(82) 
5813/8682 
(67) 
 484/1271 
(38) 
7/909 (1) 1593/3619 
(44) 
1435/3357 
(43) 
1720/4618 
(37) 
31/1117 
(3) 
18/253 
(7) 
7/46 
(15) 
Cephalosporins 2969/3549 
(84) 
5441/8195 
(66) 
 675/1192 
(57) 
18/664 
(3) 
1995/3732 
(53) 
1392/3058 
(46) 
 58/356 
(16) 
20/217 
(9) 
8/26 
(31) 
Macrolides 25/29 (86)  249/262 
(95) 
 4/1015 
(0) 
  3861/4661 
(83) 
1234/1317 
(94) 
53/137 
(39) 
2/3 
(67) 
ESBL  4085/6953 
(59) 
 276/467 
(59) 
 1186/2958 
(40) 
     
MRSA        1824/2510 
(73) 
   
Penicillin   111/124 
(90) 
    2347/2400 
(98) 
657/794 
(83) 
  
SXT  5704/7843 
(73) 
73/77 
(95) 
467/929 
(50) 
429/470 
(91) 
1753/3348 
(52) 
1329/1388 
(96) 
1021/4158 
(25) 
886/1069 
(83) 
39/237 
(16) 
44/50 
(88) 
AMC  1476/3251 
(45) 
 461/604 
(76) 
271/358 
(76) 
1080/1999 
(54) 
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Ampicillin  5547/5938 
(93) 
228/253 
(90) 
476/510 
(93) 
804/911 
(88) 
2563/2622 
(98) 
 57/64 (89) 2/21 (10) 104/252 
(41) 
35/46 
(76) 
TCC  1317/2947 
(45) 
 297/671 
(44) 
 863/1449 
(60) 
1097/2160 
(51) 
    
Azithromycin        307/370 
(83) 
65/73 (89) 3/63 (5) 1/2 
(50) 
Vancomycin   91/290 
(31) 
    45/2680 
(2)* 
16/1229 
(1) 
  
ESBL: extended-spectrum β-lactamase; MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SXT: Trimethoprim/Sulfamethoxazole; AMC: amoxicillin clavulanic acid; 
TCC: Ticarcillin/Clavulanic Acid; *: Resistant and Intermediate 
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Table 3.2.2: Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of 11 bacteria in blood and CSF (in stool for Salmonella spp. and Shigella spp.) of 13 hospitals in VINARES 2016-
2017 project 
Resistant / Tested 
(%) 
A. 
baumannii 
(N=187) 
E. coli 
(N=1535) 
E. 
faecium 
(N=51) 
Enterobacter 
spp. (N=77) 
H. 
influenzae 
(N=12) 
K. 
pneumoniae 
(N=482) 
P. 
aeruginosa 
(N=142) 
S. aureus 
(N=715) 
S. 
pneumoniae 
(N=160) 
Salmonella 
spp. 
(N=32)** 
Shigella 
spp. 
(N=37)** 
Carbapenem 110/183 
(60) 
116/1483 
(8) 
 20/77 (26) 0/11 (0) 109/476 
(23) 
54/139 
(39) 
  0/19 (0) 1/14 (7) 
Aminoglycosides 107/185 
(58) 
637/1471 
(43) 
7/9 (78) 35/75 (47)  195/470 
(41) 
48/138 
(35) 
294/637 
(46) 
   
Fluoroquinolones 96/182 
(53) 
953/1475 
(65) 
 24/76 (32) 0/9 (0) 177/459 
(39) 
37/138 
(27) 
297/689 
(43) 
2/143 (1) 3/27 (11) 4/31 (13) 
Cephalosporins 118/178 
(66) 
931/1402 
(66) 
 37/66 (56) 0/11 (0) 221/471 
(47) 
47/120 
(39) 
 17/125 (14) 4/28 (14) 7/21 (33) 
Macrolides 1/1 (100)  46/48 
(96) 
 0/4 (0)   545/693 
(79) 
140/152 
(92) 
1/5 (20) 2/3 (67) 
ESBL  655/1107 
(59) 
 7/16 (44)  128/365 
(35) 
     
MRSA        372/521 
(71) 
   
Penicillin   19/22 
(86) 
    490/504 
(97) 
42/100 (42)   
SXT  935/1377 
(68) 
20/20 
(100) 
29/57 (51) 5/8 (62) 215/454 
(47) 
74/82 (90) 233/661 
(35) 
107/134 
(80) 
6/30 (20) 31/34 
(91) 
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AMC  180/577 
(31) 
 26/32 (81) 1/5 (20) 112/285 
(39) 
     
Ampicillin  928/1028 
(90) 
37/40 
(92) 
21/23 (91) 7/8 (88) 278/287 
(97) 
   14/31 (45) 23/33 
(70) 
TCC  169/356 
(47) 
 14/45 (31)  115/195 
(59) 
46/110 
(42) 
    
Azithromycin        30/40 
(75) 
14/21 (67) 1/5 (20) 1/2 (50) 
Vancomycin   13/51 
(25) 
    7/565 
(1)* 
4/148 (3)   
ESBL: extended-spectrum β-lactamase; MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SXT: Trimethoprim/Sulfamethoxazole; AMC: amoxicillin clavulanic acid; 
TCC: Ticarcillin/Clavulanic Acid; *: Resistant and Intermediate; **: sample collected in stool 
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Table 3.2.3: Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of 11 bacteria isolated from ICU specimens of 13 hospitals in VINARES 2016-2017 project 
Resistant /  
Tested (%) 
A. 
baumannii 
(N=1176) 
E. coli 
(N=1016) 
E. 
faecium 
(N=65) 
Enterobacter 
spp. (N=230) 
H. 
influenzae 
(N=146) 
K. 
pneumoniae 
(N=1069) 
P. 
aeruginosa 
(N=1158) 
S. aureus 
(N=690) 
S. 
pneumoniae 
(N=184) 
Salmonella 
spp. (N=18) 
Shigella 
spp. 
(N=10) 
Carbapenem 976/1132 
(86) 
146/1004 
(15) 
 96/229 (42) 0/146 (0) 415/1051 
(39) 
664/1128 
(59) 
  0/12 (0) 0/1 (0) 
Aminoglycosides 962/1135 
(85) 
422/998 
(42) 
6/6 
(100) 
128/229 (56)  632/1032 
(61) 
604/1136 
(53) 
250/468 
(53) 
 2/5 (40) 1/1 
(100) 
Fluoroquinolones 958/1103 
(87) 
568/950 
(60) 
 120/224 (54) 6/117 (5) 570/973 
(59) 
597/1126 
(53) 
331/647 
(51) 
2/137 (1) 2/17 (12) 2/7 (29) 
Cephalosporins 992/1076 
(92) 
579/925 
(63) 
 139/201 (69) 2/48 (4) 726/1033 
(70) 
554/1014 
(55) 
 10/94 (11) 1/16 (6) 3/4 (75) 
Macrolides 17/18 (94)  57/59 
(97) 
 3/134 (2)   548/660 
(83) 
154/167 
(92) 
1/6 (17) 2/3 (67) 
ESBL  435/716 
(61) 
 62/82 (76)  424/780 
(54) 
     
MRSA        185/270 
(69) 
   
Penicillin   20/24 
(83) 
    313/324 
(97) 
42/83 (51)   
SXT  700/925 
(76) 
2/2 
(100) 
121/204 (59) 111/120 
(92) 
629/937 
(67) 
332/351 
(95) 
116/615 
(19) 
103/130 
(79) 
5/18 (28) 10/10 
(100) 
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AMC  259/489 
(53) 
 52/58 (90) 64/94 (68) 527/781 
(67) 
     
Ampicillin  556/584 
(95) 
50/54 
(93) 
123/126 (98) 92/98 (94) 696/704 
(99) 
   10/17 (59) 10/10 
(100) 
TCC  313/646 
(48) 
 85/158 (54)  491/696 
(71) 
436/693 
(63) 
    
Azithromycin        101/123 
(82) 
7/10 (70) 1/6 (17) 1/2 (50) 
Vancomycin   22/64 
(35) 
    17/340 (5)* 1/146 (1)   
ESBL: extended-spectrum β-lactamase; MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SXT: Trimethoprim/Sulfamethoxazole; AMC: amoxicillin clavulanic acid; 
TCC: Ticarcillin/Clavulanic Acid; *: Resistant and Intermediate
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3.2.3.4. Comparison with data from VINARES 2012-2013 
Here we compare susceptibility of priority bacteria-antimicrobial combinations between the 
two periods of VINARES (2012-2013 versus 2016-2017). Laboratories used similar protocols 
in the two periods, including antimicrobial susceptibility testing methods using translated CLSI 
guidelines and data collection procedures. Laboratories were enrolled in the UK-NEQAS 
external quality assessment programme during both data collection periods. Since the 
VINARES 2016-2017 had 13 hospitals, we calculated the antimicrobial susceptibility result of 
VINARES 2012-2013 in whole dataset and in a subset of 13 hospitals. Supplementary table 
S3.2.2 showed resistant proportions of priority pathogen-antimicrobial combinations between 
the two periods.  
The number of isolates submitted in the 2016-2017 period was twice as high as in the 2012-
2013 period. Overall, antimicrobial resistant proportions were higher in 2016-2017 for almost 
all pathogen-antimicrobial combinations of interest including imipenem-resistant A. 
baumannii, P. aeruginosa and Enterobacteriaceae.  
Resistant proportions for 13 pathogen-antimicrobial combinations of 13 hospitals that 
participated in both periods (2012-13, 2016-17) are shown in figure 3.2.2. Most hospitals had 
higher imipenem-resistant A. baumannii, K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa and penicillin non-
susceptible S. pneumoniae proportions in the second period. ESBL positive Enterobacteriaceae 
were lower in the second period. No trends for vancomycin-resistant E. faecium, ceftriaxone-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae and MRSA were seen. Proportions of vancomycin-intermediate 
and resistant S. aureus were small in both time periods of VINARES. 
 
 Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results of VINARES project: 2016-2017  
 
111 
 
 
Figure 3.2.2: Resistant proportions of 13 pathogen-antimicrobial combinations from 13 hospitals that participated 
in two VINARES periods. Resistant proportion for each pathogen-antimicrobial combination by hospital in two 
periods is represented by a dot. A reference line is added in the figure. A dot above this line indicates a higher 
resistant proportion in the second period than in the first period. H .influenzae - ampicillin was not included in the 
figure because all H. influenzae isolates in 2012 were from the hospitals that did not submit results 2016-17. IPM: 
imipenem, CRO: ceftriaxone, VAN: vancomycin, PEN: penicillin 
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3.2.4. Discussion 
In this paper, we describe the antimicrobial susceptibility testing results from 13 laboratories 
within the VINARES network in 2016-2017.  Overall, we found high proportions of resistance 
among all tested priority bacteria and these proportions were generally higher than those 
reported for 2012-2013. 
Proportions of carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative pathogens increased gradually in the 
VINARES hospitals. Carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii rose up over the years: 40% reported 
from the GARP report in 2009 [164]; 70% (1495/2138) from the VINARES in 2012-2013 and 
79% in the 2016-2017 period. A similar observation can be found with carbapenem-resistant 
P. aeruginosa (30%, 33% and 45%, respectively).  
In the 2012 point prevalence survey in 16 hospitals’ ICU in Viet Nam, Phu et al. reported that 
the two most common pathogens of hospital acquired infections (HAI) were A. baumannii 
(24%) and P. aeruginosa (14%) [190]. This report showed carbapenem resistance in patients 
having HAI was most common in A.  baumannii (89% [149/167]) and P. aeruginosa (56% 
[49/88]) [190], similar to our VINARES 2016 data.  
The proportions of MRSA remained consistently about 70% in both data periods in VINARES, 
higher than the one reported from the GARP in 2009 (from 17% to 63% in hospitals) [164] and 
from the Antimicrobial Sensitivity Testing Study program in 2006 (42%) [201].  
Vancomycin-intermediate and resistant S. aureus remained negligible and stable over the two 
time periods of VINARES with no trend observed. Vancomycin-resistance among S. aureus 
was not confirmed molecularly and we are unsure of the significance of these findings 
The decrease in ESBL detection among Enterobacteriaceae is mostly due to changes in use of 
detection methods. This difference, looking at the denominators for testing between 2012 and 
2016, is more likely an artefact of increased ESBL testing using VITEK2 or other automated 
systems than a signal of a decrease of ESBL circulation. In 2012-13 ESBL confirmation was 
only done on a proportion of ceftriaxone resistant isolates in most sites, whereas in 2016-17 a 
number of sites had switched to using automated systems and almost all isolates were screened 
for ESBL production.  
An increasing trend of penicillin non-susceptible S. pneumoniae could not be described 
properly for the period between 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 as different methods were used for 
assessment. There was a change from oxacillin disk diffusion screening in 2012 to penicillin 
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susceptibility test in 2016 across sites. The ANSORP study from 2000 to 2001 reported 91% 
of penicillin non-susceptible S. pneumoniae [32] in Viet Nam, but it may not represent the true 
prevalence of the entire country because samples were taken in only one hospital in Ho Chi 
Minh city.  
A result from the SOAR study (2009-2011) in 11 centres in Viet Nam reported that 51% 
(100/195) of H. influenzae were resistant against ampicillin [165]. In our VINARES data, 
ampicillin resistant proportions increased further from 71% in 2012-2013 to 88% in 2016-2017.  
Despite a lower number of hospitals participating in the surveillance network in the second 
period than in the first period, the number of isolates submitted was significantly higher in the 
second period. This reflects the increase in the use of microbiology over the time (doctors have 
increasingly collected specimens for diagnostics) and the improvement in microbiology 
capacity in all hospitals. 
We have attempted to assess the associations between the level of antibiotic use and resistance 
rates. However, due to the small number of data time points (about 12 months on average) and 
the high variability in the data, it was difficult to identify significant associations and any 
underlying trends.  
The isolates included in VINARES were from the routine clinical specimens, and therefore the 
rates of isolation and resistance might over-represent patients with severe infections especially 
when empiric treatment has failed. In addition, these rates may also over-represent the patients 
with hospital-acquired infections, especially those who have stayed for a long period in hospital 
and have an increased risk of infection. In addition, these estimated rates were only specific to 
the hospitalized patient population, and thus unlikely to represent the bacteria circulating in the 
community where there can be asymptomatic carriers and people with mild infections that do 
not require hospital admission. 
The results highlight the difference between national and provincial hospitals. Previous studies 
[202–204] showed that the proportion of patients with hospital-acquired infection was higher 
in the national than in provincial hospitals. As bacteria associated with hospital acquired 
infections are usually more resistant, this may partially explain this difference. Also, patients 
with resistant bacterial infections or patients unresponsive to therapy because of resistance are 
more likely to be transferred to national level hospitals.  
Limitations 
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VINARES collected isolate-based data (surveillance approaches based solely on laboratory 
data), without epidemiological, clinical, and population-level data. Currently, GLASS accepts 
both isolate-based and sample-based data, but it encourages countries to collect and report 
sample-based data, which can provide stratified and therefore more useful information [39]. 
Current data collected in VINARES do not allow to differentiate between hospital or 
community acquired infections. Therefore, resistant proportions may be inflated when trying 
to use data to inform empiric treatment for community acquired infections. Sample- or case-
based data collection may provide potential solutions for this issue. 
A standardized sampling and data collection strategy across the whole surveillance network is 
important to minimize selection bias, enhance representativeness and interpretation of the 
results, and allow inference of the results to the country representativeness [39]. The change in 
the participation of hospitals had impact on the overall resistant proportions.  
 
 
3.2.5. Conclusion 
We show the results from a successful continuation of a large AMR surveillance network in 
Viet Nam. The data show alarmingly high and increasing resistant proportions in important 
organisms causing infections in Viet Nam. However, resistant proportions varied across 
hospital types in the network. The results may not reflect the true AMR prevalence in Viet Nam 
as there may be biases in sample selection for AST and data on whether isolates were hospital 
or community acquired were not collected here. Affordable and scalable ways to adopt a 
sample-or case-based approach across the network should be explored. Clinical data should 
also be included in the reports from the hospitals to help provide more informative 
interpretations of the surveillance data. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Optimizing cost and effectiveness of AMRSS 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
As part of the strategies in the National and Global Action Plan to combat AMR, surveillance 
systems have been established in many countries for the systematic collection and analysis of 
AMR data. These systems should be able to inform local treatment guidelines and clinical 
decision-making, track changes in resistance patterns over time and space, detect emergence 
of important resistance mechanisms for public health actions and support in outbreak 
notification and investigation, benchmark for measuring intervention  and inform the 
development and implementation of policy and interventions [37],[27]. However, in the health 
budget constrained context in LMICs such as Viet Nam, the implementation of AMR 
surveillance system will have to compete for scarce resources with many other healthcare 
related and other programmes and interventions. More evidence is required to inform policy 
makers on the effectiveness of AMR surveillance system and the costs to set up, maintain and 
expand the system.  
Assessing the cost and effectiveness of a public health surveillance system in general is 
particularly challenging because different criteria need to be considered to describe the system, 
including the surveillance objectives, utility and technical performance attributes. As a result, 
very few economic evaluation studies have been conducted [205]. In our recent review 
including 79 studies reporting on AMR surveillance systems around the world, there were only 
seven studies describing the results of evaluating performance and only two reported the costs 
of implementation of these surveillance systems [52–55,113,114,117]. These studies evaluated 
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a number of performance attributes such as representativeness, timeliness, sensitivity and level 
of coverage. However, none systematically assessed the system performance by varying the 
system structure to identify the optimal design and in relation to the costs being invested on 
these systems.  
In Viet Nam, the National AMR Surveillance Network has been formally established in 2016 
and consists of 16 hospitals of three types: national level general hospitals which are directly 
managed under the Ministry of Health (MoH), provincial level general hospitals which are 
managed by Provincial Departments of Health (DoH) in the respective province, and 
specialized (infectious diseases) hospitals which are managed either by MoH or DoH [167]. 
This national network originated from the VINARES network with the same surveillance 
structure and protocol [166]. VINARES was launched in 2012 and collected data on AMR for 
the 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 time periods. We have previously used SurvTool [152] and 
OASIS [175] to systematically evaluate the organization and performance of the AMR 
surveillance system in Viet Nam in these two VINARES periods to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of this system and identify further improvement areas to support the performance 
of the National AMR Surveillance Network. Based on the output of surveillance evaluation 
framework in chapter 2 and expert opinions, we identified that the precision, bias, sensitivity, 
representativeness and coverage are the important performance attributes for the AMR 
surveillance network in Viet Nam. These attributes can vary when the structure of the network 
changes, for example in terms of the number of hospitals participating in the network or the 
distribution of the hospitals by types.  
One of the important objectives of the hospital-based AMR surveillance network is to provide 
accurate data on the resistance patterns of common bacterial pathogens to inform local 
antibiotic treatment guidelines and guide empiric treatment for doctors in hospitals in Viet 
Nam. However, as shown in our evaluation of the VINARES network, the current surveillance 
system is unable to distinguish the origin of infection in terms of community-acquired infection 
(CAI) or hospital-acquired infection (HAI). The current system for data submission does not 
include relevant clinical information to distinguish these. From the current surveillance system 
only the averaged resistant proportions can be estimated, which is likely to be overestimated 
for CAI but under-estimated for HAI, as the resistant proportion among HAI associated 
pathogens is generally higher than among CAI [202–204]. Consequently, using the resistant 
proportions to guide clinical treatment may lead to an overuse of broad-spectrum antibiotics to 
cover for the presumed high resistance levels among CAI. In order to interpret the AMR data 
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from the current surveillance system, we aimed to develop a mechanism to estimate the 
resistant proportions for CAI and HAI patients.  
This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness and costs of hypothetical AMR surveillance 
systems (AMRSS) in order to identify options for an optimal system where performance can 
be maximized to achieve the most accurate estimate for outcome while maintaining the 
affordable costs of investment. Evaluation of AMRSS in chapter 2 showed that the cost of the 
national AMR surveillance system is dependent on the number and distributions of hospitals 
by types participating in the network. Adding an additional hospital might increase the benefits 
but also increase the costs for establishing and maintaining the system. The question we try to 
answer from this model-based evaluation is which combination of hospitals for the national 
surveillance system can provide a good value for money for the government to invest. In the 
other words, which combination will be most cost-effective from a health systems perspective. 
We used modelling methods to evaluate four effectiveness attributes: Mean Squared Error 
(precision and bias) of the resistant proportions, sensitivity, representativeness and coverage of 
AMRSS. In order to evaluate the accuracy of the resistant proportions among bacteria causing 
CAIs, we first developed an algorithm to predict this proportion based on VINARES data and 
data from other studies. We then used this predicted value of resistant proportions for CAI in 
our effectiveness evaluation. The results from this study are important as the represent the first 
practical evidence on the costs and effectiveness of AMR surveillance to inform the 
government and policy makers in further implementation of the National AMR Surveillance 
Network.  
4.2. Methods 
We conducted a model-based evaluation of a hypothetical AMR surveillance system that was 
built with the same characteristics as the VINARES network established in 2012-2013 and the 
current National AMR Surveillance Network, which originated from VINARES. All values for 
the parameters in the models were obtained from the VINARES surveillance dataset and 
project documents for cost data. To deal with the lack of data on the origin of infection, we 
used a classification model derived from an external training dataset to predict the HAI/CAI 
status of each pathogen (having a non-duplicated isolate) in the VINARES dataset. However, 
there are very few studies identifying the origin of bacterial infections in hospitals that 
represent the general hospitalized patient population. We could only identify one such external 
dataset for K. pneumoniae, therefore we decided to run our evaluation analysis for this 
bacterium only. We chose to focus on carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae (based on the 
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imipenem-resistant K. pneumoniae data) because this is an important indicator for antibiotic 
resistance in Viet Nam and a critical priority pathogen-antimicrobial combination 
recommended by WHO [177]. In addition, the number of isolates for this combination was large 
compared to other combinations which would help increase the statistical power for our 
analyses. The number of ESBL K. pneumoniae was small to give  an accurate result. Therefore, 
for the remaining of this chapter, our analyses and results refer to K. pneumoniae - carbapenem 
combination. 
We used the following assumptions: 
· Three types of hospitals are included in the AMR surveillance system: national, 
specialized and provincial. For simplicity, we assumed that hospitals were similar to 
one another within each type of hospital regarding hospital size (patient admissions, 
bed capacity), proportion of CAI/HAI in patients with infection and resistant 
proportions in CAI/HAI patients. In addition, we also assumed that the proportion of 
resistant infections among CAI was similar in all hospital types, while that among HAI 
varied by type of hospitals.  
· The number of CAI patients in the participating hospitals in each hospital type followed 
a Poisson distribution. There were three distinct distributions in three hospital types. 
The number of HAI patients of three hospital types also followed three distinct Poisson 
distributions. 
· The number of patients carrying resistant isolates among CAI in each hospital type 
followed a Binomial distribution. Therefore, there were three Binomial distributions for 
the number of patients carrying resistant isolates among CAI, and three for HAI. 
Previous studies supported these assumptions: GARP report [164] showed the similar E.coli 
producing ESBL were not different (p-value > 0.05) between specialized hospitals; Imipenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae were similar in national hospitals (they did not provide detailed data 
to calculate p-value). VINARES 2012-2013 data confirmed the imipenem-resistant S. 
pneumoniae were similar between provincial hospitals (p > 0.05); and the same conclusions 
were found for specialized hospitals (p > 0.05). 
In each simulation process, the number of CAI/HAI patients and the number of patients 
carrying resistant isolates were varied randomly using the baseline input data from VINARES 
surveillance network. This process could be applied for other AMRSS by importing its baseline 
data to produce the optimal AMRSS. 
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In the first section, we classified the infection origin of VINARES patients in one of two 
categories (CAI or HAI). By definition, an infection was defined as a hospital-associated 
infection present on the day of the survey if the onset of symptoms was on Day 3 of 
hospitalization or later (day of admission = Day 1) or if the patient presented with an infection 
but was discharged less than 48 hours from the same or another hospital [206]. CAI was defined 
as an infection that does not fit the criteria for a HAI [207]. However, we could not classify 
VINARES patients using these definitions because the surveillance system does not collect 
information on the date admission. It only collected information on age, sex, type of specimen, 
specimen collection date, and ward sending the specimen. We developed a classification model 
(see below) to predict the HAI/CAI status of each patient based on these types of information.   
Next, we developed the calculation formula for 4 indicators: Mean Squared Error (MSE), 
Sensitivity, Representativeness and Coverage to evaluate the effectiveness of a surveillance 
network. These indicators were selected based on the literature review of AMR surveillance 
systems in the world and evaluation of the VINARES surveillance network. Lower MSE, and 
higher sensitivity, coverage and representativeness were preferred. 
Baseline surveillance cost was calculated from VINARES document. Using this data, annual 
surveillance cost formula was developed for an AMRSS having an arbitrary number of 
hospitals. 
In the last section we describe the methods used to generate the number of patients and the 
number of resistant cases of one hospital in a hypothetical AMRSS; and the methods to 
calculate MSE via simulation. 
4.2.1. Classification model for CAI/HAI status 
In this part, we used machine learning terms as following: 
· Training: a process of training a model involves a learning algorithm with a dataset 
(training data) to learn from. The algorithm finds patterns in the training data that map 
the input data attributes to the answer (which is available in training data). Training 
provides a model that captures these patterns. 
· Training dataset: a sample of data used to fit the model. The training data must contain 
the correct answer (the infection origin in this study) which we want to predict. 
· Testing: a process of using a testing dataset to evaluate how well the final algorithm 
was trained with the training dataset. 
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· Testing dataset: a dataset that is independent of the training dataset, but that is assumed 
to follow the same probability distribution as the training dataset. 
· Validation: a process of frequent evaluation of a model in order to tune model 
parameters. 
· Validation dataset: The sample of data used to validate the model in the validation 
process. 
· Model accuracy: The overall agreement rate averaged over cross-validation iterations 
· Model sensitivity: measures the proportion of actual CAI that are correctly identified. 
In the classification, CAI was assigned as a “positive” or “event” value and HAI was a 
“negative” or “no event” value. The sensitivity definition mentioned here had a 
different meaning with the sensitivity of AMRSS which mentioned in chapter 2 and the 
effectiveness attribute formula (paragraph 2.3). 
· Model specificity: measures the proportion of actual HAI that are correctly identified. 
· Model positive predictive value: proportion of true CAI results in CAI returned by the 
classification 
· Model F1 score: the harmony average of positive predictive value and sensitivity [208] 
For training our classification model, we used a dataset containing information on 278 K. 
pneumoniae isolates recovered from patients admitted to the National Hospital for Tropical 
Diseases between 2007-2011 in which similar data were collected as in the VINARES, but also 
including the HAI/CAI status of each patient.  
Machine learning algorithms were used to develop the classification model from the K. 
pneumoniae dataset. The models were used to identify the set of predictors that explained 
variation in the outcome (HAI vs CAI) the most. For validation, each model was applied to the 
testing dataset (a subset of training dataset) in order to quantify the quality of the predictors in 
terms of four quality variables: accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and F1 score. 
4.2.1.1. Classification algorithms 
Classification is an algorithm that maps the input data to a specific category. We selected 5 
commonly used classification algorithms to develop the possible prediction models. These 
were selected after a test run was applied for 8 popular methods and the ones that achieved 
convergence with training data were selected (table 4.1).The other methods which were tested 
but did not work were: Support Vector Machines with Linear Kernel, AdaBoost Classification 
Trees and Linear Discriminant Analysis [209].
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Table 4.1: Description, strength, weakness and implementation of potential classification algorithms 
Classification 
algorithms 
Description Strength Weakness Implementation in R 
Naïve Bayes This algorithm is based on applying Bayes' 
theorem, with strong (naïve) independence 
assumptions between the features, which returns 
the probability of outcome when the predictors are 
known. 
This algorithm requires a small amount 
of training data to estimate the necessary 
parameters. Naive Bayes classifiers are 
extremely fast compared to more 
sophisticated methods.  
 
Rarely one of the best 
algorithms in terms of 
quality of predictions 
Function: naive_bayes 
 
Package: naive_bayes 
Boosted Logistic 
Regression 
LogitBoost fits an additive logistic regression 
model by stage wise optimization of the binomial 
log-likelihood [210] 
Powerful classification technique with 
remarkable success on a wide variety of 
problems, especially in higher 
dimensions [211] 
High bias Function: LogitBoost 
 
Package: caTools 
Random Forest This is an ensemble method based on decision 
trees where, for each tree, both observations and 
features are sampled. This model learns from 
various over grown trees and a final decision is 
made based on the majority [212]. 
 
It manages overfitting very well  
Time consuming 
Function: rf 
 
Package: randomForest 
Gradient boosting 
machine 
This method is similar to Random Forest, except 
that it is sequential and the features of each tree 
are weighted according to the performance of the 
previous tree. 
This algorithm has high predictive 
accuracy and handles missing data. 
Prone to over-fitting and 
computationally 
intensive. 
Function: gbm_h2o 
 
Package: h2o 
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K-Nearest 
Neighbours 
This classification algorithm determines the 
outcome of an observation based on the outcome 
values of similar observations. 
This algorithm has ease to interpret 
output, great calculation time and good 
predictive power [213] 
 
The classes with the 
more frequent examples 
tend to dominate the 
prediction of the new 
observation 
Function:  knn 
 
Package: class 
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4.2.1.2. Data 
We determined the origin of infection of patients with results on antimicrobial susceptibility 
testing in VINARES 2012-2013 dataset. Information about this project and the resistant 
proportions of key pathogen – antimicrobial combinations have described in our published 
paper [183]. VINARES collected data on 4 groups of variables: patient information (sex, age); 
hospital data (hospital, ward), specimen (specimen type, collection date) and microbiology 
(bacteria name, antimicrobial susceptibility).  
The training data was collected from patients admitted to the National Hospital for Tropical 
Diseases (Hanoi) who had cultures positive with K. pneumoniae. Data were collected 
retrospectively for the period from 2007 to 2009 and prospectively from 2009 to 2011 [214]. 
CAI contributed 56% (156 isolates), 58% (90 patients) of CAI patients were between 40 and 
60 years old (table 4.2). The proportions of critical care and other wards were similar in CAI 
(52% versus 48%), while it had a large difference in HAI (88% critical care versus 12% other 
wards). Blood and sputum were the specimens that K. pneumoniae was cultured from most 
frequently, with sputum being by far the most common specimen in HAI (88%). 
Table 4.2: Distribution of predictors in CAI and HAI in training dataset 
Characteristic Summary statistic (n (%)) 
 CAI (N=156) HAI (N=122) 
Age Category   
- (10,20] 5/156 (3) 10/122 (8) 
- (20,40] 34/156 (22) 40/122 (33) 
- (40,60] 90/156 (58) 41/122 (34) 
- (60,100] 27/156 (17) 31/122 (25) 
Ward   
- Critical Care 81/156 (52) 107/122 (88) 
- Other 75/156 (48) 15/122 (12) 
Specimen   
- Blood 53/156 (34) 9/122 (7) 
- CSF 6/156 (4) 1/122 (1) 
- Pus 21/156 (13) 2/122 (2) 
- Sputum 64/156 (41) 107/122 (88) 
- Urine 10/156 (6) 3/122 (2) 
- Other 2/156 (1) 0/122 (0) 
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4.2.1.3. Implementation 
A model consisted of predictors and an algorithm to classify the dependent variable into one 
of the possible classes. From the training dataset, there were only 3 predictors that were the 
same as in VINARES and therefore were evaluated: age category, ward of hospitalisation, and 
specimen type. We evaluated 3 model combinations:  
· One variable only: Age category or ward or specimen type,  
· Two variables: Age category and specimen type; Age category and ward; ward and 
specimen type, 
· Three variables: age category, ward and specimen type. 
Training datasets were split in two subsets: one subset for model training (90% of observations) 
and one (10% of observations) for validation.  
Five classification algorithms were applied for 7 combinations of predictors generating 35 
models. Each model was assessed for four quality variables: accuracy, sensitivity, specificity 
and F1 score.  
A principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted to determine which model had highest 
quality variables overall.  PCA produced a score that represented value of these variables, 
higher score implied a better model. The models having positive scores were combined in an 
ensemble model aggregating the prediction from these models to generate a final prediction 
with a reduced prediction error (assuming the base models are independent). The combination 
method used the score of each model produced from the PCA as a weight for that model in the 
ensemble model, following the steps below: 
· Choose best models which have positive score produced by PCA  
· Classify infection origin of VINARES patients using these models 
· Assign a value of 1 to CAI and 0 to HAI status 
· Calculate round average of HAI/CAI status for each patient from these models, using 
the PCA score as a weight 
Analysis was done using R [189]. The classification model was built using the caret (version 
6.0-85) package. PCA was performed using the factoextra (version 1.0.6) package. Other 
relevant packages used are listed in table 4.1. 
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4.2.2. Calculate hospital parameters 
After classifying patients as having HAI and CAI in each hospital, the parameters of one 
hospital for the target pathogen – antimicrobial combination were calculated. These parameters 
include the number of isolates stratified by HAI/CAI status and the resistant proportion in 
isolates with HAI or CAI status. We assumed that the resistant proportion among CAI is the 
same for all hospitals and the proportion among HAI is dependent on the type of hospital. 
4.2.3. Effectiveness attribute formulas 
To characterize the effectiveness of a surveillance network, we considered 4 indicators: Mean 
Squared Error, Sensitivity, Representativeness and Coverage. These indicators were selected 
based on the literature review of AMR surveillance systems and evaluation of the VINARES 
surveillance network.   
· MSE indicates how the estimator of resistant proportion is closely around the resistant 
proportion in CAI. 
· Sensitivity represents the percentage of resistant cases that the AMRSS can detect 
among all resistant cases in Vietnamese hospitals. 
· Coverage calculates the percentage of patients that the AMRSS can reach among all 
patients in Vietnamese hospitals. 
· Representativeness describes how the sample in the AMRSS reflects the whole patient 
population in all hospitals in Viet Nam. 
The absolute value of sensitivity and coverage cannot be calculated as the denominator (data 
from all Vietnamese hospitals) are generally unknown. The ratio of these statistics will be 
calculated instead to compare the quality of two AMRSS. 
A hospital will be characterized by four parameters E#FG #HG IFG IHJ where 
• #F are the number community-acquired infection patients; 
• #H is the number of hospital-acquired infection patients; 
• IF is the proportion of resistance among patients with community-acquired infection; 
• IH is the prevalence of resistance among patients with hospital-acquired infection. 
 
Based on the results from our literature review (Chapter 1) and our evaluation of the VINARES 
surveillance network (Chapter 2), we can characterize an AMRSS by the number of hospitals 
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of each type: AMRSS (&3G &KG &1J. National, specialized and provincial hospitals are indicated 
from 1 to 3, with &3G &K and &1!indicating the number of hospitals of each type. 
4.2.3.1. Mean Squared Error 
Definition 
By definition, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) expresses the average squared difference 
between the estimated values and the true values. The MSE can be written as the sum of the 
variance of the estimator and the squared bias of the estimator [215]. Therefore, the MSE 
represents the precision and bias of the estimator.  
In this study, MSE of the resistant proportions among CAI was calculated. Our aim was to 
estimate the precision and bias of estimator ILF (the estimated value of IF)based on the data in 
each AMRSS) of IF in terms of MSE. It was the expected value of the squared of the difference 
between the estimator ILF of resistant proportion in CAI from AMRSS and the expected 
IF)from)the)community. 
M!6 = 6[EIF O ILFJK] 
MSE formula when having one hospital in the system 
In absence of information on #F, #H and IH, the best estimator of IF we can get is 
IF^ = 7* =
#FIF P #HIH
#F P #H G where 
ILF was the overall resistant proportion of one pathogen-antimicrobial combination (K. 
pneumoniae – carbapenem in this chapter) in the AMRSS. R and N are the number of 
resistant cases and total number of cases for the target pathogen – antimicrobial combination, 
respectively.  
By definition, 
QSTUIF^V = WarUIF^V P XiasUIF^VK = IF^ UY O IF^V#F P #H P UIF^ O IFV
K
! 
where Var and Bias is the variance and bias of the estimator. 
MSE formula when having k hospitals in the system 
If we consider k hospitals, each hospital i is characterized by four parameters E#F/G #H/G IF G IH/J. 
The resistant proportion among CAI (IF) is assumed to be the same across all hospitals. 
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The average resistant proportion now reads:  
IF^ = 7* =
Z E3\/\_ #F/IF P #H/IH/J
Z E3\/\_ #F/ P #H/J  
The total number R of patients infected with a resistant pathogen and the total number N of 
patients can be split by hospital type and by origin of infection. 
7 =--#F`bIF
dg
b23
1
`23
P--#H`bIH`b
dg
b23
1
`23
)EYJ 
* =--#F`b
dg
b23
1
`23
P--#H`b
dg
b23
1
`23
 
where ; = Y j k corresponding to the three types of hospitals: national, specialized and 
provincial, respectively.  &3, &K and &1 are number of national, specialized and provincial 
hospitals so that 
&3 P)&K P)&1 = . 
The variance of the estimated resistant proportion reads 
WarUIF^V = l:p q7*v =
Y
*K l:pE7J 
In formula (1), the number of resistant cases in CAI #F`bIF follows a binomial distribution 
B(#F`b,)IF) with #F`b trials and probability of event IF. The number of resistant cases in HAI 
#H`bIH`b is also a binomial distribution B(#H`b G IH`b). Therefore, R is the sum of x 0 k 0
E&3 P &K P &1J = )z. binomial variables. Specifically,  
7 = 6{I"?&"|)l:;>"E--E}%#9@%:;F`bU#F`b G IFV P)}%#9@%:;H`bU#H`b G IH`bVJ
d~
b23
1
`23
 
So, the variance of R: 
l:pE7J = l:pE--E}%#9@%:;F`bU#F`bG IFV P)}%#9@%:;H`bU#H`b G IH`bVJ
d~
b23
1
`23
 
Under the assumption that these distributions are independent, the variance of the sum is the 
sum of variances, thus: 
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l:pE7J =--ql:p }%#9@%:;F`bU#F`b G IFV P )l:p }%#9@%:;H`bU#H`b G IH`bVv
d~
b23
1
`23
 
l:pE7J =--UIFEY O IFJ#F`b P)IH`bUY O IH`bV#H`bV
d~
b23
1
`23
 
Therefore,  
QSTUIF^V = WarUIF^V P XiasUIF^VK = l:pE7J*K P UIF^ O IFV
K)ExJ 
Simulation process for MSE 
In this section I explain how I run Monte Carlo simulations in order to numerically validate the 
MSE formula that I derived analytical in the section above. For that, I first describe the 
algorithm used to generate random AMRSSs and, then, how I compare the simulations with 
the analytical formula derived above. 
Hypothetical AMRSS generation 
We denoted an AMRSS (&3G &KG &1J to describe an AMRSS by three numbers: &3, &K and &1 
which are number of national, specialized and provincial hospitals respectively, and . as the 
total number of hospitals (&3 P)&K P)&1 = .J;  
We generated the AMRSSs by varying &3, &K, and &1.  
For a given AMRSS (&3G &KG &1J, the following procedure was applied for the ;dH hospital (l from 
1 to .) to generate the number of HAI/CAI patients and resistant proportions: 
· Generate the number of HAI and CAI patients: 
o Determining the distribution of number of HAI and CAI following a Poisson 
distribution with an average count of annual patients as estimated from VINARES. 
Random numbers were drawn from this distribution. Then the maximum likelihood 
of this distribution’s parameter was calculated from data points. 
o Generating a random data point which follows this Poisson distribution with the 
above maximum likelihood parameter 
· Generate resistant proportion in HAI and CAI patients using corresponding data points of 
VINARES by: 
o Determining resistant proportion in HAI and CAI. First, we assumed it follows a 
binomial distribution with an average count of annual patients and the proportion 
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of resistant infections as estimated from VINARES. Then the maximum likelihood 
of this distribution’s parameter was calculated from data points. 
o Generating a random data point which follows this binomial distribution with the 
above maximum likelihood parameter 
MSE calculation: 
For a given AMRSS (&3G &KG &1J, its MSE was calculated by: 
i. Generating the number of HAI and CAI patients and resistant proportions of HAI/CAI 
patients as described above 
ii. Calculate MSE using formula (1) 
iii. Repeat 20 times of steps i and ii to have 20 MSE values, then calculate average of MSE. 
Validation of MSE formula 
The MSE formula was validated by simulations by comparing the MSE value obtained by 
formula against the values obtained by simulation. For a specific number of hospitals in 
AMRSS, we generated a random combination of national, specialized and provincial hospitals. 
The data was simulated 1000 times to get 1000 MSE values; then the mean of these values was 
compared with the MSE value obtained by the formula using the Student t-test (figure 4.1). 
This process repeated for different numbers of hospitals in AMRSS. 
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Figure 4.1: Simulation process to validate the MSE formula 
4.2.3.2. Sensitivity Ratio 
The sensitivity of two successive AMRSS were compared by assessing the ratio of their 
sensitivities. By definition, sensitivity is the proportion of patients infected with a resistant 
pathogen for the specific pathogen - antimicrobial combination that the surveillance system is 
able to detect among all resistant cases in all Vietnamese hospitals. 
We calculated the sensitivity ratios for all resistant cases regardless of HAI/CAI status. 
Assuming !3 and !K are the sensitivities of two AMRSS, from the definition of sensitivity, the 
ratio of sensitivity of AMRSS 1 having .3 hospitals and AMRSS 2 having .K hospitals are: 
7 = !3!K =
#>@"p)9)p"$%$&:#&)?:$"$)?9'"p"|)()4M7!!)Y
#>@"p)9)p"$%$&:#&)?:$"$)?9'"p"|)()4M7!!)x 
Generate a parameter set of AMRSS (&3G &KG &1J
Generate a random dataset for the number of resistant cases 
among HAI and CAI patients for each hospital based on 
binomial distributions
Calculate resistant proportion IF
Get M!6 = 6{I"?&"| ':;>" IF O IF K
Get 1000 MSE values
Student t test: compare mean of 1000 MSE values with MSE 
calculated by applying formula (2) 
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7 =
Z E3\/\_ #F/IF P #H/IH/J
Z E3\b\_ #F/IF P #H/IH/J
 
 
where 
#F/)and #H/ are the number of CAI and HAI patients and IH/ is the resistant proportion in 
hospital % of AMRSS j.) 
 
4.2.3.3. Coverage Ratio 
Coverage of one AMRSS is calculated by dividing the number of patients having antimicrobial 
susceptibility test (AST) per year reached by the AMRSS by the total number of patients having 
AST per year in all Vietnamese hospitals. 
For a fixed budget, higher AMRSS’ coverage was better. However, the denominator (number 
of patients having AST in all Vietnamese hospitals) is unknown, we cannot determine the 
coverage proportion. 
Therefore, we calculated coverage ratio of AMRSS 1 having .3 hospitals and AMRSS 2 having 
.K hospitals as follows: 
7 =)*>@"p)9)4!8)?9'"p"|)()4M7!!)Y*>@"p)9)4!8)?9'"p"|)()4M7!!)x 
7 =
Z E3\/\_ #F/ P #H/J
Z E3\b\_ #F/ P #H/J
 
where 
#F/))and #H/ were number of CAI and HAI patients in hospital % of AMRSS 1.) 
#Fb ))and #Hb were number of CAI and HAI patients in hospital  of AMRSS 2. 
 
4.2.3.4. Representativeness 
Representativeness describes how the patients covered under the AMRSS reflected the overall 
patient population. In this study, the distribution of number of hospitals in each type was chosen 
as the indicator of representativeness of an AMRSS.  
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The distribution of number of hospitals in each type of Viet Nam in 2016 was used as the 
reference. 
The goodness of fit of each AMRSS was measured by the chi-squared statistic: 
K =-E</ O 6/J
K
6/K
1
/23
 
</ and 6/ were number of patients covered under an AMRSS and total number of patients in 
each hospital type. 
Chi-squared value K)was used to compare the representativeness of two AMRSS. The smaller 
K, the more representative that AMRSS had. 
4.2.3.5. Generalized linear model assessment of effectiveness 
A generalized linear model (GLM) was applied for MSE, sensitivity ratio and coverage ratio 
in function of number of hospitals. Theses effectiveness values were log transformed before 
applying the models. There were two models: 
· Effectiveness in function of number of hospitals in general: log(effectiveness) ~ number 
of hospitals 
oEM!6J = 3 P 33.) 
· Effectiveness in function of number of hospitals in each type: log(effectiveness) ~ 
number of national + number of specialized + number of provincial hospitals 
oEM!6J = K P)K3&3 P)KK&K P K1&1 
 
The coefficient of GLM and the 95% CI were re-transformed to the linear scale in order to 
represent the change of effectiveness when one more hospital was added in one AMRSS. 
This analysis was performed in R. 
4.2.4. Cost assessment 
4.2.4.1. Cost data 
Yearly cost per hospital was calculated based on information collected from VINARES 
surveillance network’s documents. Cost depends on the role of hospital: reference or 
participating hospital. There were two reference hospitals in the system (National Hospital for 
Tropical Diseases in the North and Hospital for Tropical Diseases in the South), which were in 
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charge of coordination between hospitals, OUCRU and MoH; and worked as reference 
laboratory. Both reference and participating hospitals provided AST data. 
VINARES’ surveillance costs were separated in three groups: cost for central unit, cost for 
reference hospitals and cost for participating hospitals.  
To calculate the estimated costs for adding one hospital in the surveillance network, costs were 
split in two categories: fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs were assumed to last for 5 years, 
while variable cost was calculated by year. By dividing the cost in two categories, an annual 
cost could be calculated. Fixed costs included all materials, meetings and trainings, website, 
and data management that were invested at the beginning to set up the surveillance system. 
Variable costs were on-going cost items including salary, annual meeting and refresh training. 
Other activities in VINARES surveillance network that were not related to the set-up and 
maintenance of the AMR surveillance system were excluded (e.g. point prevalence survey and 
antibiotic usage surveillance). 
4.2.4.2. Cost formula 
We assumed that each AMRSS had 1 central unit and 2 reference hospitals and a varying 
number of participating hospitals. The VINARES had two reference hospitals, which were 
located in the north and the south of Viet Nam. This is required following the usual 
administrative and operational division in the healthcare system in the country. Therefore, we 
kept both of them in all hypothetical AMRSS. Therefore, the total cost of AMRSS for one year 
is the sum of the costs for 1 central unit, for 2 reference hospitals and for all the participating 
hospitals. We assumed that the cost of one AMRSS having 1 central unit and two reference 
hospitals is: 
85 = ))59$&)9)5"#&p:;)#%& P x 0 59$&)9p)7""p"#?")9$I%&:;$ P .
0 59$&)9p)I:p&%I:&%#)9$I%&:;$ 
TC: total cost, k: number of participating hospitals 
We presented the improvement in effectiveness attributes (for example, the increase in the 
accuracy of resistant proportion among CAI patients by a percentage of reduction in MSE) for 
a given amount of costs invested. This can help the government to make the decision on which 
hospitals to include in the surveillance system under a specified budget to improve its 
effectiveness. 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Proportions of VINARES patients by origin of infection 
We generated 35 classification models with 3 predictors (age category, ward of hospitalisation 
and specimen type), using 5 algorithms (Naïve Bayes, Boosted Logistic, K-Nearest 
Neighbours, Random Forest and Gradient boosting) (Table 4.3). Each model was evaluated by 
4 quality statistics (Accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and F1 score). The generated models had 
scores for accuracy (0.55 to 0.77), sensitivity (0.34 to 0.80), specificity (0.35 to 0.88) and F1 
score (0.45 to 0.79) (table 4.3). 
We used these models to predict the proportion of isolates by origin of infection (CAI or HAI) 
in VINARES data. The estimated proportions of CAI isolates from these models were from 
0% to 98%, while those for HAI isolates from 2% to 100%. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) on four quality statistics performed to measure the quality 
of 35 models generated the scores in 4 dimensions. Two dimensions of PCA that represent the 
largest amount of variation (97.6%) of the 4 quality statistics are presented in figure 4.2. The 
PCA indicates that the gradient boosting and naïve Bayes models, which fall in the right of the 
2-dimension plane achieved highest quality overall.
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Figure 4.2: Models in two dimensions of principal component analysis coloured by their quality of representation (the importance of a component for a given observation, 
represented by squared cosine (cos2) - squared distance of the observation to the origin). Abbreviations for algorithms: Naïve Bayes (N), Boosted Logistic Regression (B), 
Random Forest (R), Gradient boosting machine (G) and K-Nearest Neighbours (K). 
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Table 4.3: Quality statistics and the HAI/CAI classification results for VINARES 
Predictors Algorithm Quality statistics Classification results 
for VINARES 
n(%) 
Score 
Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity F1 CAI HAI 
Age category Gradient boosting (G) 0.55 0.34 0.78 0.44 0 1601 4.44  
Specimen Naïve Bayes (N) 0.70 0.43 0.88 0.56 1241 360 2.14  
Ward K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.65 0.48 0.88 0.61 1271 330 1.80  
Ward Boosted Logistic (B) 0.65 0.48 0.88 0.61 1271 330 1.80  
Ward Naïve Bayes (N) 0.65 0.48 0.88 0.61 1271 330 1.79  
Ward Random Forest (R) 0.66 0.48 0.88 0.61 1271 330 1.79  
Ward + Specimen Naïve Bayes (N) 0.74 0.47 0.86 0.60 1556 45 1.29  
Ward + Specimen + Age 
category 
Naïve Bayes (N) 0.74 0.47 0.86 0.60 1351 250 1.28  
Specimen + Age category Naïve Bayes (N) 0.69 0.51 0.75 0.60 1354 247 1.25  
Age category Random Forest (R) 0.61 0.58 0.63 0.62 526 1075 1.19  
Age category Boosted Logistic (B) 0.61 0.58 0.66 0.63 526 1075 1.16  
Age category K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.61 0.58 0.66 0.63 526 1075 1.15  
Age category Naïve Bayes (N) 0.60 0.62 0.53 0.63 619 982 0.87  
Specimen + Age category Gradient boosting (G) 0.71 0.58 0.85 0.69 1354 247 0.21  
Specimen Boosted Logistic (B) 0.72 0.59 0.88 0.70 1241 360 0.09  
Specimen K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.72 0.59 0.88 0.70 1241 360 0.09  
Specimen Random Forest (R) 0.72 0.59 0.88 0.70 1241 360 0.09  
Specimen + Age category Random Forest (R) 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70 1354 247 -0.25  
Specimen + Age category K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.69 1306 295 -0.27  
Specimen + Age category Boosted Logistic (B) 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.70 1334 267 -0.34  
Ward + Age category Gradient boosting (G) 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.70 1381 220 -0.38  
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Ward + Specimen Boosted Logistic (B) 0.75 0.65 0.84 0.74 1241 360 -0.81  
Ward Gradient boosting (G) 0.60 0.80 0.35 0.69 1271 330 -0.85 
Specimen Gradient boosting (G) 0.65 0.78 0.46 0.71 1241 360 -1.03  
Ward + Specimen + Age 
category 
K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.77 0.69 0.84 0.76 1395 206 -1.32  
Ward + Specimen + Age 
category 
Boosted Logistic (B) 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.76 1479 122 -1.49  
Ward + Age category K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.70 0.78 0.59 0.75 1381 220 -1.54  
Ward + Age category Boosted Logistic (B) 0.69 0.80 0.51 0.73 1317 284 -1.55  
Ward + Age category Random Forest (R) 0.70 0.79 0.59 0.75 1381 220 -1.58  
Ward + Age category Naïve Bayes (N) 0.70 0.79 0.59 0.75 1381 220 -1.58  
Ward + Specimen + Age 
category 
Gradient boosting (G) 0.77 0.73 0.80 0.77 1368 233 -1.65  
Ward + Specimen + Age 
category 
Random Forest (R) 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.79 1395 206 -1.89  
Ward + Specimen Random Forest (R) 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.79 1556 45 -1.94  
Ward + Specimen K-Nearest Neighbours (K) 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.79 1556 45 -1.97  
Ward + Specimen Gradient boosting (G) 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.77 1556 45 -1.99  
F1: harmony average of positive predictive value and sensitivity; CAI: community acquired infection; HAI: hospital acquired infection. A higher score represents a better model.
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Based on the PCA result, we selected 17 models having positive scores to predict the CAI/HAI 
status for VINARES isolates. We assembled these models assigning a weight for each model 
in order to generate a more accurate prediction of CAI/HAI status for each patient isolate in 
the VINARES dataset. PCA scores of each model was used as a weight (table 4.3). The final 
assembled model classifies 1216 (76%) of VINARES patients as having a CAI and 385 (24%) 
having HAI. These proportions varied by type of specimens and ward (table 4.4). The 
proportion of CAI was 42% among patients aged from 40-60 years, while patients more than 
60 years old presented the largest group in HAI (62%). Critical care ward presented a low 
proportion in CAI (13%) but higher in HAI (45%). Sputum contributed 67% of specimen in 
HAI. 
 Table 4.4: Distribution of age, admission ward and specimen in CAI and HAI for VINARES patients  
Characteristic Summary statistic (n(%)) 
 CAI (N=1216) HAI (N=385) 
Age category   
- (10,20] 68/1216 (6) 25/385 (6) 
- (20,40] 238/1216 (20) 109/385 (28) 
- (40,60] 515/1216 (42) 11/385 (3) 
- (60,100] 395/1216 (32) 240/385 (62) 
Ward   
- Critical Care 158/1216 (13) 172/385 (45) 
- Other 1058/1216 (87) 213/385 (55) 
Specimen   
- Blood 122/1216 (10) 7/385 (2) 
- CSF 26/1216 (2) 1/385 (0) 
- Pus 140/1216 (12) 4/385 (1) 
- Sputum 103/1216 (8) 257/385 (67) 
- Urine 84/1216 (7) 1/385 (0) 
- Other 741/1216 (61) 115/385 (30) 
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4.3.2. Parameters for hospitals participating in surveillance network 
Estimated values for the number of patients and number of resistant cases in CAI and HAI of 
each hospital participating in the surveillance network are presented in table 4.5. For each type 
of hospitals, the average number of patients (defined as having one K. pneumoniae isolate) was 
calculated. Specialized hospitals had the highest number of K. pneumoniae patients for CAI. 
The estimated carbapenem-resistant proportion of K. pneumoniae for CAI was 9%, and from 
9% to 15% for HAI depending the type of hospitals. 
Table 4.5: Parameters of one hospital of VINARES 
Hospital type All patients with K. pneumoniae 
isolate (n (sd)) 
Proportion of patients having carbapenem-
resistant K. pneumoniae  (% (sd)) 
 CAI HAI CAI HAI 
National 45 (17) 24 (13) 9 (1) 15 (2) 
Specialized 98 (66) 7 (4) 9 (1) 14 (4) 
Provincial 39 (20) 34 (18) 9 (1) 9 (2) 
 
4.3.3. Number of hospitals 
The effectiveness measurements were performed on a set of simulated AMR surveillance 
systems (AMRSS). Each simulated AMRSS consists of national, specialized and provincial 
hospitals. We varied the number for each type of hospitals as follows:   
· Number of national hospitals: from 1 to 30 
· Number of specialized hospitals: from 1 to 30 
· Number of provincial hospitals: from 1 to 40 
The maximum total number of hospitals hypothetically participating in the national 
surveillance network was set at 100. The higher number of hospitals in an AMRSS was not 
realistic and it caused high computational time for the modelling process. 
The actual number of provincial hospitals is higher than national and specialized hospitals in 
Viet Nam. Therefore, we set the maximum for the number of provincial hospitals as 40 while 
that for national and specialized hospitals was 30. 
For each number of hospitals participating in the AMRSS, there can be different combinations 
of national, specialized and provincial hospitals. The total number of hospitals in one 
hypothetical AMRSS can vary from 4 to 100. However, for AMRSS that have 70 hospitals, the 
results were biased due to lack of combinations of three hospital types, which made it difficult 
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to interpret. Therefore, we restricted our simulations to the AMRSS with up to 70 hospitals. 
We also excluded the combinations with the number of hospitals below 11 for a better 
precision. Finally, only AMRSS having 12 to 70 hospitals were included in the analysis. 
4.3.4. Effectiveness attributes: results from simulation 
4.3.4.1. Mean Squared Error 
Validation of MSE formula 
Simulation was initially performed for AMRSS having 3-100 hospitals. Only those with 11 to 
70 hospitals were then included for the analysis because of the wide variation in simulation 
results for the number of hospitals below 11 and above 70.   
MSE values were estimated using formula (2) and by simulation method. Values returned by 
simulation were consistent with the values calculated by formula (Student t test returns all p-
value > 0.05). Figure 4.3 illustrated the MSE produced by formula against the MSE obtained 
by simulation. Formula based MSE values were all in the 95% CI of the simulation based MSE 
values. This indicates the validity of MSE formula to be used as a measure for precision and 
bias in the proportions of resistance in CAI generated from the hypothetical AMRSS. 
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Figure 4.3: MSE obtained by formula and by simulation in hypothetical AMRSS with different number of 
hospitals. In one AMRSS, the number of hospitals for each of the three hospital types were randomly chosen. 
95% CI of simulated MSE is also displayed. The CI ranges were randomly increased or decreased because of 
random combination of hospital types in different AMRSS. 
Mean Squared Error of VINARES 
The mean squared error of resistant proportion for CAI in the data collected in VINARES 
2012-2013 is 2.27x10-4. The VINARES 2012-2013 consisted of 4 national hospitals, 5 
specialized hospitals and 7 provincial hospitals. 
Mean Squared Error of simulated AMRSS 
MSE of the simulated AMRSS varies from 0.55 x 10-4 to 8.38 x 10-4, with a median of 2.28 x 
10-4 [IQR 1.61 x10-4 – 3.04 x10-4]. Figure 4.4 (A) illustrates the overall decreasing trend of 
MSE when increasing the number of hospitals, while figure 4.4 (B)-(D) classify MSE by 
number of national, specialized and provincial hospitals, respectively. The number of hospitals 
was categorized into five intervals for each hospital type.  
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Overall, MSE decreases while the number of hospitals increases. This trend remains even when 
stratifying by the number of national hospitals, however the higher number of national 
hospitals, the higher value of MSE (meaning less accuracy). On the other hand, a higher number 
of specialized or provincial hospitals result in a lower value of MSE. 
When stratified by the proportion of hospitals (q1: 0 to 33%, q2: 34% to 66%, q3: 67% to 
100%) by each type of hospital (national-specialized-provincial), we found that MSE value 
was lower when the proportion of national hospitals was in the q1 range (figure 4.5 (A)). 
Particularly, the MSE values were lowest in the q1-q1-q3 combination, with national and 
specialized hospitals ranging between 0-33% and provincial hospitals contributing more than 
67%. The lowest MSE point in this combination was when the total number of hospitals was 
43.  
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(A) Variation of MSE depending on the number of 
hospitals. Each boxplot showed the variation of MSE 
of different combinations for one number of 
hospitals. 
 
(B) MSE values were categorized by group of 
number of national hospitals.  
 
(C) MSE values were categorized by group of 
number of specialized hospitals.  
 
(D) MSE values were categorized by group of 
number of provincial hospitals. 
Figure 4.4: Variation of MSE in function of number of hospitals (A), and by type of hospitals (B)-(D). Smooth 
lines estimate the trend of MSE. The smooth lines in figure (B)-(D) represented the average of MSE of each group 
with similar number of hospitals. 
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(A) MSE 
 
(B) Sensitivity ratio of two successive AMRSS (x-
axis is number of hospitals in former AMRSS) 
  
(C) Coverage ratio of two successive AMRSS (x-axis 
is number of hospitals in former AMRSS) 
 
(D) Representativeness 
Figure 4.5: MSE, sensitivity ratio, coverage ratio and representativeness stratified by proportion of hospitals for 
each hospital type. Number of hospitals in one type was categorized by their contribution into three intervals: 0 
to 33% (q1), 34% to 66% (q2), 67% to 100% (q3) of the total number of hospitals in the AMRSS.  
Linear regression was performed to regress the logarithm of MSE against the number of 
hospitals. First regression analysis took into account the total number of hospitals and the 
second used the number of hospitals in each type as three covariables (table 4.6). Overall, when 
adding one more hospital, MSE will decrease 0.6% (CI 0.6% - 0.7%). Stratified by type of 
hospitals, adding one specialized or one provincial will reduce MSE by 1.8% (CI 1.8% - 1.8%) 
and 2.2% (CI 2.2% - 2.2%), respectively. On the other hand, adding one national hospital will 
increase MSE by 3.5% (CI 3.4% - 3.5%).  
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Table 4.6: Regression of logarithm of MSE, sensitivity ratio and coverage ratio against the number of hospitals. 
Coefficient and coefficient interval (CI) are exponentialized.  
  Coefficient Low CI High CI p-value 
MSE      
Log(MSE) ~ number of 
hospitals 
Hospital 
number 0.994 0.993 0.994 
< 0.0001 
Log(MSE) ~ number of 
national + specialized + 
provincial hospitals 
National        1.035 1.034 1.035 < 0.0001 
Specialized        0.982 0.982 0.982 < 0.0001 
Provincial      0.978 0.978 0.978 < 0.0001 
Sensitivity ratio      
Log(Sensitivity ratio) ~ 
number of hospitals 
Hospital 
number 0.999 0.999 0.999 
< 0.0001 
Log(Sensitivity ratio) ~ 
number of national + 
specialized + provincial 
hospitals 
National        0.999 0.999 0.999 < 0.0001 
Specialized        0.999 0.999 0.999 < 0.0001 
Provincial      
0.999 0.999 0.999 
< 0.0001 
Coverage ratio      
Log(Coverage ratio) ~ 
number of hospitals 
Hospital 
number 0.999 0.999 0.999 
< 0.0001 
Log(Coverage ratio) ~ 
number of national + 
specialized + provincial 
hospitals 
National        0.999 0.999 0.999 < 0.0001 
Specialized        0.999 0.999 0.999 < 0.0001 
Provincial      
0.999 0.999 0.999 
< 0.0001 
 
 
4.3.4.2. Sensitivity and coverage ratio   
The sensitivity ratio of two successive AMRSS varies from 0.88 to 1.29, with a median of 1.02 
(IQR 1.00 – 1.04). In general, the sensitivity ratio was higher than 1 (Student t-test p-value < 
0.0001), which indicates that the sensitivity increases when adding one more hospital. The 
sensitivity ratios are different between type of hospitals (figure 4.5).  
Similar observations were found for coverage. The coverage ratio of two successive AMRSS 
varies from 0.97 to 1.23, with median 1.02 (IQR 1.01 – 1.03). The coverage ratio was higher 
than 1 (Student t-test p-value < 0.0001), which indicates that coverage increases when adding 
one more hospital. The coverage ratios are also different between type of hospitals (figure 4.6).  
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The coefficients of sensitivity ratio and coverage ratio in the regression against the total number 
of hospital and type of hospital were 0.999 for both (table 4.6), indicating that the sensitivity 
ratio and coverage ratio were smaller when adding one more hospital. In other words, the 
percentage of increasing sensitivity and coverage decreased 0.1%. In average, sensitivity and 
coverage increased 1.09 times when adding 1 hospital into an AMRSS having 11 hospitals, but 
this increase was 1.05 times when adding 1 hospital to an AMRSS having 20 hospitals. 
The results showed sensitivity ratio and coverage ratio could be smaller than 1. This happened 
when AMRSSk had mainly provincial hospitals (which usually have smaller numbers of 
specimens) and AMRSSk+1 consisted of mostly specialized hospitals (which usually have 
larger numbers of specimens). 
Figure 4.5 (B-C) did not show much difference in sensitivity ratio and coverage ratio when 
stratifying by the proportions of hospitals in each hospital type. 
 
Figure 4.6: Variation of sensitivity and coverage ratio by hospital type. Smooth lines represented average of 
sensitivity ratio when number of hospitals increase. 
4.3.4.3. Representativeness 
Chi-square values of the Pearson goodness-of-fit test represented the level of 
representativeness in the distribution of hospitals in a hypothetical AMRSS in comparison with 
the distribution of hospitals in Viet Nam. A lower chi-square value signified a higher level of 
representativeness. 
The number of national : specialized : provincial hospitals in Viet Nam 2012 was 18 : 145: 329 
(approximated 1 : 8 : 18) and was used as reference distribution.  
Chi-square value for each AMRSS against the reference distribution was shown in figure 4.5 
(D).  
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Table 4.7 presents the chi-square statistic of the National : Specialized : Provincial combination 
that has the highest level of representativeness for a specific number of hospitals in a 
hypothetical AMRSS (table 4.7). The combination of 1 national, 7 specialized and 17 
provincial hospitals could be considered to provide the highest level of representativeness. 
Table 4.7: Combination of hospital types of the most representative AMRSS for a given total number of hospitals 
based on the value of Chi-square statistic  
Number of hospitals Number of hospitals by hospital type 
(National : Specialized : Provincial) 
Chi-square statistic 
12 1 : 3 : 8 0.76  
13 1 : 4 : 8 0.61  
14 1 : 4 : 9 0.46  
15 1 : 4 : 10 0.39  
16 1 : 5 : 10 0.34  
17 1 : 5 : 11 0.23  
18 1 : 5 : 12 0.18  
19 1 : 6 : 12 0.19  
20 1 : 6 : 13 0.11  
25 1 : 7 : 17 0.03  
30 1 : 9 : 20 0.01  
40 1 : 12 : 27 0.14  
50 2 : 15 : 33 0.02  
60 2 : 18 : 40 0.02  
70 3 : 26 : 41 1.89 
 
4.3.5. Cost and effectiveness assessment 
The total cost of surveillance for VINARES 2012-2013 was 386 thousand USD for 24 months. 
This cost was broken down in specific cost items (table 4.8). The cost for central unit, a 
reference and participating hospital were 38,000, 21,300 and 7,300 USD per year, respectively. 
Using these costs as input to our analysis of simulated AMRSS, we estimated that for an added 
hospital, the annual cost for the simulated AMRSS will be increased by 7300 USD regardless 
of type of hospital. 
Table 4.8: Detail costs of surveillance for 24 months in VINARES 2012-2013 
Cost item Cost 
allocated to 
Total 
cost 
Total 
cost/year 
Annual 
cost / 
hospital 
Type of 
cost 
Comments 
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Labour - central unit Central unit 73560 36780 36780 Variable Cost for 2 years 
Labour - reference hospital Reference 
hospital 
24600 12300 6150 Variable Cost for 2 years 
Labour - participating 
hospital 
Hospital 34272 17136 1069 Variable  
Equipment Hospital 23100 4620 289 Fixed  
Consumable Reference 
hospital 
15700 15700 7850 Variable  
Travel - initial training Hospital 64800 12960 810 Fixed  
Travel - site support and 
monitoring  
Hospital 28500 28500 1781 Variable Implementation 
for 1 year 
Training - initial Hospital 36800 7360 460 Fixed  
Training - annual refresh Hospital   230 Variable Estimated to be 
half of the initial 
training 
Approval and initial admin 
costs 
Central unit 14624 2925 183 Fixed  
EQA Hospital 7429 7429 1061 Variable Only 7 hospitals 
participated in 
EQA 
Guidelines and updates Central unit 9429 1886 118 Fixed  
Website Central unit 10000 2000 125 Fixed  
Data management/ analysis/ 
reporting 
Central unit 11571 11571 723 Variable First year 
implementation 
Data entry  Hospital 24000 24000 1500 Variable First year 
implementation 
Site evaluation Hospital 8000 1600 100 Fixed  
EQA: External Quality Assessment 
4.3.5.1. Cost and Effectiveness 
In the regression analysis of MSE against costs, MSE will decrease when the cost goes up 
(figure 4.6). For one million USD per year added in the surveillance system to expand the 
network, MSE will decrease by 81% (CI 80% - 82%, p-value < 0.0001) (table 4.9).  
Table 4.9: Percentage of reduction of MSE when cost of AMRSS increases 
Added cost (USD) MSE reduced (%) CI (%) p-value 
10 000 0.8 0.7 – 0.8 < 0.0001 
100 000 8.1 7.4 – 8.4 < 0.0001 
500 000 34.2 32.1 – 36.2 < 0.0001 
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Higher costs increased sensitivity and coverage, however the percentage of increase in 
sensitivity and coverage were lower as the cost increases, reflected in the decreasing trend in 
their ratio (figure 4.7). MSE reduces quickly at the beginning, however change in MSE slope 
decreases when the added cost reaches above 1 million USD. At the same time sensitivity ratio 
goes down gradually. With 830 000 USD added in the AMRSS, MSE will decrease 50%.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Reduction of MSE and sensitivity ratio (%) when adding annual cost to one AMRSS 
 
4.3.5.2. Choosing the optimal AMRSS 
For a given priority pathogen – antimicrobial combination, with a given amount of budget, the 
number of hospitals can be determined using the above described effectiveness attributes. For 
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a given number of hospitals, we can identify which combination of national-specialized-
provincial hospitals returns the lowest MSE, highest sensitivity and highest representativeness.  
The procedure for choosing the optimal AMRSS for a given number of hospitals is in following 
priority: MSE, sensitivity and representativeness. For given number of hospitals, the AMRSS 
having to 10% of the smallest MSE values and top 10% of highest numbers of patients infected 
by resistant pathogens (which represents sensitivity) were selected. Then the combination 
having the lowest Chi-square statistic (which implies the highest level of representativeness) 
can be considered optimal. Coverage is not taken into account in this selection because it has 
high correlation with sensitivity.  
Table 4.10 presented the combinations of hospitals by type that had the highest level of 
representativeness after we conducted the selection procedure above for each given total 
number of hospitals in the AMRSS. We compared these combinations to the combination set 
up in VINARES, which is also the same in the current National AMR Surveillance Network. 
For each given number of hospitals in total, the decision maker can choose the best hospital 
combination as in this table. Higher number of hospitals in total overall resulted in a better 
AMRSS, but also higher cost needs to be invested.   
Table 4.10: List of best AMRSS by number of hospitals after selection based on MSE, sensitivity and representativeness 
Total number 
of hospitals 
Number of 
hospitals by 
type(a) 
Cost of 
AMRSS 
($) 
Sensitivity 
Increase 
(%) 
Coverage 
Increase 
(%) 
MSE 
Decrease 
(%) 
Cost 
Increase 
(%) 
12 1 : 6 : 5 153 600 107 111 90 84 
13 1 : 5 : 7 160 900 109 106 87 88 
14 1 : 4 : 9 168 200 103 103 80 92 
15 1 : 4 : 10 175 500 104 109 72 96 
16 1 : 5 : 10 182 800 118 119 64 100 
16(*) 04:05:07 182 800 100 100 100 100 
17 1 : 5 : 11 190 100 123 126 71 104 
18 1 : 11 : 6 197 400 166 175 70 108 
19 1 : 7 : 11 204 700 152 153 69 112 
20 1 : 7 : 12 212 000 154 155 61 116 
25 1 : 12 : 12 248 500 214 220 58 136 
30 1 : 7 : 22 285 000 191 204 43 156 
40 2 : 11 : 27 358 000 277 292 42 196 
50 1 : 13 : 36 431 000 342 352 38 236 
60 1 : 19 : 40 504 000 435 448 36 276 
70 1 : 29 : 40 577 000 546 574 37 316 
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(a) (National : Specialized : Provincial); (*) Reference combination, which was the combination of hospitals set up in 
VINARES in 2012 and remains the same in the current National AMR Surveillance Network. The percentage of 
increase/decrease in effectiveness attributes was compared to this reference combination. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
In Viet Nam, the current national AMR surveillance system aims to monitor the proportion of 
resistant isolates obtained from patients presenting at hospitals in order to give specific 
recommendations for empiric therapy and assess the AMR prevalence to support control 
actions. In this study, using a subset of the dataset on carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae 
isolates from the VINARES network in 2012-2013 as baseline, we evaluated the effectiveness 
and costs of AMR surveillance systems by varying the number of participating hospitals by 
three types of hospitals (national, specialized and provincial). Incremental changes in costs and 
benefits from increasing an additional hospital to the network were compared between the 
simulated systems to identify the optimal combinations of hospitals for a given number of 
hospitals in a given budget allocated for AMR surveillance. We assessed the four effectiveness 
attributes that represent the outcomes of the surveillance system: accuracy of resistant 
proportion for CAI causing bacteria using MSE, sensitivity of the system to detect resistant 
cases, representativeness in describing the patient population and coverage which reflects the 
proportion of patient population reached by the system. Since denominator data is lacking, we 
evaluated ratios of attributes of two successive simulated systems to determine the systems 
with optimal hospital combinations for MSE, sensitivity and coverage. 
Since one key objective of the national AMR surveillance system is to provide accurate 
estimates of resistant proportions among patients with community acquired infections 
presenting to hospital to guide empiric treatment, MSE can be used as an important criterion 
in choosing the most effective structure for the surveillance system. We found that adding a 
hospital does not always decrease the MSE (or increase the accuracy) of CAI specific resistant 
proportions. While expanding to an additional specialized or provincial hospital tend to 
increase accuracy, adding a national hospital appears to decrease the accuracy of the resistance 
estimates. This might be because the predicted values for HAI and CAI for specialized and 
provincial hospitals were highly variable due to the quality of training data, therefore an 
increase in the number in these hospital types can help reduce the amount of bias for the 
resistant proportion. However, the highest level of representativeness was indicated in the 
combinations with lower number of national hospitals. This is valid because the number of 
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national hospitals is much smaller compared to the number of other hospital types in Viet Nam 
overall. Therefore, considering both MSE and representativeness, the best combination of 
hospitals is still likely to be those with lower number of national hospitals. 
In the previous and current surveillance networks clinical data that can support the separate 
reporting of resistant proportions in CAI and HAI causing bacteria is not collected. This has 
restricted the effective use of surveillance data in informing guidelines development and 
guiding empiric treatment in local hospitals in Viet Nam. We overcome this difficulty by 
identifying a predictive model using different approaches and estimate the resistant proportions 
separately for CAI and HAI from the VINARES surveillance data. Data from a previous study 
[214] were used to build the model to predict CAI/HAI status in VINARES data. We estimated 
24% of isolates included in the VINARES surveillance during 2012-2013 were from HAI 
patients. There was limited data on the prevalence of HAI in hospitals in Viet Nam. A 
prevalence survey in the same period of VINARES in adult ICU settings in 14 hospitals showed 
a HAI prevalence ranging from 5.6% to 60.9% with an average of 29.5% [11]. Another study 
in 2014-2016 in a hospital for tropical diseases also reported a proportion of 23.4% in the 
observed patients contracting HAI in an adult ICU [12]. The overall hospital-wide rate is much 
lower, as shown in some reports from non-peer reviewed literature (below 5%) [216,217]. Our 
estimate of HAI proportions in VINARES data using predictive modelling was rather high, 
closer to the average range reported in ICUs. However, this high estimate might be because of 
the overrepresentation of severe infections in the routine antimicrobial susceptibility testing 
data submitted to the surveillance network. Patients who had specimens collected for 
microbiological investigations are usually those with more severe illness or who don’t respond 
to treatment. With the estimated proportion of 24% of HAI and 76% of CAI in VINARES data, 
the estimated resistant proportion for K. pneumoniae was 9% in CAI and 9-15% in HAI 
depending on the type of hospital.  
We used K. pneumoniae in our evaluation because this organism is among the most common 
organisms in the VINARES surveillance network and we also had available external datasets 
on K. pneumoniae with information on origin of infection for developing the predictive model. 
Carbapenem resistant K. pneumoniae is among the priority pathogen – antimicrobial 
combinations for surveillance and research and included in the GLASS implementation 
guidelines [13]. The proportion of carbapenem resistance reported for this organism in the 
above-mentioned prevalence survey in ICUs was 14.9%. No data was available for the 
resistance rate among non-ICU patients. The overall carbapenem resistance among 
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Klebsiella spp. in VINARES 2012-2013 was 17% for all specimens and 18% for invasive 
specimens [14]. Based on the predictive model developed from the external dataset collected 
in 2011 in the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases, which does not include a wide range of 
specimens and wards and was specific to only one hospital setting, our derived estimates for 
carbapenem resistant proportion were not much different between CAI and HAI. This 
estimation can be improved if a more representative external dataset is available.  
Sensitivity and coverage always increase as the number of participating hospitals increases but 
quickly reach equilibrium when the increase is minimal considering the additional costs 
involved. Both effectiveness attributes display similar patterns in the results of simulation 
because there is some resemblance in how they were defined and calculated: the proportion of 
resistant cases detected by the surveillance network out of all resistant cases highly correlate 
with the proportion of patients covered under the surveillance out of the total population of 
patients in Viet Nam. Determining the sensitivity of a public health system usually requires 
additional data collection or access to an external data source on the health condition under 
surveillance. From a practical standpoint, a surveillance system does not need to have a high 
sensitivity to be useful, as long as it remains reasonably stable overtime in order to help 
identifying changes for response actions [37,59]. The stability of sensitivity over time depends 
mostly on the consistency of surveillance protocols and testing methods. The use of ratios in 
our evaluation of the simulated systems provides an alternative solution to evaluate relative 
change in these types of effectiveness attributes, with the assumption that the core surveillance 
protocols and testing methods remain stable as the system expands to additional hospitals. 
The number of hospitals participating in the network affected the total cost of the surveillance 
system. Increasing the number of hospitals generally increase the effectiveness attributes, 
however a decision has to be made on the most cost-effective system in a limited health budget 
with many competing health priorities. A public health surveillance system should be designed 
and implemented to provide decision makers with valid and timely information at the lowest 
possible amount of resources consumed [218]. While these can be improved by optimizing the 
efficiency in the operating procedures and staff capacity and skills, having the right hospital 
combination with an appropriate number of hospitals can greatly improve the validity or the 
accuracy of the AMR data for guiding treatment and taking other control actions.  It is 
important to note that the implementation of the VINARES surveillance network was donor 
funded to meet an immediate demand for data to inform AMR control actions led by the 
Ministry of Health. While the costs and benefits of surveillance systems often spill across 
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national borders and the support from international donors for capacity building is justified 
[218], governmental resources must be mobilized for a sustainable and strong national AMR 
surveillance system. Therefore, a full health economic evaluation of the national AMR 
surveillance system should be considered in future, including conducting additional data 
collections to measure the costs and effects as well as the possibility of developing an integrated 
surveillance system from a one-health approach to create synergies and minimize the system 
operating costs [43].  
Due to the unavailability of data for classifying the origin of infection, we only conducted the 
analysis for one pathogen – antimicrobial combination to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
surveillance system that targets all pathogen – antimicrobial combinations tested in the routine 
microbiology from the participating hospitals. This limitation can be overcome in the future 
when more data are collected. In principle, our approach can be done to all priority pathogen – 
antimicrobial combinations provided that data on origin of infection is available. These data 
can be either integrated into the current surveillance system or coming from external data 
collection. Decisions on the optimal surveillance structure can be made based on the first 
priority drug resistant bacteria or a composite score for the key bacteria of public health 
importance in the country.  
The AMRSS effectiveness models were assessed with input data including the type and number 
of hospitals, and the rates of resistance in community-acquired infections which depend on the 
types and quality of data available either within the surveillance dataset itself (if clinical 
information is integrated into the ARMSS) or from external datasets. Therefore it is not 
straightforward to predict about the expected changes for other types of bacteria. The risk 
characteristics for other bacterial infections can influence on the types of specimens collected. 
On the other hand, since all three types of hospitals are included in our models, the results of 
identifying the optimal hospital combinations are likely to remain in similar directions for other 
types of bacteria. 
Within the scope of this thesis, we only evaluated the representativeness attribute using the 
simple approach of measuring the deviation in the distribution of hospitals in each hypothetical 
AMRSS in comparison with the nation-wide distribution of hospitals by types. This approach 
only took into account the variation between the types of hospitals. Using this approach, the 
most representative AMRSS were found to be those containing only one or two national 
hospitals. However, this might not be practical in reality as national hospitals deserve to have 
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more representativeness profile, given their contribution in the number of isolates and their 
impact on the overall work on AMR control in the country. Therefore, further work can be 
done to take into account other representativeness aspects including geographical 
representativeness, hospital size (bed capacity and annual number of admissions), and variation 
within each hospital type. Among hospitals within one type of hospitals, there can be a lot of 
variations in the HAI/CAI patterns as well as the resistance profiles. However, we could not 
integrate this level of details in our analyses due to lack of hospital specific data nation-wide. 
The calculations in this chapter were based on VINARES data, therefore the results are likely 
to be valid for surveillance systems that have similar organizational structures and data 
collection protocols like VINARES. With a resource-limited setting such as Viet Nam and 
many other LMICs, this methodology can be applied because we usually have to optimize the 
surveillance system in a restricted budget. By substituting the corresponding baseline data 
(number of hospital types, number of patients with CAI/HAI, number of patients carrying 
resistant isolates), effectiveness attributes for these surveillance systems can be assessed to 
determine the most desirable structure. 
In the next generation of AMR surveillance in Viet Nam, the origin of infection will be 
collected as part of the process for integrating clinical meta-data. Currently, a project called 
ACORN (A Clinically-Oriented Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network) is being 
implemented as a pilot protocol for case based AMR surveillance since 2019 in Viet Nam, 
Laos and Cambodia [181,182]. ACORN aims to develop an efficient clinically orientated AMR 
surveillance system and implement routine clinical care in hospitals in LMIC settings, and 
OUCRU and the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases are piloting this now in Viet Nam. 
Data from this pilot project will be used for our model to find the optimal setting for an 
extended AMRSS in the future. The surveillance protocol that the Ministry of Health is 
developing for the national AMR surveillance network will also include collection of some 
clinical metadata. With this addition, we will have the actual data for HAI/CAI patterns for 
each participating hospital in the network and will not need to perform CAI/HAI classification 
models as done in this chapter. However, the principles underlying these classification methods 
can still be applied to the datasets of other surveillance systems that still do not have clinical 
data particularly in LMIC settings. 
The strengths in our analysis are the inclusion of three types of hospitals representing the main 
hospital types in Viet Nam and the availability of cost breakdowns for the implementation of 
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a hospital-based AMR surveillance network. With the assumption of homogeneity among 
hospitals within each hospital type, we were able to evaluate the effect of adding each type of 
hospital and the associated added costs on the performance of the whole surveillance network. 
This type of lab-based surveillance system can only include hospitals equipped with laboratory 
diagnostic capacity and therefore excludes smaller and lower-level healthcare facilities such as 
district hospitals. However, even when clinical information is integrated to the current 
surveillance system to have accurate data on origin of infection, AMR data from this lab-based 
surveillance system can only be used at the provincial and national levels and cannot be 
generalized to the patient population attending the primary healthcare facilities. Future AMR 
surveillance systems can consider the incorporation of community-based surveillance 
components, which can focus on important indicator bacteria and feasible options for specimen 
collection [144]. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness in terms of accuracy, sensitivity, coverage and 
representativeness of the current AMR surveillance system can be enhanced when adding more 
hospitals into the network. For a given health budget allocation for improving the national 
AMR surveillance network, optimal structures for hospital combination can be determined 
through our model-based evaluation approach and the most cost-effective option can be 
identified depending on the priorities for implementing and maintaining the system. Further 
economic evaluations should be considered to collect additional datasets for conducting full 
analyses and to explore the additional surveillance components to increase the utility of the 
surveillance data for public health actions.
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Surveillance data are crucial to inform about the current situation, trends in time and space and 
as benchmark for implementing actions to control the spread of AMR locally and globally. 
Despite a number of initiatives to set up surveillance for AMR in Viet Nam and the recent 
recognition of the VINARES network as the National AMR Surveillance Network (2016, 
decision 6211 of MoH) [167], the effectiveness of this network has not been evaluated. 
Evaluation of surveillance systems is critical to ensure surveillance objectives are being 
achieved and to identify areas for improving the efficiency and effectiveness and for 
sustainability [57]. Therefore, I set out to systematically evaluate the existing AMR 
surveillance system (AMRSS) in Viet Nam using available data from VINARES and to assess 
the costs and effects of simulated AMRSS structure (number of hospitals of each type in the 
network) to determine the optimal combinations that can provide accurate estimates, by origin 
of infection, of the proportion of patients infected by resistant bacteria. 
Since one of the aims of the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam is to collect information to 
inform local treatment guidelines and clinical decision-making, one focus in this thesis was to 
identify an approach to predict the resistant proportions by origin of infection, i.e. hospital or 
community acquired.  
My first hypothesis was that the current passive laboratory-based surveillance system 
overestimates the resistant proportions among community acquired infections (CAI) because 
(i) microbiology diagnostics are under-used and often reserved for more severe and 
unresponsive cases and no metadata are collected to distinguish between community- and 
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hospital-acquired infections (HAI), and (ii) proportion of antibiotic resistance in HAI is much 
higher than in CAI. My first research question was investigating whether we can estimate the 
proportion of resistance to inform local treatment guidelines for patients with CAI.   
Secondly, I hypothesized that human and economic resources for AMR surveillance in Viet 
Nam are not adequately allocated. The result (resistant proportion) could be affected by the 
number of hospitals and the types of hospitals (national, specific and provincial) participating 
in the surveillance system. My second research was aimed at optimizing the effectiveness of 
the AMR surveillance system for a given budget allocation. 
Review of AMR surveillance systems around the world 
In my literature review (Chapter 1), I showed that the number of AMR surveillance systems 
globally has been increased substantially in the late 1990s; with most of the systems established 
after 2010 being passive international systems. These systems vary greatly in many aspects 
including surveillance objectives, target pathogens, number of participating hospitals, inclusion 
of reference / central laboratories, standards for interpretation of AST results, quality control 
measures, information on de-duplication, and integration of clinical information. These 
variations lead to difficulties when aggregating data and making comparisons across locations 
and regions.  
There is also no standardized framework and guidelines for conducting evaluation of AMR 
surveillance systems. Such evaluations have also not been performed or reported in most of the 
AMR systems in this review. An evaluation was reported in less than 10% of the systems, 
focusing on few attributes such as representativeness, timeliness, bias, cost, coverage, and 
sensitivity. Depending on the health condition under surveillance, evaluation can focus on the 
attributes that are most relevant as also reflected in a systematic review on evaluation of animal 
and public health surveillance systems in the world previously [57]. 
From this review, I identified the key elements of an AMR surveillance system and the gaps 
and common issues in running these systems at local and international levels. The review also 
shows the gap in evaluation of AMR surveillance systems. Such a gap is critical to improve 
AMRSS performance and effectiveness and to ensure resources are adequately used to achieve 
the surveillance objectives. While there are generic guidelines for evaluating public health 
surveillance systems, these guidelines may not be specific enough to the context of AMR 
surveillance. AMR surveillance is different from surveillance of any specific disease because 
it is more complex with a wide range of targeted organisms, various types of specimens and 
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protocols for testing and quality control. One important aspect is that AMR surveillance plays 
an important role in helping to determine appropriate antibiotic treatments for patients whose 
illness requires antibiotic treatment [219]. Appropriate treatment (covering the suspected or 
detected pathogen) is not only beneficial at the individual patient level as it will improve the 
success of the treatment but in public health management of diseases and control of increasing 
AMR problems appropriate treatment (when indicated and not too broad) is also beneficial at 
population level by mitigating the spread of AMR.  
The most common objectives in 48/79 surveillance systems in my review were to monitor 
trends in infection and resistance and study antimicrobial susceptibility patterns. The objective 
of developing treatment guidelines was explicitly stated in a small number (5) of systems, and 
two evaluated the bias in the estimated proportion of resistance in animal [114] or bias towards 
over-representation of resistant infections in the sampling protocol [55].   
Information on how the effectiveness attributes of the surveillance systems were evaluated was 
poorly described in most studies, except for the systematic evaluation of the Australian 
Gonococcal Surveillance Programme [52]. Evaluation was often described as an add-on 
analysis rather than a systematic evaluation of the whole AMR surveillance system. In all 
studies, the context of surveillance was not described in detail.  
Having gained an overview of the AMR surveillance systems and their evaluation worldwide, 
I focused my evaluation on the VINARES network in Viet Nam. This evaluation was 
conducted systematically to evaluate all aspects of the system organization and performance. 
A recent review of the existing approaches to evaluation of surveillance systems showed that 
most approaches were generic with broad recommendations and common steps for the 
evaluation process, including defining the surveillance system under evaluation, designing the 
evaluation process, implementing the evaluation, and drawing conclusions and 
recommendations [62]. 
Evaluation of AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam based on the VINARES network 
I used SurvTool and OASIS to systematically evaluate the AMR surveillance system in Viet 
Nam. SurvTool helps the user to establish an evaluation context, including surveillance 
description, evaluation questions and suggestion of assessment methods. OASIS - a qualitative 
assessment tool for assessment of strengths and weaknesses of surveillance systems based on 
78 criteria – can be used to assess the situation and operation of a surveillance system. 
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I chose the VINARES network because the current National AMR Surveillance Network in 
Viet Nam consists of the VINARES hospitals and essentially employs the same structure and 
protocols as VINARES. Using these tools, I assessed the surveillance system organization to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system and the impact of the system function on 
its effectiveness.  
I selected five attributes to assess, which were indicated in the outputs of SurvTool and that are 
relevant for the surveillance system under evaluation in answering our research questions. 
Based on expert opinion, I included four effectiveness attributes (sensitivity, coverage, 
representativeness and timeliness) and cost.  
The VINARES network was operational as an AMRSS in 2012-13 and 2016-17. It then became 
the National AMR Surveillance System in 2016, and data collection resumed in 2018. There 
were 16 hospitals enrolled in the VINARES network in 2012: 4 national, 5 specialized and 7 
provincial hospitals. In 2016, the number of hospitals submitting data was reduced to 13 with 
3 national, 3 specialized and 7 provincial hospitals. The hospitals that dropped out of the 
network were large tertiary hospitals located in the capital city. Changes in the number of 
hospitals affected the surveillance data and the distribution of isolates of key organisms: 10% 
increase in the number of isolates from national hospitals in 2016-17 compared with 2012-13, 
while the proportion was the same for provincial hospitals in the 2 periods (44%). This could 
affect the accuracy of the estimated resistant proportions. As emphasized throughout this thesis, 
one important objective of AMR surveillance in Viet Nam is to gain accurate information on 
the resistance patterns to inform control actions and treatment. Therefore, it is important to 
identify the combinations of hospitals that provide data with low bias and high precision while 
saving the resources invested in the surveillance system. 
The very limited amount of clinical metadata collected in the surveillance made the estimation 
of resistant proportions by origin of infection impossible. This is a concern for the use of 
surveillance data to help doctors in making decision for empiric treatment of their patients prior 
to sampling for microbiological diagnostics. The overall resistant proportion for all patients is 
likely to be biased towards hospital acquired and more severe or unresponsive patients, who 
are more likely to have drug resistant infections. While waiting for the integration of clinical 
data into the surveillance system, we aimed to model or estimate the proportions of resistance 
among CAI versus HAI from the surveillance data.  
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Under a passive surveillance protocol, laboratories at the hospitals in VINARES were asked to 
send data to the central unit following a specified timeframe (monthly in first and quarterly in 
second period); these data were AST results of the isolates recovered from specimens routinely 
collected by doctors and sent to the labs for diagnostics. This surveillance approach was 
effective in obtaining data from a large number of hospitals at a low cost using the existing 
health infrastructures. Passive surveillance is considered a relatively inexpensive strategy to 
gain health information from populations with a large geographical coverage, however this 
approach also poses issues in the control of data quality and timeliness because the system 
relies heavily on staff at the participating institutions to perform the required surveillance 
activity [218]. In VINARES, the data quality and consistency were assured by training, use of 
translated CLSI guidelines, ATCC strains for internal quality assurance, enrolment into UK-
NEQAS for external quality assurance and standardized data submission using (translated) 
WHONET. But there was still a delay in data submission from the hospitals (10% of 
submissions were up to 3 months after the deadline), which affected the timeliness of the 
surveillance system. This and many other operational issues can be improved through regular 
and concurrent evaluation of the surveillance system to identify problems and implement 
prompt resolutions. Periodic evaluations may help ensure the system operates efficiently, 
information provided by the system is useful for public health practice, and health resources 
are spent appropriately for surveillance [220]. 
Resistant proportions: results from analysis of AST data from VINARES’s surveillance 
network 
Despite the limitations intrinsic to the passive surveillance approach and the absence of clinical 
metadata, the data collected in VINARES during the two periods 2012-2013 and 2016-2017 
have provided a description of the resistant proportions of important bacteria – antibiotic 
combinations for each of the participating hospitals in the network and for all hospitals 
combined, stratified by sample (blood & CSF vs. other) and ward (ICU vs. non-ICU). These 
data are important to understand the distribution and magnitude of the AMR problem in 
hospitals in Viet Nam.  
Resistance patterns varied greatly between the hospitals, and there were trends of increase of 
the resistant proportions over time between the two periods in some pathogen-antimicrobial 
combinations, and mixed results in other combinations. For example, imipenem-resistant 
proportions appeared to increase overtime for K. pneumoniae, while no such trend was 
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observed for MRSA and vancomycin-resistant E. faecium. Imipenem-resistant A. baumannii 
and P. aeruginosa were higher in second period of VINARES. 
Such data can be used to inform local treatment guidelines at each hospital but direct use of 
these detected resistant proportions is limited considering the bias caused by the absence of 
clinical metadata and thus the inability to distinguish between hospital and community acquired 
origin of infection.  
There are a number of priority pathogens recommended by GLASS [39] that are currently 
being monitored under the National AMR Surveillance Network. Comparison between the 
surveillance data and data from a point prevalence survey (PPS) in 15 ICUs in the VINARES 
network in 2012-2013 [190] for the key pathogens revealed striking differences. Imipenem 
resistance in the surveillance data was 70% for A. baumannii and 33% for P. aeruginosa, for 
all types of specimens combined (45% and 28% in blood and CSF). On the other hand, 
carbapenem resistance in HAI patients in the point prevalence survey was 87% and 56% for A. 
baumannii and P. aeruginosa respectively [221]. These large differences between the two data 
sources can be explained by the types of patients included, with the surveillance data including 
both CAI and HAI patients, the difference between ICU and non-ICU patients and the relative 
abundance of HAI among ICU patients, especially those receiving mechanical ventilation. This 
illustrates the likely effect of mixing the origin of infection on the resistance estimates, resulting 
in the overestimation of resistance among CAI patients as stated in my first research hypothesis.  
For imipenem resistant K. pneumoniae, which was used as the target pathogen in the modelling 
study in chapter 4, the overall resistant proportion was 15% among all isolates in the VINARES 
surveillance data of 2012-2013. This was comparable to the proportion reported in the PPS 
[190]. Similarly, the proportion of K. pneumoniae resistant to third generation cephalosporins 
was 68% in the surveillance data in 2012-2013 and 72% in the PPS (p77) [221]. The 
surveillance data aimed to capture the resistance patterns for all patients with clinical specimens 
routinely collected (not distinguishing between CAI and HAI) while the PPS only targeted HAI 
patients in ICUs. The similarity in resistant proportion from surveillance data with that from 
the PPS is related to the over-representation of HAI isolates among the imipenem resistant K. 
pneumoniae isolates in the surveillance data and indicates the need to sample all patients with 
infection or requiring antibiotics for microbiological diagnostics, and not only severe or 
unresponsive patients..  
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Integration of clinical information as part of an AMR surveillance system from the beginning 
is urgently needed. If this could be done, data on resistant proportions will be more accurate 
and useful for control and treatment of infections. Until then, we have to determine how the 
surveillance data could be analysed to incorporate information on the origin of infection to 
make it more meaningful and effective.  
Classifying origin of infection for VINARES surveillance data: results from classification 
models 
Hospital and community acquired infections are intrinsically different in terms of causative 
pathogens, resistant proportions, patient populations and epidemiology. However, 
classification of an infection as community acquired or hospital acquired in practice is largely 
done based on the date of symptom onset. Those who developed symptoms before hospital 
admission for a disease are considered to have community-acquired infection while those 
developing symptoms after 48 hours or more of hospitalization are considered hospital 
acquired. Risk factors for HAI are complex; a recent systematic review reported the increased 
risk in patients with comorbidity, immunosuppression, surgery related factors, antibiotic use, 
ICU admission, and mechanical ventilation [222]. Older age was also linked to the increased 
risk of HAI, which was thought to be related to dysregulated immune function and increased 
susceptibility to infection in the elderly patients [223,224]. Finally, certain types of specimens 
are collected more often in patients with HAI than CAI; for example pneumonia is the most 
common type of HAI [190,225] and thus sputum or endotracheal specimens are collected more 
often among HAI than CAI patients. Therefore, the type of specimens can be used to help 
classify the CAI/HAI status of patient data. 
To answer my first research question, I examined how to classify an individual patient as 
having CAI or HAI based on the observed data for the covariables collected in the surveillance 
system. Statistical modelling has been used as a common method for disease diagnosis, 
however this required prior assumptions and is less capable of dealing with massive 
complicated non-linear and dependent datasets generated from routine hospital information 
systems. I used classification models from machine learning with a combination of five 
classifiers including Naïve Bayes, which has been considered as a benchmark algorithm to be 
tried before other advanced techniques in the medical area [226]. The results from my analysis 
also showed Naïve Bayes classifier produced more high-quality models than other classifiers.  
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I only applied this approach to K. pneumoniae, as it was the only pathogen for which I could 
identify a suitable external dataset for use as training data. The resulting estimates for HAI 
proportions and imipenem resistance for this organism in the VINARES data were in the 
plausible ranges compared to other studies. In principle, this approach can be applied to any 
other pathogen – antimicrobial combination in the surveillance data that need to be evaluated, 
provided suitable external datasets are available. This depends on public health priorities and 
activities funded by local or international research funding sources. While integrating 
electronic clinical information from all participating hospitals into the national AMR 
surveillance system should be the long-term and sustainable way to go, funding smaller 
research to collect detailed clinical data for key bacteria at local hospitals can provide a short-
term solution to enhance the clinical utility of the current AMR surveillance datasets. 
Optimizing AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam  
My second hypothesis was that the resources for the current AMR surveillance system are not 
adequately allocated to achieve the best outcome at a given budget. I evaluated this by 
simulating a large number of AMR surveillance systems with different combinations of 
hospitals containing national, specialized, and provincial hospitals and assessed their 
performance using the baseline values from the VINARES surveillance system in 2012-2013. 
The simulation results showed that the current AMR surveillance system should increase the 
proportions for specialized and provincial hospitals in order to increase the accuracy of resistant 
proportions and system representativeness. The initial set-up of VINARES included a higher 
proportion of national hospitals than that in the country. In addition, there is no single solution 
for the optimal combination of hospitals. Rather, it depends on the amount of budget that the 
government is willing to spend on AMR surveillance. The approach that I used to determine 
the cost and effectiveness of the systems can provide an answer on the option that would lead 
to the best outcomes in achieving the objectives of surveillance under a budget constraint. 
Economic evaluation deals with costs and consequences and concerns choices to be made on 
the use of scarce resources [227]. Conventional healthcare evaluations often provide cost and  
effectiveness ratios among alternative healthcare programs, although there is an increasing 
debate that such ratios are not sufficient to make decisions on the optimal allocation of 
resources [228]. This is mainly because the costs and consequences often need to be narrowed 
down in order to calculate the ratios and therefore often failed to include many aspects 
influencing decision making in real-life practice. In my cost and effectiveness analysis, I did 
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not calculate the cost-effectiveness ratios because I did not compare the costs and effects of 
two distinctive surveillance programs with different surveillance approaches. The national 
AMR surveillance system has just been established using the structure of the VINARES 
hospital network with a passive laboratory-based surveillance approach. While the passive 
surveillance approach has inherent limitations due to the nature of voluntary or routine 
reporting systems [229], it is a long-term and low-cost solution suitable for LMIC settings such 
as Viet Nam. Therefore, the objective of the cost and effectiveness evaluation in my study was 
to optimize the effectiveness of the AMR surveillance system under a budget constraint (or a 
fixed budget).  
Further work could be done to have a full economic evaluation of AMR surveillance providing 
evidence on the cost-effectiveness of different surveillance approaches, especially in the 
context where countries such as Viet Nam need to improve their surveillance methodologies in 
the roadmap to participate in the global case-based surveillance system (GLASS). GLASS aims 
to collect valid AMR data to monitor trends and burden as well as to inform local and national 
guidelines. The recommended surveillance approach in GLASS is more complex and time-
consuming, but provides more reliable and less biased information than conventional 
laboratory-based surveillance systems [48]. Budget impact analysis might also be necessary to 
assess the affordability and to provide evidence on the non-healthcare costs that can support 
decision makers in rational resource allocation [230]. This is particularly required when 
moving toward a one-health approach as promoted by international organizations and 
formulated as a central recommendation of the Global Action Plan for AMR control [36]. 
Conclusions and recommendations for the next steps 
Through a systematic evaluation of the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam based on the 
VINARES network and application of modelling and simulation methods to evaluate the 
performance of hypothetical systems, this research showed a number of important results.  
Firstly, the performance and effectiveness of the AMR surveillance system in Viet Nam was 
determined by the structure of the hospital network, the surveillance approach including the 
design of data collection protocols to include necessary metadata, the concurrent monitoring 
and prompt feedback of data to participating hospitals, and the integration of ongoing 
evaluation to timely identify issues and implement improvement resolutions.  
Secondly, the AMR surveillance system has provided important data that help understand the 
AMR burden, support decision making in clinical treatment for patients and inform the design 
General discussion, future directions and conclusion  
 
166 
 
and evaluation of controls actions in Viet Nam. However, AMR data from the surveillance 
system are likely to provide an over-estimation of the resistant proportions for infections 
acquired in the community and should be validated by external datasets before interpretation 
and used for treatment and control actions. Classification models can be useful in determining 
the origin of infection for the patients reported under the surveillance system.  
Finally, the analysis showed that the current structure including 4 national, 5 specialized and 7 
provincial hospitals is not optimal; increasing the proportions of specialized and provincial 
hospitals appears to improve the accuracy and representativeness of resistance data. The most 
effective combination of hospitals can be identified in a given budget allocated for AMR 
surveillance in the country. 
In Viet Nam, the national AMR surveillance network was implemented since 2017 and 
continues to collect data using a protocol similar to VINARES. Currently, case-based AMR 
surveillance is an alternative approach recommended by GLASS, which can improve the utility 
of surveillance data in informing treatment guidelines and clinical practice, providing 
consistent and systematic data streams for analyses of the effectiveness of interventions and 
identifying high-risk populations and settings vulnerable to AMR infections [39].  
Since 2019, OUCRU and the National Hospital for Tropical Diseases are piloting ACORN (A 
Clinically-Oriented Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network), with additional 
enrolment sites in Laos and Cambodia. ACORN combines clinical and laboratory data 
collection with direct feedback to local physicians [181,182]. Data from this pilot project will 
be used for our model to find the optimal setting for an extended AMRSS in the future. 
Based on the results of this research and current situation in Viet Nam, the following 
recommendations are put forward for the next steps in improving the cost-effectiveness of 
AMR surveillance in Viet Nam and in other LMIC settings: 
· Develop a feasible evaluation plan to be integrated to the current National AMR 
Surveillance Network to regularly monitor and improve the technical performance and 
efficiency of the system. Providing valid and timely information to decision makers at 
a lowest possible cost is the fundamental principle of any public health surveillance 
[218]. It is also equally important to ensure that data collected from the surveillance 
system are used appropriately and effectively to improve antibiotic treatment and to 
control AMR problems. This is well reiterated in the following quotation: "The reason 
for collecting, analysing, and disseminating information on a disease is to control that 
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disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to consume resources if action 
does not follow" [231]. 
· AMR surveillance is one of the important strategies in the National Action Plan to 
control AMR. Data from the AMR surveillance system should be used for design and 
evaluation of the national and local actions and interventions to tackle AMR issues 
including development of treatment guidelines and tools for doctors in local hospitals. 
This data should therefore be in an open-access format, which should be accessible for 
research and program implementation as well as local practitioners. 
· The design of the current National AMR Surveillance protocol should be extended to 
include key clinical information of each patient, particularly information on the origin 
of infection to improve the utility of the AMR surveillance data in guiding treatment 
therapy and developing specific treatment guidelines. The feasibility of this extension 
should be evaluated carefully based on data from ACORN and the evidence 
implementing GLASS from other countries. In the meantime, separate research studies 
can also be conducted to determine the prevalence and resistance patterns of key 
pathogen – antimicrobial combinations for community acquired and hospital acquired 
infection. These datasets can be used for cross-validation of the AMR data collected 
from the national surveillance system or classification of these surveillance data by 
HAI/CAI status. 
· Consider additional AMR surveillance components or alternatives including an active 
surveillance approach and an integrated one health surveillance approach. There needs 
to be more economic evaluation of these components including budget impact analysis 
to provide more evidence for policy makers in making decisions to allocate resources 
on the most effective options or combination of options within a constrained budget for 
AMR surveillance.  
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Appendices 
Chapter 1 
Table S1.1: Completed checklist for systematic review of AMR surveillance systems worldwide – Chapter 1 
Item # Item definition Applicable in the thesis  
TITLE    
Title  1 Identify the report as a systematic 
review, meta-analysis, or both.  
Yes 
ABSTRACT   
Structured 
summary  
2 Provide a structured summary including, 
as applicable: background; objectives; 
data sources; study eligibility criteria, 
participants, and interventions; study 
appraisal and synthesis methods; results; 
limitations; conclusions and implications 
of key findings; systematic review 
registration number.  
Not applicable for chapter format.  
INTRODUCTION   
Rationale  3 Describe the rationale for the review in 
the context of what is already known.  
Yes 
Objectives  4 Provide an explicit statement of 
questions being addressed with reference 
to participants, interventions, 
comparisons, outcomes, and study 
design (PICOS).  
Yes. The statement is “to identify relevant 
technical and operational aspects and 
effectiveness attributes that could affect 
the performance of AMR surveillance 
systems around the world, and review the 
evaluation processes that have been used 
for these systems”.  
METHODS   
Protocol and 
registration  
5 Indicate if a review protocol exists, if 
and where it can be accessed (e.g., Web 
address), and, if available, provide 
registration information including 
registration number.  
Not applicable 
Eligibility 
criteria  
6 Specify study characteristics (e.g., 
PICOS, length of follow-up) and report 
characteristics (e.g., years considered, 
language, publication status) used as 
criteria for eligibility, giving rationale.  
Yes. This is a descriptive systematic 
review. We defined the time range of 
search for any published reports in 
English or French. Criteria for inclusion 
of reports were also described. 
Information 
sources  
7 Describe all information sources (e.g., 
databases with dates of coverage, 
contact with study authors to identify 
additional studies) in the search and date 
last searched.  
Yes, we listed the databases used for 
search. 
Search  8 Present full electronic search strategy for 
at least one database, including any 
limits used, such that it could be 
repeated.  
Yes, the key words used for search were 
provided. 
Study selection  9 State the process for selecting studies 
(i.e., screening, eligibility, included in 
systematic review, and, if applicable, 
included in the meta-analysis).  
Yes, the process was described. 
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Data collection 
process  
10 Describe method of data extraction from 
reports (e.g., piloted forms, 
independently, in duplicate) and any 
processes for obtaining and confirming 
data from investigators.  
We described the data that were 
extracted, duplicates were also removed. 
For the purpose of this PhD, we only used 
information provided (published) in the 
reports, so we did not attempt to contact 
the authors for further information. 
Data items  11 List and define all variables for which 
data were sought (e.g., PICOS, funding 
sources) and any assumptions and 
simplifications made.  
We defined all variables in relation to the 
surveillance systems being reported in 
each of the paper. 
Risk of bias in 
individual 
studies  
12 Describe methods used for assessing risk 
of bias of individual studies (including 
specification of whether this was done at 
the study or outcome level), and how 
this information is to be used in any data 
synthesis.  
This is not applicable in this systematic 
review because we reviewed all 
information and synthesized all 
information descriptively.  
Summary 
measures  
13 State the principal summary measures 
(e.g., risk ratio, difference in means).  
We only reported count and proportions. 
Synthesis of 
results  
14 Describe the methods of handling data 
and combining results of studies, if 
done, including measures of consistency 
(e.g., I2) for each meta-analysis.  
We only used a narrative approach to 
summarize the data. 
Risk of bias 
across studies  
15 Specify any assessment of risk of bias 
that may affect the cumulative evidence 
(e.g., publication bias, selective 
reporting within studies).  
Not applicable due to the nature of this 
review which is limited to a narrative 
review. 
Additional 
analyses  
16 Describe methods of additional analyses 
(e.g., sensitivity or subgroup analyses, 
meta-regression), if done, indicating 
which were pre-specified.  
Not applicable. 
RESULTS   
Study selection  17 Give numbers of studies screened, 
assessed for eligibility, and included in 
the review, with reasons for exclusions 
at each stage, ideally with a flow 
diagram.  
Yes, this was provided. 
Study 
characteristics  
18 For each study, present characteristics 
for which data were extracted (e.g., 
study size, PICOS, follow-up period) 
and provide the citations.  
A table of all reports on AMR 
surveillance systems was provided with 
citation and relevant characteristics. 
Risk of bias 
within studies  
19 Present data on risk of bias of each study 
and, if available, any outcome level 
assessment (see item 12).  
Not applicable. 
Results of 
individual 
studies  
20 For all outcomes considered (benefits or 
harms), present, for each study: (a) 
simple summary data for each 
intervention group (b) effect estimates 
and confidence intervals, ideally with a 
forest plot.  
Not applicable. 
Synthesis of 
results  
21 Present results of each meta-analysis 
done, including confidence intervals and 
measures of consistency.  
Not applicable. 
Risk of bias 
across studies  
22 Present results of any assessment of risk 
of bias across studies (see Item 15).  
Not applicable. 
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Additional 
analysis  
23 Give results of additional analyses, if 
done (e.g., sensitivity or subgroup 
analyses, meta-regression [see Item 16]).  
Not applicable. 
DISCUSSION   
Summary of 
evidence  
24 Summarize the main findings including 
the strength of evidence for each main 
outcome; consider their relevance to key 
groups (e.g., healthcare providers, users, 
and policy makers).  
Yes, we summarized the main findings 
and identified the gaps in the current 
literature on AMR surveillance systems 
worldwide. 
Limitations  25 Discuss limitations at study and outcome 
level (e.g., risk of bias), and at review-
level (e.g., incomplete retrieval of 
identified research, reporting bias).  
Study-level limitations were mentioned 
throughout the discussion. We did not 
specifically discussed review-level 
limitations as this review includes all 
papers on AMR surveillance systems to 
the time of search and we did not 
examine the reporting bias in the 
published data. 
Conclusions  26 Provide a general interpretation of the 
results in the context of other evidence, 
and implications for future research.  
Yes, these were reflected in the 
conclusion section of this chapter. 
FUNDING   
Funding  27 Describe sources of funding for the 
systematic review and other support 
(e.g., supply of data); role of funders for 
the systematic review.  
This was described in my 
acknowledgement section for the whole 
thesis. 
Checklist was from:  Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PLoS Med 6(7): e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097  
 
 
 
Figure 1a: AMRSS in INSPEAR program (1998) 
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Figure 1b: AMRSS in Alexandrer Project (2000) 
 
Figure 1c: AMRSS in ARESC program (2006) 
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Figure 1d: AMRSS in CAESAR program (2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 1e: AMRSS in Euro-GASP program (2016) 
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Figure 1f: AMRSS in EARS-Net program (2017) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1g: AMRSS in SENTRY program (2017) 
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Chapter 2 
Table S2.1: Specialized hospitals participating in VINARES surveillance system 
Hospital Period of VINARES Type Target population 
National Hospital for Tropical 
Disease 
2012 – 2013 
2016 - 2017 
Infectious disease Patient in the north of 
Viet Nam 
Hospital for Tropical Disease 2012 – 2013 
2016 – 2017 
Infectious disease Patient in the south of 
Viet Nam 
Children Hospital 2012 – 2013 
2016 – 2017 
Children Patient in the south of 
Viet Nam 
Viet Duc Hospital 2012 – 2013 Surgical Patient in the north of 
Viet Nam 
National Children's Hospital 2012 – 2013 Children Patient in the north of 
Viet Nam 
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Chapter 3 
Table S3.1.1: Patient and samples characteristics for the nine indicator bacteria 
Characteristic 
n (%) 
Escherichia 
coli 
(n = 4 437) 
Klebsiella spp. 
(n = 3 290) 
Acinetobacter 
spp.  
(n = 2 895) 
Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa  
(n = 2 326) 
Staphylococcus 
 aureus  
(n = 2 039) 
Enterobacter 
spp.  
(n = 1067) 
Streptococcus  
pneumoniae  
(n = 813) 
Haemophilus 
influenzae  
(n = 404) 
Enterococcus 
faecium  
(n = 98) 
Sex 3 776 2 740 2 230 1 951 1713 988 633 396 58 
- Female 1 709 (45) 940 (34) 753 (34) 656 (34) 585 (34) 373 (38) 216 (34) 136 (34) 26 (45) 
- Male 2 067 (55) 1 800 (66) 1 477 (66) 1 295 (66) 1 128 (66) 615 (62) 417 (66) 260 (66) 32 (55) 
Age group 4 339 2 944 2 427 2 273 1 779 1 029 480 177 62 
- 0 to 10 years 631 (15) 453 (15) 385 (16) 366 (16) 485 (27) 145 (14) 427 (89) 152 (86) 17 (27) 
- 11 to 20 years 252 (6) 116 (4) 147 (6) 164 (7) 161 (9) 55 (5) 8 (2) 2 (1) 3 (5) 
- 21 to 40 years 809 (19) 490 (17) 424 (17) 462 (20) 442 (25) 204 (20) 10 (2) 7 (4) 10 (16) 
- 41 to 60 years 1 261 (29) 786 (27) 585 (24) 620 (27) 348 (20) 269 (26) 10 (2) 7 (4) 17 (27) 
- 61 years or older 1 386 (32) 1 099 (37) 886 (37) 661 (29) 343 (19) 356 (35) 25 (5) 9 (5) 15 (24) 
Specimen 4 437 3 290 2 895 2 326 2039 1067 813 404 98 
- nasopharyngeal 
swab 
6 (0) 15 (0) 6 (0) 11 (0) 28 (1) 12 (1) 11 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
- pus 555 (13) 243 (7) 148 (5) 225 (10) 538 (26) 92 (9) 10 (1) 5 (1) 14 (14) 
- stool 143 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 
- urine 992 (22) 246 (7) 165 (6) 185 (8) 50 (2) 160 (15) 0 (0) 0 (0) 18 (18) 
- vaginal swab 85 (2) 14 (0) 3 (0) 3 (0) 35 (2) 31 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (2) 
- wound swab 168 (4) 79 (2) 50 (2) 65 (3) 204 (10) 61 (6) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
- blood 508 (11) 369 (11) 294 (10) 141 (6) 246 (12) 75 (7) 49 (6) 6 (1) 21 (21) 
- CSF 19 (0.4) 44 (1) 19 (1) 13 (1) 12 (1) 7 (1) 38 (5) 4 (1) 3 (3) 
- sputum 172 (4) 574 (17) 720 (25) 430 (18) 237 (12) 210 (20) 489 (60) 287 (71) 2 (2) 
- others 1 789 (40) 1 706 (52) 1 490 (51) 1 251 (54) 687 (34) 419 (39) 215 (26) 101 (25) 38 (39) 
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Table S3.1.2: Number of percentages of antimicrobial susceptibility test of pathogen – antimicrobial combinations by hospital 
Bacteria 
Antibio
tic H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14 H15 H16 
S. aureus VAN 0/120(0) 
13/17(7
6) 0/26(0) 
70/70(100
) 
12/98(12
) 0/18(0) 
14/137(1
0) 
29/29(100
) 0/80(0) 0/99(0) 
113/114(9
9) 0/80(0) 
99/109(
91) 
54/201(2
7) 
97/97(10
0) 0/57(0) 
S. aureus OXA 7/120(6) 0/17(0) 0/26(0) 
70/70(100
) 1/98(1) 0/18(0) 0/137(0) 
29/29(100
) 0/80(0) 0/99(0) 0/114(0) 0/80(0) 
18/109(
17) 0/201(0) 0/97(0) 0/57(0) 
S. aureus FOX 
92/120(7
7) 
16/17(9
4) 
26/26(10
0) 
70/70(100
) 
67/98(68
) 0/18(0) 
37/137(2
7) 
29/29(100
) 
75/80(94
) 
60/99(61
) 0/114(0) 76/80(95) 
99/109(
91) 
143/201(
71) 
95/97(98
) 
57/57(10
0) 
S. 
pneumoniae PEN 0/13(0)  0/19(0)  0/4(0) 0/3(0)  6/7(86) 0/8(0) 0/2(0) 0/332(0) 0/10(0) 4/12(33) 
75/186(4
0) 0/1(0) 0/1(0) 
E. faecium VAN  5/7(71) 2/2(100) 
15/15(100
) 2/2(100)   4/5(80) 8/9(89)  6/6(100) 
13/13(100
)   1/1(100)  
E. coli IPM 
317/338(
94) 
17/17(1
00) 
160/161(
99) 59/60(98) 
68/119(5
7) 
23/23(1
00) 
159/428(
37) 
100/100(1
00) 
155/156(
99) 
127/132(
96) 
162/162(1
00) 
99/102(97
) 0/10(0) 
50/167(3
0) 
226/414(
55) 
171/259(
66) 
E. coli SXT 
108/338(
32) 
11/17(6
5) 
159/161(
99) 56/60(93) 
64/119(5
4) 9/23(39) 
95/428(2
2) 
100/100(1
00) 
32/156(2
1) 
60/132(4
5) 0/162(0) 
100/102(9
8) 5/10(50) 
100/167(
60) 
336/414(
81) 
253/259(
98) 
E. coli TOB 
112/338(
33) 
15/17(8
8) 0/161(0) 0/60(0) 
108/119(
91) 0/23(0) 
186/428(
43) 0/100(0) 2/156(1) 
124/132(
94) 
161/162(9
9) 
98/102(96
) 0/10(0) 
143/167(
86) 0/414(0) 
129/259(
50) 
Klebsiella 
spp. IPM 
188/204(
92) 9/9(100) 
34/34(10
0) 80/83(96) 
93/184(5
1) 
31/31(1
00) 
45/140(3
2) 23/24(96) 
96/96(10
0) 
62/63(98
) 
142/143(9
9) 
133/133(1
00) 
71/78(9
1) 
13/65(20
) 
109/175(
62) 
97/122(8
0) 
Klebsiella 
spp. SXT 
72/204(3
5) 1/9(11) 
34/34(10
0) 79/83(95) 
100/184(
54) 
17/31(5
5) 
33/140(2
4) 23/24(96) 
26/96(27
) 
28/63(44
) 0/143(0) 
133/133(1
00) 
52/78(6
7) 
51/65(78
) 
144/175(
82) 
119/122(
98) 
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Klebsiella 
spp. TOB 
70/204(3
4) 6/9(67) 0/34(0) 0/83(0) 
173/184(
94) 0/31(0) 
57/140(4
1) 0/24(0) 3/96(3) 
52/63(83
) 
142/143(9
9) 
133/133(1
00) 
72/78(9
2) 
52/65(80
) 0/175(0) 
73/122(6
0) 
Enterobacter 
spp. IPM 
106/114(
93)  
10/10(10
0) 1/1(100) 8/16(50) 1/1(100) 
21/46(46
)  
22/22(10
0) 
72/73(99
) 
22/22(100
) 
19/19(100
) 
19/20(9
5) 
21/175(1
2) 
64/98(65
) 
24/31(77
) 
Enterobacter 
spp. SXT 
36/114(3
2)  
10/10(10
0) 1/1(100) 
10/16(62
) 0/1(0) 
14/46(30
)  5/22(23) 
34/73(47
) 0/22(0) 
19/19(100
) 
15/20(7
5) 
140/175(
80) 
85/98(87
) 
31/31(10
0) 
Enterobacter 
spp. TOB 
35/114(3
1)  0/10(0) 0/1(0) 
16/16(10
0) 0/1(0) 
27/46(59
)  2/22(9) 
68/73(93
) 
22/22(100
) 17/19(89) 
19/20(9
5) 
77/175(4
4) 0/98(0) 
16/31(52
) 
Acinetobacter 
spp. IPM 
140/158(
89) 
14/14(1
00) 
86/87(99
) 
302/302(1
00) 0/172(0) 
15/15(1
00) 
32/93(34
) 
15/15(100
) 
87/88(99
) 
46/47(98
) 4/49(8) 
160/161(9
9) 9/13(69) 1/11(9) 
111/121(
92) 
44/59(75
) 
P. aeruginosa IPM 
66/80(82
) 2/2(100) 
46/46(10
0) 
43/43(100
) 0/113(0) 
14/14(1
00) 
28/115(2
4) 8/8(100) 
52/53(98
) 
43/44(98
) 
51/51(100
) 
142/144(9
9) 
46/50(9
2) 
31/94(33
) 
154/163(
94) 
39/55(71
) 
H. influenzae AMC   0/5(0) 0/1(0)   0/1(0)  2/7(29)  
214/217(9
9) 7/8(88) 3/3(100) 0/61(0)   
H. influenzae AMP   0/5(0) 1/1(100)   0/1(0)  0/7(0)  
214/217(9
9) 0/8(0) 0/3(0) 0/61(0)   
Blank cells represent that no isolate was detected in that hospital; VAN: Vancomycin; OXA: Oxacillin; FOX: Cefoxitin; PEN: Penicillin; IPM: Imipenem; SXT: 
Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; TOB: Tobramycin; AMC: Amoxicillin/clavulanic acid; AMP: Ampicillin; pathogen – antimicrobial combinations were selected using 
priority pathogen list recommended by World Health Organization (http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/WHO-PPL-Short_Summary_25Feb-ET_NM_WHO.pdf).  
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Table S3.2.1: Antimicrobial susceptibility testing results by hospital type 
Resistant / Tested 
(%) 
Acinetobacter spp. (N=2469) E. coli (N=4001) S. aureus (N=1534) 
 National Provincial Specialised National Provincial Specialised National Provincial Specialised 
Carbapenem 1979/2413 
(82) 
432/632 
(68) 
444/577 
(77) 
466/3801 (12) 370/3253 (11) 125/1776 (7)    
Cephalosporins 2053/2377 
(86) 
464/637 
(73) 
452/535 
(84) 
2670/3541 
(75) 
1730/2884 
(60) 
1041/1770 
(59) 
   
ESBL    2145/3726 
(58) 
1541/2371 
(65) 
399/856 (47)    
MRSA       827/1032 
(80) 
425/677 
(63) 
572/801 
(71) 
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Table S3.2.2: Resistant proportion of priority bacteria-antimicrobial combinations in all specimens and in blood and CSF, in 2012 and 2016. Decreasing resistant proportion 
were highlighted 
*: Intermediate and Resistant; **: Screened with oxacillin   
Resistant /  
Tested (%) 
Bacteria All specimens Blood and CSF (stool for Salmonella spp. and 
Shigella spp.) 
    2012 (16 hospitals) 2012 (13 hospitals) 2016 2012 (16 hospitals) 2012 (13 hospitals) 2016 
ESBL E. coli 1337/1928 (69) 626/844 (74) 4085/6953 (59) 126/183 (69) 59/81 (73) 655/1107 (59) 
ESBL K. pneumoniae 887/1400 (63) 555/815 (68) 1186/2958 (40) 91/172 (53) 34/61 (56) 128/365 (35) 
Imipenem A. baumannii 1 495/2 138 (70) 1056/1584 (67) 2769/3551 (78) 110/244 (45) 85/205 (41) 100/178 (56) 
Imipenem E. coli 180/2 977 (6) 145/2111 (7) 687/8438 (8) 15/403 (4) 9/309 (3) 92/1410 (7) 
Imipenem K. pneumoniae 393/2 294 (17) 259/1697 (15) 891/3647 (24) 64/361 (18) 26/233 (11) 91/454 (20) 
Imipenem P. aeruginosa 578/1 765 (33) 322/996 (32) 1403/3220 (44) 36/129 (28) 22/88 (25) 49/135 (36) 
MRSA S. aureus 1 098/1 580 (69) 950/1303 (73) 1824/2510 (73) 145/197 (74) 130/171 (76) 372/521 (71) 
Vancomycin* S. aureus 28/823 (3.4) 10/372 (2) 45/2680 (2) 5/135 (3.7) 0/65 (0) 7/565 (1) 
Penicillin S. pneumoniae 115/344 (33)** 115/341 (34)** 657/794 (83) 7/30 (23) ** 7/30 (23) *** 42/100 (42) 
Vancomycin E. faecium 20/79 (25) 20/79 (25) 91/290 (31) 2/14 (14) 2/14 (14) 13/51 (25) 
Ampicillin H. influenzae 160/226 (71) 1/1 (100) 804/911 (88) 3/5 (60) 1/1 (100) 7/8 (88) 
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Ceftriaxone E. coli 2342/4 192 (56) 776/1472 (53) 5051/7049 (72) 240/514 (47) 114/234 (49) 912/1324 (69) 
Ceftriaxone K. pneumoniae 1479/2 227 (66) 626/1380 (45) 1912/3436 (56) 101/190 (53) 63/175 (36) 214/435 (49) 
Ceftriaxone S. pneumoniae 90/358 (25) 31/299 (10.4) 57/352 (16) 9/52 (17) 4/47 (8.5) 17/125 (14) 
*: Intermediate and Resistant; **: Combination result of oxacillin screening and penicillin MIC test 
 
